IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1121

International Court of Justice

Filed Nov. 28, 1945
H B Willing
Secy.

N

H-1121

H1121-0002

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, et al

defendants

DOCUMENT BOOK

"N"

In re: AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U.S. Chief of Counsel

To be argued by: SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN

Of Counsel:

SIDNEY J. KAPLAN
Commander, USCGR

HAROLD LEVENTHAL
Lt. Commander, USCGR

Exhibit U.S.a. 74
Filed Nov. 29,1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-102
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-5/C-102

Berlin, 11.3.38.

H1121-0003

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
OKW L I a Nr. 420/38 g.Kdos.

30 Copies
11th Copy

Referring to: Operation OTTO.

TOP SECRET

1) If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

2) The whole operation will be directed by myself.

According to my instructions:

The Ob.d.H. will direct the land operations with the 8th Army in the formation and strength suggested to me, and with the attachments of the Air Force, the SS and police (see appendix).

The Ob.d.L. will direct the air operations with the forces suggested to me.

3) Operational duties:

a) Army
The invasion of Austria must be carried out in the manner explained to me. The Army's first target is the occupation of upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Austria, the Tyrol, the speedy occupation of Vienna and the securing of the Austro-Czech frontier.

b) Air Force
The Air Force must demonstrate and drop propaganda material, occupy Austrian aerodromes for the use of further possible reinforcements, assist the Army upon demand as necessary, apart from that, hold bomber units in readiness for special tasks.

4) The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

5) The behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms

Austrian units who come over to us, immediately come under German Command.

6) On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.

Signed A. HITLER

Translator's Note: This document bears the initials of Jodl, Keitel and one other which is undecipherable.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C 102

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am throughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 102.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

Exhibit U.S.A. 75
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 103
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-5/C-103

A T 16/38 "Ocl"

Berlin, 11 March 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 428/38 Top Secret L. IA.

40 Copies
6th Copy

Pencil note: -C-in-C Navy
is informed.

TOP SECRET

Special instructions No. 1
to "The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 427/38
Top Secret L IA of 11.3.38."

Directive:

for policy towards Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.

1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.

2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrain Question.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By order
JODL

DISTRIBUTION:
as Directive No. 1

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-103

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 103.

GERARD SCHAEFER,
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

Exhibit U.S.A. 69
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

H1121-0006

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-175 (EXTRACTS)
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Translated Extracts)

S.O. Top Secret

Berlin, 24.6.1937
S.O. only
(Stamp) Access only by an Officer.

The Reich Minister for War
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Nr. 55/37 g.K, S.O. only L. Ia

4 Copies
2nd Copy.

Subject: " Directive 1937/38"

Reference: W.A. 36/36 S.O. Only L Ia v. 26.6.36.

(Remark in ink)
AI op. 34/37 Gkdos Chefs'
Received 25.6.

Written by an Officer.

Outgoing documents in connection with this matter, and dealing with it in principle, are to be written by an officer.

Marginal Remark in ink: AIop.24/36

Enclosed "Directive for Unified Preparation for war of the Armed Forces" comes into force from 1.7.1937. At the same time the "Directive for the unified preparation of a possible war by W.A.,* Army, Navy and Air Force" (W.A. 36/36 S.O. only LIa of 26.6.36.) will be cancelled and is to be returned to W.A. (L.Ia) with covering letter by 10.7.37.

I request the forwarding to me of the results of the considerations to be made, according to part 3 of the Directive by 1.9.37.

(signed) v. Blomberg

Distribution:

Ob.d.H. (C.in C. Army)	1 Covering letter (Copy 1),	1 Directive (Copy 1)
Ob.d.M. (C.in C. Navy)	1 " " (Copy 2),	1 " (Copy 2)
R.d.L. and Ob.d.L. (Reich Minister for Air and C.in C. Air Force)	1 Covering letter (Copy 3)	1 Directive (Copy 3)
W.A. (L)	1 " " (Copy 4)	2 Directives (Copies 4 & 5)

* W.A. - Branches of the Armed Forces

(Remark in ink): MI op. 34/37 Gkdos Chefs.

H1121 - 0007

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Berlin, 24 June 37
55/37 g K. Chefsache L 1a

5 copies
Copy No. 2

Written by an Officer

Top Secret
Only through an officer

AI op 34/37 Gkds Chefs

Directive

For the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces.

(valid from 1. 7.37. until presumably 30.9.1938)

Contents

		Page
Part 1.	General Guiding Principles	3 to 8
Part 2.	Likely Warlike Eventualities (Concentrations)	9 to 17
Part 3.	Special Preparations	18 to 22

Part 1.

General Guiding Principles

1). The general political position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of States and of Russia in particular.

The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by German. Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.

a). to counter attacks at any time

b). to enable the military exploitation of politically favourable opportunities should they occur.

Preparations of the Armed Forces for a possible war in the Mobilization Period 1937/38 must be made with this in mind. They must therefore be prepared for various possibilities and will be apportioned according to:

a). General Preparations (vide Para 2)

b). Work on warlike eventualities, which owing to their probability stand high on the list, the shape of concentration plans with the participation of the organization detailed below (vide Para 3).

c). Special preparations in the shape of studies and considerations, generally however only within the High Commands (Special preparations vide Para 4).

2). The preparations of a general nature include:

a). The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament and

full preparedness for war.

b). The further working on "Monilization without public announcement" in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.

c). The working on the transport of the balk of the regular army from East Prussia to the Reich.

d). Preparatory measures in case German territory is violated suddenly by a foreign power with hostile intention.

*

3). Among the probable warlike eventualities for which concentration plans will be drafted are:

I). War on two fronts with the centre of gravity in the West (Concentration "Red")

II). War on two fronts with the centre of gravity in the South East (Concentration "Green")

for details see part 2 of the Directive.

4). Special preparations are to be made for the following cases:

I). Armed intervention against Austria (Special case Otto)

II). Warlike entanglement with Red Spain (Special case Richard)

III). England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us. (Special case "Enlargement Red/Green")

**

5). ***

The Directive for the conduct of war itself and the drawing up of the objects of war, which depend on the political and also the general military and economic situation at the beginning of a war, will be given through me by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander.

(signed) Blomberg.

Part 2.

Probable warlike eventualities.
(Concentrations)

I). War on two fronts with centre of gravity West.
(Concentration "Red")

Translator's Notes

* Full detals follow of limits of authority of Local Commanders in this event.

**Assumption is to be made that Germany will have no allies at first anyway.

***Liaison must be carried out between branches on the basis of this directive which covers only the opening stages of a war.

H1121 - 0009

****

II). War on two fronts with centre of gravity South East (Concentration "Green")*****

1). Suppositions. The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. For such an action the political conditions in accordance with international law must be created beforehand.

*****

2). The task of the German Armed Forces is to prepare in such a way that the bulk of the whole strength can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as a rear cover for this attack.
The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate completely, for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armedforces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.

******

Part 3.

Special Preparations.

The following special cases are to be considered inside the High Commands, in general without participation by outside authorities.

I). Special Case "Otto".

"Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy".

The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration.

Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna and will break any resistance.

****

Translator's Notes:-

**** Suppositions regarding neutrals are detailed. The opening of war may be in the nature of a surprise attack by the French army and air force.
The German Armed Forces must be prepared to employ its main strength in the West. Details of tasks of (a) Army, (b) Navy and (c) Air Force are given.

***** The whole of 2 has been revised at a later date and has a pencil stroke through it.

****** Possible enemies and neutrals are then detailed.

******* Para 3 details the tasks of Army, Air Force and Navy.

******** "Otto" is to be prepared as an isolated action although "Green" may develop from it.

H1121 - 0010

II). Special Case "Richard".

"Warlike entanglements with Red Spain".

The Spanish Civil War contains the danger that, though accidental or provoked incidents, conflict may arise between Germany and Red Spain which can lead to a state of war between the two governments.

For this case preparatory considerations are to be made only by the Navy. For the Army and Air Force it will remain a matter of assistance for White Spain with material and personnel, as has been the previous procedure. Placing of parts of the Air Force under command of the Navy may come into question.

III). Special case "Enlargement Red/Green".

The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans "Red and Green" can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania, or all three countries mentioned, join the side of our opponents from the beginning of the war.

Thereon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland.

Nevertheless considerations are to be made as supplements to concentration plans "Red and Green" for the eventuality of the failure of this intention of the political leadership.

The following conditions are to be the basis for the considerations:-

a). England.
England will employ all her available economic and military means against us. She will at first support France with sea and air forces and eventually try to win Belgium and Holland as bases.

b). Poland.
That Poland should take part in an opening of hostilities against us, where possible at the side of Russia, is, in the present political situation, more than improbable. Should it nevertheless come to this, then Poland's land concentration against Germany would take place in a form which is, in its essence, known to us, in order to gain first of all East Prussia and, co-operating with Czechoslovakia, Silesia.
With her Air Force, apart from using parts against East Prussia, she will take part in a Czech-Russian attack against the Reich, and at sea she will co-operate with the Russian Fleet to interrupt the connection between East Prussia and the Reich.

c). Lithuania.
Lithuania will, above all, serve the Russian Air Force as an advanced base. An attack on land need only be reckoned with in combination with Poland or after the arrival of Russian Army forces in Lithuania.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. C-175

13 November 1945.

I, D. E. SHERRIFF, Second Officer, WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-175.

D.E. SHERRIFF,
2/O, WRNS,
36482.

Exhibit U.S.A. 77
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

SEC 24-10/C-182

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-182
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW L 1 a No. 427/38 Top Secret

Berlin, 11th March 1938
2045 hours.

C-in-C Navy
(pencil note) has been informed

35 Copies
6th Copy

Re: Operation Otto

Directive No. 2

1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.

2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

I expect the set objectives to be reached, by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

signed Adolf HITLER

initialled by JODL
and possibly WARLIMONT

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-182

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 269 PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1121-0012

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-150
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
Exhibit USA. 65 (L-150)
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

S t r e n g v e r t r a u l i c h.

Aktennotiz
ueber die Unterhaltung zwischen William C. Bullitt, amerikanischer Gesandter in Frankreich und dem deutschen Aussenminister von Neurath am 18. Mai 1936 in Berlin.

Am 18. Mai besuchte ich den Aussenminister von Neurath und hatte ein langes Gespraech mit ihm ueber die allgemeine Lage in Europa.

Von Neurath sagte, die Politik der deutschen Regierung waere, in Auslandssachen nichts zu unternehmen bis "das Rheinland verdaut sei". Er erklaerte, dass er damit sagen wolle, dass die deutsche Regierung alles tun wuerde, einen Aufstand der Nationalsozialisten in Oesterreich zu verhindern eher denn zu ermutigen, und dass sie sich auch mit Bezug auf die Tschechoslovakei zurueckhalten wuerde, bis die deutschen Befestigungen an der franzoesischen und belgischen Grenze fertiggestellt waeren. "Sobald unsere Befestigungen gebaut sind und die mitteleuropaeischen Laender merken, dass Frankreich nicht jederzeit deutsches Gebiet betreten kann, werden diese Laender ihre Aussenpolitik aendern und eine neue Konstellation wird sich bilden" sagte er.

Wir besprachen dann die Position der kleinen Entente und von Neurath sagte, dass er mir mit absoluter Gewissheit versichern koennte, dass Yugoslavien bestimmt die Sowjet-Regierung nicht anerkennen werde. Yugoslavien hatte sich absolut geweigert, sich mit Rumaenien und der Tschechoslovakei in einem Block unter russischer Oberherrschaft zu vereinen. Er sagte, dass Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Yugoslavien sich sehr verbessert haetten. Die letztere Bemerkung war von etwas aehnlichem wie einem Blinkeln begleitet, welches ich dahin auslegte, dass irgendeine bestimmte Vereinbarung zwischen Deutschland und Yugoslavien zustande gekommen war.

Als wir ueber Frankreich sprachen, sagte er, er koenne beschwoeren, dass Hitlers groesster Wunsch eine wirkliche Verstaendigung mit Frankreich waere. Er fuegte hinzu, dass ich doch von vielen Unterhaltungen, die wir im Laufe der Jahre ueber dieses Thema gefuehrt haetten, wisse, dass der Kern seiner persoenlichen Aussenpolitik die Herbeifuehrung einer franzoesich-deutschen Verstaendigung waere. Er sagte weiter, dass er ungemein bedaure, dass heute nicht die geringste Chance zu einer Versoehnung zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland zu bestehen scheine. Er versicherte, dass jeder Versuch, den er oder Hitler gemacht haette, den Franzosen naeher zu kommen, entweder keine Antwort oder eine Abfuhr gebracht haette.

Von Neurath erklaerte, dass kein Uebereinkommen zwischen Deutschland und Italien erreicht worden waere und er gab zu, dass die Freundschaftsdemonstrationen zwischen Deutschland und Italien lediglich Demonstrationen waeren, die in Wirklichkeit keine Basis haetten. Er fuhr fort, dass er im Moment keinen Weg saehe, die gegensaetzlichen Interessen von Deutschland und Italien an Oesterreich in Einklang zu bringen. Er sagte, dass es drei Haupt-

H1121 - 0013

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-150
CONT'D

gruende gaebe, derentwegen Deutschland im Moment darauf draenge, dass die oesterreichischen Nationalsozialisten sich ruhig verhielten. Der erste Grund war, dass Mussolini heute den groesssten Teil seiner Armee an der oesterreichischen Grenze mobilisiert habe, bereit zuzuschlagen und dass er sicher zuschlagen wuerde, wenn er eine gute Ausrede faende. Der zweite Grund, die oesterreichischen Nationalsozialisten im Moment ruhig zu halten, war die taegliche Zunahme der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung in Oesterreich. Die Jugend Oesterreichs wende sich mehr und mehr den Nationalsozialisten zu und die Herrschaft der nationalsozialistischen Partei in Oesterreich waere unvermeidlich und nur eine Frage der Zeit.

Was England anbetrifft, sagte er, bedauere er sehr, dass keine wirklich freundlichen Beziehungen zwischen der deutschen und britischen Regierung hergestellt werden konnten. Ich frug ihn, ob er damit sagen wolle, dass er nicht mit Eden oder dem britischen Gesandten in Berlin gesprochen habe oder sprechen koenne, einfach und gerade wie er mit mir spraeche. Er antwortete, dass er dies absolut nicht tun koenne und dass dies gaenzlich unmoeglich waere. Ich fragte ihn, was er ueber die britische Politik denkt was Deutschland betrifft. Er antwortete, dass er in der letzten Woche zu Hitler gesagt haette, dass er eine freundschaftliche Geste der Englaender erwarte, die wahrscheinlich in Form einer privaten Erklaerung gemacht werden wuerde, in welcher England sagen wird, dass es keine moralischen Bedenken haette ueber den Anschluss der oesterreichischen Deutschen an die deutsche Republik. Er fuhr fort, dass er und Hitler auf dieses Manoever vollkommen vorbereitet waeren und dass der wirkliche Wunsch Englands waere, Deutschland in einen Streit mit Italien zu verwickeln durch einen nationalsozialistischen Coup d'etat in Oesterreich. "Aber wir haben nicht die Absicht", sagte er, "fuer die Englaender in Europa die Kastanien aus dem Feuer zu holen. Unsere Politik ist eine deutsche Politik und nichts weiter."

Wir besprachen die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjet-Regierung. Von Neurath sagte, dass er es fuer unmoeglich hielte, dass die Feindseligkeiten zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjet-Union beseitigt werden koennten. Er versicherte mir, dass die Sowjet-Union das nationalsozialistische Deutschland als das einzige Hindernis betrachte, das der Eroberung von Europa durch den Kommunismus im Wege stehe. Darum wuerden die Feinseligkeiten zwischen den beiden Laendern nie enden. Er versicherte mir, dass die deutsche geheime Polizei kuerzlich herausgefunden habe, dass die Sowjetregierung durch die Komintern die kommunistische Bewegung in Deutschland mit groesserer Intensivitaet denn je betreibe.

In Bezug auf die inneren Angelegenheiten, insbesondere die Ernennung Goerings als Schachts Vorgesetzter, machte Neurath die folgenden Aussagen:
Er sagte, dass vor ungefaehr zwei Monaten Hitler ihm gesagt habe, dass es absolut noetig waere, etwas zu tun, um Schacht vor den Angriffen gewisser nationalistischer Stellen und Personen, welche die Gewohnheit haetten, Devisen in grossen Mengen ohne Schachts Erlaubnis zu gebrauchen, zu schuetzen. Ich fragte ihn, welche Stellen er meine, und er sagte, dass das Propaganda-Ministerium unter Goebbels die schlimmste sei und Millionen fuer auslaendische Propaganda ausgegeben haette, die gar keine Erfolge gebracht haette. Er versicherte, dass Hitler ihm

H1121 - 0014

gesagt habe, dass es ihm wuenschenswert erscheine, Schacht mit der breiten Figur Goerings, der grosses Prestige und Macht im Lande und der nationalsozialistischen Partei habe, zu schuetzen. Er versicherte mir, dass das Arrangement mit der Zustimmung Doktor Schachts gemacht worden waere und dass es sehr gut funktioniere.
Er sagte, Schacht und Goering saessen gemeinsam einer wichtigen Konferenz ueber Wirtschaftsfragen vor und dass Goering nur eingreife, wenn gewisse Parteichefs sich weigerten, Schachts Autoritaet anzuerkennen. Er erklaerte, dass er glaube, das gegenwaertige Arrangement wuerde befriedigende Resultate zeigen und dass es von laengerem Bestand sein wuerde.

Ich wies von Neurath darauf hin, dass es mir sehr unklug erscheine, zu einem Zeitpunkt, an dem soviel britische Unterstuetzung wie moeglich erwuenscht ist, die Kolonialfrage unnoetigerweise aufzubringen, nachdem er mir doch in einer frueheren Unterhaltung gesagt habe, dass die Kolonien, die Deutschland zurueckbekommen moechte, nicht genuegend Rohstoff stellen koennten, um eine Besserung der deutschen Wirtschaftslage herbeizufuehren. Er erwiderte, dass er seine Meinung etwas geaendert habe, seit er mit mir ueber diese Frage gesprochen haette und dass einige der Kolonien sehr nuetzlich sein koennten, besonders Kamerun. In weiteren Bemerkungen schien er anzudeuten, dass Deutschland versuchen wuerde, Kamerun zu bekommen, aber dass es im Moment keine weiteren Kolonialansprueche durchzusetzen versuchen werde.

Ich fragte von Neurath, wann er das britische Frageschreiben ueber die Bedeutung von Hitlers Friedensvorschlaegen beantworten wuerde. Er antwortete, dass die deutsche Regierung sich Zeit lassen wuerde, bevor sie antworte und dass die Antwort sicher nicht in naechster Zeit gegeben werden wuerde.
Er fuhr fort, dass die ganze Angelegenheit der britischen Frageschrift von dem Britischen Aussenministerium gaenzlich verpfuscht worden sei. Er sagte, dass Sir Eric Phipps ihm das Schreiben gebracht habe mit dem Ersuchen, dessen Inhalt absolut geheim zu halten und dass er absolutes Schweigen zugesagt habe, da es unmoeglich waere, internationale Abkommen mit Debatten in der Presse zu erreichen. Er sagte, dass zu seinem groessten Erstaunen Sir Eric Phipps ihn spaeter anrief und ihm sagte, dass er es sehr bedauerte, ihm mitteilen zu muessen, dass ein Bruch des Schweigens, den Inhalt des Schreibens betreffend, vorgekommen sei und dass die britische Regierung sich genoetigt fuehle, es am naechsten Morgen zu veroeffentlichen. Von Neurath sagte, er haette Phipps gefragt, ob der Bruch des Schweigens in dem franzoesischen Aussenministerium vorgekommen sei und Sir Eric Phipps haette geantwortet, dass es ihm ausserordentlich leid taete sagen zu muessen, dass der Bruch in London vorgekommen sei.

Von Neurath furh fort, dass, da nun vorgeschlagen worden sei, den Voelkerbund gaenzlich zu reformieren und da einer der Vorschlaege der deutschen Regierung war, dass Deutschland dem Bund beitrete, waere es unmoeglich, Entscheidungen zu treffen oder Aussagen zu machen mit Bezug auf Auslandspolitik bis die Art des neuen Bundes bekannt waere. Er sprach laengere Zeit ueber diese Frage und schien anzudeuten, dass die deutsche Antwort zu dem englischen Schreiben lange verzoegert werden wuerde und dass sie nicht eingehend sein wuerde und dass dieser Mangel an Wesentlichkeit damit entschuldigt werden wuerde, dass es unmoeglich waere, Versprechen bezueglich Aussenpolitik zu machen, bevor die neue Verfassung des Bundes bekannt waere.

H1121 - 0015

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-150
CONT'D

Der Gesamteindruck, den ich von der Unterredung mit von Neurath hatte, war, dass Deutschland versuchen wird, sich ruhig und harmlos zu benehmen, bis die Befestigungen an der franzoesischen und belgischen Grenze fertig sind und dass es waehrend dieses Zeitraumes versuchen wird, jegliche Verpflichtungen zu vermeiden, die es in seinen zukuenftigen Unternehmungen einschraenken koennten.

Was die Tschechoslovakei anbelangt, sagte von Neurath, dass zwar die Tschechen im Moment stark anti-deutsch eingestellt waeren, dass er aber nicht ueberrascht sein wuerde, eine Besserung in den Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Tschechoslovakei zu sehen, die durch die Konstruktion der deutschen Befestigungen an der franzoesischen Grenze verursacht wuerde. Er sagte, dass die deutsche Regierung ebensogut wie die Russen wuesste, dass die ganzen Versprechungen von russischer militaerischer Hilfe an die Tschechoslovakei im Moment Nonsens waeren. Er sagte, dass die russischen Truppen die Tschechoslovakei nicht erreichen koennten und dass russische Flugzeuge nicht so leicht nach der Tschechoslovakei fliegen koennten, da die Russen keine langen Fluege ueber solch schwere Strecken, wie sie zwischen Kiew und Prag liegen, machen koennten.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT L-150

19 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-150.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5
33812169

H1121-0016

 Exhibit U.S.A. 70
Filed Nov. 29 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-151
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Paris, den 23. November 1937

Betreffs: Botschafter Bullitt's Warschauer Besuch.

Streng vertraulich fuer den Sekretaer und Untersekretaer.

(illegible file numbers and letters)

An den
Ehrwuerdigen Herrn Staatssekretaer,

Washington, D.C.

Verehrter Herr!

Ich habe die Ehre zu berichten, dass ich gemaess meines Telegrammes Nr. 1557 vom 4. November, 2 Uhr nachmittags, an die Abteilung und deren Telegramm Nr. 563 an mich vom 4. November, 3 Uhr nachmittags, Paris Sonnabend um 6 Uhr 15 nachmittags verlassen habe, um Botschafter Biddle zu besuchen. Ich kam um 4 Uhr 32 nachmittags am 14. November in Warschau an. Ich verliess Warschau am 17. November um 10 Uhr 20 abends, und traf am 18. November um 8 Uhr morgens in Berlin ein. Ich verliess Berlin am 19. November um 9 Uhr 30 abends, und kam am Sonnabend, 20. November, um 9 Uhr 55 vormittags in Paris an.

Im Verlauf dieser Reise habe ich mit einer Anzahl von Staatsmaennern und Diplomaten gesprochen, und es fiel mir ein, dass die Abteilung in mehr als einem formellen Bericht der Daten meiner Reise interessiert sein koennte. Demgemaess fuege ich Memoranda mit teilweisen Auszuegen der Unterhaltungen wie nachstehend bei:

1. Der polnische Aussenminister, Oberst Joseph Beck, Marschall Smigly-Rydz, und andere polnische Regierungsmitglieder,
2. Der japanische Gesandte in Warschau, Shvichi Sakoh,
3. Der italienische Gesandte in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico,
4. Baron Konstantin von Neurath,
5. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht,
6. General Hermann Goering.

Ihr sehr ergebener

William C. Bullitt

Liste der Anlagen:

1. Memorandum der Unterredung zwischen Gesandtem Bullitt und Oberst Beck, Marschall Smigly-Rydz, und anderen Mitgliedern der polnischen Regierung.

2. Memorandum der Unterredung zwischen Gesandtem Bullitt und dem japanischen Gesandten in Warschau.

3. Memorandum der Unterredung zwischen Gesandtem Bullitt und dem italienischen Gesandten in Berlin.

4. Memorandum der Unterredung zwischen Gesandtem Bullitt und Baron Konstantin von Neurath.

H1121-0017

5. Memorandum der Unterredung zwischen Gesandtem Bullitt und Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

6. Memorandum der Unterredung zwischen Gesamdtem Bullitt und General Hermann Goering.

WCB:CO/lhh

Anlage Nr. 5 der Depesche Nr. I267 vom 23. November I937 von der Gesandtschaft in Paris.

Memorandum einer Unterhaltung zwischen dem Gesandten Bullitt und Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

Ich hatte mit Dr. Hjalmar Schacht eine Unterredung, die nicht gaenzlich ohne Interesse verblieb. Schacht begann mit den Worten, dass er es ausserordentlich bedaure, dass seine zwei Besuche in Paris, waehrend welcher er eine Grundlage fuer ein franzoesich-deutsches Zusammenkommen zu schaffen versuchte, nichts ergeben haetten. Er sagte, dass er Blum ausserordentlich verstaendig in der Kolonienfrage vorgefunden habe.

Er sprach weiterhin von der unbedingten Notwendigkeit, etwas zu tun, um in Europa Frieden zu schaffen, bevor Ausbruch eines Krieges, dem der Kontinent zustrebt. Er leitete seine Aeusserungen mit den Worten ein, dass er heute selbst "gaenzlich ohne Einfluesse auf den Mann" sei, naemlich Hitler. Er schien sich als politisch erledigt zu betrachten und wenig Respekt vor "dem Mann" zu haben. Er erklaerte, dass der einzige Weg zum Frieden, den er sehen koenne, durch direkte Verhandlungen zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland sei. Er glaubte nicht, dass die bevorsthehende Unterredung zwischen Halifax und Hitler irgendwelche Ergebnisse bringen wuerde. Hitler waere wuetend auf die Englaender, weil er ihnen gegenueber eine einzige grosse Gebaerde seiner politischen Freigebigkeit kund tat, aber die Englaender nicht mit einer aehnlichen Freigebigkeit erwidert haetten. Er machte das Angebot, die deutsche Flotte zu beschraenken, und die Englaender hatten diese Zusage ruhig in die Tasche gesteckt, ohne auch (Page 2 of memorandum) darauf entsprechende Gebaerden zugunsten Deutschlands zu machen, wie Hitler erwartet hatte. Schacht erklaerte, dass seiner Ansicht nach der beste Weg, mit Hitler Verhandlungen anzufangen, wirtschaftliche und nicht politische Diskussionen waeren. Hitler sei nicht im geringsten in wirtschaftlichen Angelegenheiten interessiert . Er betrachte Geld als "Schmutz". Daher war es moeglich, Verhandlungen mit ihm auf dem oekonomischen Gebiet zu beginnen, ohne seine leicht erregbare Abneigungen zu erwecken; und durch eine so begonnene Unterhaltung ihn in die Uebereinkommen in den politischan und militaerischen Gebieten, in welchen er aeusserst interessiert war, hinueberzuleiten.

Hitler sei entschlossen, Oesterreich spaeter Deutschland anzuschliessen und wenigstens Autonomie fuer die Deutschen in Boehmen zu gewinnen. Im Augenblick waere er, seiner Ansicht nach(Schacht's), nicht wesentlich am polnischen Korridor interessiert; es sei moeglich, den Korridor bestehen zu lassen, falls Danzig erlaubt wuerde, sich Ostpreussen anzuschliessen und falls irgendeine Art von Bruecke ueber den Korridor gebaut werden koennte, die Danzig und Ostpreussen mit Deutschland verbinden wuerde.

Anlage Nr. 6 der Depesche Nr. I267 vom 23. November I937 von der Gesandtschaft in Paris.

H1121-0018

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-151
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Memorandum der Unterhaltung zwischen
Gesandtem Bullitt und General Hermann Goering.

Sogleich als ich General Goering antraf, sagte ich ihm, dass ich ausserordentlich froh sein wuerde, seine Gedanken ueber die Aussicht fuer eine europaeischen Frieden und Krieg kennenzulernen, und dass ich wuenschte, dass er mir zuerst von seinen Gedanken ueber Deutschlands Verhaeltnisse mit Frankreich mitteilen wuerde.

Goering erklaerte, dass ueberhaupt kein direkter Konflikt zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich heute bestehe. Deutschland haette gaenzlich und fuer immer den Gedanken einer Wiedergewinnung von Elsass-Lothringen aufgegeben. Deutsch - land haette durch lange Erfahrung gelernt, dass die Bevoelkerung von Elsass und Lothringen unvermeidlich gegen das der beiden Laender, das gerade im Augenblick die Oberherrschaft ueber Elsass-Lothringen besitze, sein wuerde, und dass die Bevoelkerung staendig eine Quelle von Uneinigkeit mit dem Land sein wuerde, dem sie angehoerte. Deutschland wolle keine halb-loyalen Buerger haben, und habe daher an einer Zurueckgabe von Elsass-Lothringen and das Deutsche Reich nicht das geringste Interesse.

Weiterhin ergaenzten sich die wirtschaftlichen Systeme Frankreichs und Deutschlands vollkommen. Es muesse moeglich sein, den Austausch aller Warenarten zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland in einem groesseren Umfange zu entwickeln.

Ferner haben die Franzosen so viel zur deutschen Kultur, und die Deutschen so viel zur franzoesischen Kultur beigetragen, dass sie als zwei zivilisierte Voelker, welche nebeneinander wohnten, eine tiefe (Page 2 of memorandum) unterbewusste Hochachtung voreinander haetten. Weiterhin schaetzten sich die Franzosen und Deutschen gegenseitig als tapfere Soldaten und mutige Voelker, welche fuer ihre Laender zu sterben bereit waeren. Ferner habe die franzoesiche Regierung angedeutet, dass sie, soweit es sie anbetrifft, bereit sei,die deutschen Kolonien, welche durch den Versailler Vertrag an Frankreich uebergingen, zurueckzugeben. Ungluecklicherwiese war jedoch die Bedingung dabei, dass Frankreich nur dann dieses unternehmen wuerde, wenn England bereit waere, ein aehnliches Zugestaendnis zu machen.

Daher gaebe es ueberhaupt keinen Grund zur Uneinigkeit in dem unmittelbaren Verhaeltnis zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland, welches die engste Freundschaftsweise zwischen den beiden Laendern verhindere. Hinsichtlich Deutschland koenne er mit Autoritaet sagen, dass Deutschland heute bereit sei, sofort ein offensives und defensives Buendnis mit Frankreich abzuschliessen.

Die einzige Reibungsquelle zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich bestehe in Frankreich's Weigerung, Deutschland gewisse lebensnotwendige, nationale Notwendigkeiten zustandebringen zu lassen. Falls Frankreich, anstatt mit Deutschland zusammenzuarbeiten, die Politik weiterverfolgen sollte, Buendnisse in Osteuropa zu erschaffen, um Deutschland von der Erreichung seines legitimen Zieles zu verhindern, dann sei es klar, dass es zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland zum Konflikt kommen wuerde.

H1121-0019

Ich stellte Goering die Frage, auf welche Ziele erbesonders anspiele. Er antwortete: "Wir sind entschlossen, alle Deutschen, welche am Rande des Reiches leben und nur durch die kuenstlichen Schranken, die vom Versailler Vertrag auferlegt wurden, von der grossen (Page 3 of memorandum) Masse der deutschen Rasse getrennt sind, dem deutschen Reich anzuschliessen."

Ich fragte Goering, ob er meinte, dass Deutschland unbedingt entschlossen sei, Oesterreich dem Reich anzuschliessen. Er antwortete, dass dieses ein unbedingter Entschluss der deutschen Regierung sei. Die deutsche Regierung wuerde diese Angelegenheit zu dieser Zeit nicht draengen wegen gewisser gegenwaertiger, politischer Beruecksichtigungen, besonders in ihrem Verhaeltnis mit Italien; aber Deutschland wuerde keine andere Loesung der oesterreichischen Frage als die der Eingliederung Oesterreichs in das Deutsche Reich dulden. Dann gab er eine Erklaerung ab, die weiter ging, als ich sie je in dieser Angelegenheit gehoert habe. Er sagte: "Es gibt Plaene fuer eine Union von Oesterreich, Ungarn und der Tschechoslowakei, entweder mit oder ohne einen Habsburger an der Spitze der Gesellschaft. Solch eine Loesung ist unbedingt unannehmbar fuer uns, und die Folgerung solch eines Abkommens wuerde ein sofortiger casus belli sein (Goering gebrauchte den lateinischen Ausdruck casus belli. Das ist keine Uebersetzung von der deutschen Sprache, in welcher die Unterhaltung gefuehrt wurde).

Ich fragte Goering, ob die deutsche Regierung in ihren Ansichten bezueglich der Deutschen in Boehmen genau so entschlossen sei wie bezueglich Oesterreich. Er erwiderte, dass es nur eine endgueltige Loesung dieser Frage geben koenne. Die Sudetendeutschen muessten dem deutschen Reich beitreten genau wie alle anderen Deutschen, die am Rande des Reichs wohnten.

Ich stellte die Frage, ob die deutsche Regierung nicht zufrieden sein koennte, wenn die tschechische Regierung (Page 4 of memorandum) den Deutschen in Boehmen viel lokale Autonomie gewaehren wuerde, waehrend die Oberherrschaft den Tschechen verbliebe. Goering antwortete, dass solch ein Zugestaendnis seitens der tschechoslowakischen Regierung zu einer vorlaeufigen Befriedigung der Lage fuehren wuerde; aber die Autonomie muesste eine wirkliche Autonomie sein, und auch solch eine Loesung wuerde keine endgueltige sein. Es koenne keine endgueltige Loesung ausser der Einschliessung dieser Deutschen in das Deutsche Reich geben.

Ich fragte Goering, wie er den Fall der Deutschen in den anderen Teilen Europas betrachte, besonders der Deutschen in Transylvanien. Er erwiderte, dass diese rassischen Gruppen von dem eigentlichen deutschen Volk abgeschnitten waeren und ihm daher nicht angeschlossen werden koennen. Deutschland wuerde nur darauf bestehen, dass sie wie Gleiche mit gleichen Rechten behandelt wuerden und Erlaubnis erhielten, ihr Kulturleben zu behalten. Die Lage der Deutschen in Transylvanien waere aeusserst unzufriedenstellend. Andererseits haetten die Jugoslawen die Deutschen innerhalb ihrer Grenzen mit solch auffallendem Verstaendnis und Billigkeit behandelt, dass die Fuehrer der Deutschen in Jugoslawien ihm kuerzlich mitgeteilt haetten, dass sie keine wirklichen Beschwerden haetten und dass sie sich aufs Aeusserste irgendwelchen Anordnungen in Europa, welche ihre Rueckkehr nach Ungarn in Aussicht stellen koennte, widersetzen wuerden.

H1121-0020

page 6

I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"); in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

page 7

2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

page 8.

This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

page 9

5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable in himself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by

(Note: Entire Document L-172 is in Document Book for "1933-1936: Preparation for Aggression")

H1121-0021

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No.L-273
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.
Exhibit U.S.A. 59
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

No. 344

Amerikanisches General Konsulat
Wien, 26.Juli 1938.

Betrifft: Jahrestag der Ermordung von Kanzler Dollfus.

Streng vertraulich.

An den
Staatssekretär,
Washington.

Herr Staatssekretär !

Ich habe die Ehre zu berichten, dass am 24.und 25.Juli in der ganzen "Ostmark" der Jahrestag der Ermordung von Kanzler Dollfuss gefeiert wurde, der jetzt bezeichnet wird "als der Tag an welchem vor vier Jahren leidenschaftliche und aufopferungsvolle National Sozialisten den Versuch machten, die österreichischen Provinzen in das deutsche Heimatland zurückzuführen, gemäss dem Willen ihrer Einwohner." (Neues Wiener Abendblatt, 25.Juli 1938.)
Die zwei Höhepunkte der Feier waren die Gedenktagversammlung am 24. in Klagenfurt, der Hauptstadt der Provinz Kärnten, wo 1934 der Wiener Nazi Aufstand den grössten Anklang fand, und der Marsch der am Leben gebliebenen Mitglieder der SS-Standarte 89, die 1934 den Angriff auf die Bundes-Kanzlei ausgeführt hatte, am 25.nach der vormaligen Kanzlei in Wien, sozusagen eine Wiederherstellung des Verbrechens.
Die versammelten Tausende in Klagenfurt hörten einer Ansprache des Vertreters des Führers, Rudolf Hess, zu, in Gegenwart der Familien der 13 Nationalsozialisten, die wegen Beteiligung am Juli-Putsch gehängt worden waren. Die Klagenfurter Gedenkfeier diente gleichzeitig als Anlass der feierlichen Vereidigung der sieben kürzlich ernannten Gauleiter der Ostmark.
Vom Standpunkt des Auslandes war die Rede des Reichsministers Hess hauptsächlich bemerkenswert durch die Tatsache, dass er, nachdem er die erste Hälfte seiner Ansprache der erwarteten Lobpreisung der Aufopferung der Männer, Frauen und Jugend Oesterreichs in ihrem Kampf für ein Gross-Deutschland gewidmet hatte, in eine Rechtfertigung für die Besetzung Oesterreichs und einen Angriff auf die "lügnerische Auslandspresse" und gegen diejenigen, welche die Idee eines neuen Krieges verbreiteten, überging. Es wäre ein Glück für die Welt, erklärte Hess, dass Deutschlands Führer ein Mann sei, der sich nicht herausfordern lasse. "Der Führer tut was für sein Volk notwendig ist, in allerhöchster Ruhe ..... und arbeitet für den Frieden Europas, sogar dann, wenn Provokateure unter vollständiger Ausserachtlassung der offenbaren Bedrohung des Friedens für gewisse kleine Staaten", hinterlistig behaupten, dass er eine Gefahr für den Frieden Europas bedeute.
Der Marsch nach der vormaligen Bundeskanzlei, jetzt die Reichsstatthalterei, erfolgte über ganz genau dieselben Strassen und mit genau derselben Zeiteinteilung wie der ursprüngliche Angriff. Die Marschteilnehmer wurden bei der Kanzlei von Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart begrüsst, der eine Ansprache hielt und darauffolgend eine Gedenktafel enthüllte. Von der Reichsstatthalterei marschierte die Standarte nach der alten RAVAG Rundfunkzentrale, von der seinerzeit die falschen Berichte über die Abdankung von Dollfuss gefunkt worden waren, und dort wurde eine zweite Gedenktafel enthüllt.

H1121-0022

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. L-273
CONT'D.

Steinhäusl, der gegenwärtige Polizeipräsident von Wien ist ein Mitglied der SS=Standarte 89.
Die Wohnung von Baron Peter de Leusse, Sekretär der ehemaligen französischen Legation, der vorübergehend als Konsul nach Wien beordert war, lag auf der Marschroute. Bevor er nach seinem Büro ging berichtete ihm sein Diener, die Polizei hätte befohlen, dass Hakenkreuzfahnen von seinen Fenstern ausgehängt werden müssten. Er weigerte sich. Nach seinem Weggang drang eine Abteilung von SA=Leuten ein und behängten, entgegen dem Einspruch seines Dieners, jedes Fenster mit grossen Fahnen. Als Baron de Leusse nach seiner Wohnung zurückkehrte, fand er die SA=Leute noch vordem Hause vor. Er protestierte bei dem befehlsführenden Offizier, der einen sehr unhöflichen Ton anschlug. Der Protest nützte nichts. Daraufhin protestierte Baron de Leusse beim Vertreter von Kommissar Bürckel. Die Fahnen wurden schliesslich mit dem Ausdruck des Bedauerns entfernt.
Nach der Ermordung von Dollfuss sandte der Führer ein Beileidsschreiben an die Witwe, und Mussolini ernannte sich selbst zum Beschützer ihrer Kinder. Soviel ich weiss, hält sich Frau Dollfuss gegenwärtig in der Schweiz auf, ihre Hilfegesuche an Mussolini blieben unbeantwortet, und es wurde ihr nicht erlaubt, italienisches Gebiet zu betreten. Nach den Aussagen eines Kollegen, der sie aus Oesterreich rausschmuggelte, werden ihre Geldmittel in kurzer Zeit vollständig erschöpft sein.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung Ihr

(sig.) John C. Wiley

Amerikanischer Generalkonsul.

JHM/JCW/lmp.
Anlage No.841.5

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. L-273.

18.November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. L-273.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5
33812169.

Document No. L-281

T E L E G R A M R E C E I V E D

From PLAIN
Vienna
Undated

File DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
init. MAR 12 1938
illegible
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd March 11, 1938
5.47 p.m.

REB

GPO

Secretary of State,

Washington

64

Schuschnigg made radio announcement at 7:45 in substance as follows:

I have to give my Austrian fellow countrymen the details of an eventful day and a grave situation. I declare before the whole world that the German Government today handed to President Miklas an ultimatum with a time limit attached ordering him to nominate as Chancellor a person designated by the German G vernment who would appoint a government satisfactory to them otherwise German troops would invade Austria. I have declare before the world that news launched in Germany concerning disorders created by the workers, the shedding of blood of a situation which had got out of the control of the government are lies from A to Z. The President asks me to tell the people of Austria that we have yielded to force since we were not prepared even in this terrible situation to shed blood. We decided to order the troops to offer no serious (The Chancellor corrected himself and said to offer no resistance). The Inspector General of the Army, General Shildarsky, has been placed in command of the troops. He will issue further orders to them. So I take leave of the Austrian people with a German word of farewell uttered from the depth of my heart. God protect Austria.

863.00/1408

FILED MARCH 14 1938

WILEY

EMB

RGC

H1121 – 0024

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-281
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telegramm erhalten.

REB VON Klartext
Wien, undatiert
Erhalten 11. Maerz 1938
5.47 P.M.

An den Staatssekretaer
Washington

64

Schuschnigg machte um 7.45 eine Rundfunkerklaerung im wesentlichen des folgenden Inhalts:
Ich bin verpflichtet meinen oesterreichischen Landsleuten die Einzelheiten eines ereignisvollen Tages und einer ernsten Lage mitzuteilen. Ich erklaere vor der ganzen Welt, dass die deutsche Regierung heute dem Praesidenten Miklas ein Ultimatum mit einer definitiven Zeitbegrenzung ueberreicht hat, mit dem Befehl, eine von der deutschen Regierung bezeichnete Persoenlichkeit als Kanzler zu ernennen, die eine sie zufriedenstellende Regierung bilden wuerde, andernfalls deutsche Truppen in Oesterreich einmarschieren wuerden. Ich muss der Welt erklaeren, dass von Deutschland ausgesandte Berichte ueber Arbeiterunruhen, Blutvergiessen und eines von der Regierung nicht mehr kontrollierbaren Zustandes von A bis Z Luegen sind. Der Praesident fordert mich auf, das oesterreichische Volk wissen zu lassen, dass wir der Gewalt gewichen sind, da wir sogar in dieser schrecklichen Lage nicht bereit waren, Blut zu vergiessen. Wir haben beschlossen, den Truppen den Befehl zu geben, keinen ernstlichen -- (der Kanzler berichtigte sich selbst und sagte: keinen Widerstand zu leisten). Dem General-Inspektor der Armee, General Shilharvsky wurde das Kommando ueber die Truppen uebertragen. Er wird ihnen die weiteren Befehle erteilen. So nehme ich Abschied von dem oesterreichischen Volke mit einem deutschen Lebewohl, das aus der Tiefe meines Herzens kommt. Gott schuetze Oesterreich.

EMB
RGC

Wiley.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT L - 281

18 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-281.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5
33812169

DOCUMENT NO. L-291
Office U.S. Chief of Counsel

H1121-0025

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REB

From: BERLIN
Dated March 11, 1938
Rec'd 3:40 p.m.

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphased before being communicated to anyone.(B)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

109, March 11, 5 p.m. (GRAY)

Embassy's 105, March 10, 7 p.m.

This morning's press publishes reports and warning comments with respect to the Austrian situation.

Pointing out that the Austrian Cabinet was not consulted with respect to the ballot the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER observes (one) that the vote is to be carried out under the supervision of the Fatherland Front which so soon after the Berchtesgaden agreement includes hardly any National Socialists, (two) as no identification is necessary there is no guarantee against repetitious voting as repeaters, (three) that the provision of only affirmative ballots and the fact that the voters will probably be forced to return their ballots openly deprives the procedure of the "secret character" 'distinguishes' elections in every civilized country". The VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER terms the election a "tragic comedy" and a "most impudent parody of democracy".

The same paper reports large demonstrations by National Socialists in Vienna calling for "one people, one Reich". It also reproduces a Reuter despatch to the effect that Dr. Jury described as Seyss-Inquart's representative has demanded his followers to abstain from voting.

A development that must be considered as ominous in view of Hitler's stated mission to combat the Comintern is the fact that the Deutsches Nachrichten Buro reports communist manifestations in favor of Schuschnigg attended by cries of Heil Schuschnigg Heil Moscow and the display of the hammer and sickle. (END GRAY)

Berlin at the present moment is full of rumors which however cannot be confirmed. The only authoritative information as yet at hand is the following telegram just received from the Consul General at Munich. "Troop movements and mobilization of reservists and automobiles going on all night. Active troops apparently moving toward Austria".

WILSON

CSB

H1121 - 0026

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-291
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telegramm empfangen:

Ein Teil dieses Telegrammes muss genau umschrieben werden, bevor es irgend jemandem mitgeteilt wird. (B)

Von Berlin
Datum 11. Maerz 1938
eingegangen 3:40 Uhr
Stempel

:Abteilung fuer Europaeische Angelegenheiten
12. Maerz 1938
:Auswaertiges Amt

An den Aussenminister
Wasington

109, 11. Maerz, 1700 Uhr (Gray)
Botschaft's 105, 10 Maerz/1400, 1900 Uhr.

Heute morgen's Zeitungen veroeffentlichen Berichte und warnende Kommentare mit Bezug auf die Oesterreichische Lage. Hervorhebend, dass der oesterreichische Ministerrat mit Bezug auf die Abstimmung nicht konsultiert wurde, bemerkt der "Voelkische Beobachter" (eins) dass die Wahl unter der Aufsicht der Vaterlaendischen Front durchgefuehrt werden muss, welche so kurz nach dem Abkommen von Berchtesgaden kaum irgendwelche Nationalsozialisten enthaelt, (zwei) da keine Ausweise noetig sind gibt es keine Garantie gegen wiederholte Stimmenabgabe, (drei) dass die Vorbereitungen nur die Moeglichkeit geben bejahende Stimmen abzugeben und die Tatsache, dass die Waehler wahrscheinlich gezwungen werden, ihre Stimmzettel offen abzugeben, beraubt das Wahlverfahren seiner "geheimen Natur", welche die Wahlen in jedem zivilisierten Lande auszeichnet. Der "Voelkische Beobachter" nennt die Wahl eine"tragische Komoedie", und eine"unverschaemte Parodie der Demokratien". Das gleiche Blatt berichtet grosse Demonstrationen von Nationalsozialisten in Wien, welche fuer "Ein Volk, ein Reich" rufen. Das Blatt veroeffentlicht ebenfalls einen Reuter-Bericht mit dem Inhalt, dass Dr. Jury, welcher als ein Repraesentant Seyss-Inquarts beschrieben wird, seine Anhaenger aufgefordert hat nicht zur Wahl zu gehen.
Eine Entwicklung die als verhaengnisvoll betrachtet werden muss hinsichtlich Hitler's erklaerter Mission die Comintern zu befechten ist die Tatsache die das "Deutsche Nachrichtenbuero" veroeffentlicht, wonach Kommunistische Kundgebungen zugunsten Schuschniggs stattfinden, welche mit den Schreien "Heil Schuschnigg" und "Heil Moskau" begleitet werden, und die Entfaltung von Fahnen mit dem Hammer und Sichel. (Ende Gray)
Berlin ist im jetzigen Augenblick voll von Geruechten, die aber nicht bestaetigt werden koennen. Die einzige amtliche Nachricht verfuegbar ist das nachstehende Telegramm vom Generalkonsul in Muenchen:
"Truppenbewegungen und Mobilisierung von Reservisten und Autos gehen die ganze Nacht an. Kampftruppen marschieren anscheinend in der Richtung nach Oesterreich."

Wilson

H1121 - 0027

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-291
CONT'D

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT L - 291

18 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT., 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L - 291.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT.
33779426

H1121-0028

Exhibit U.S.A. 78
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

DOCUMENT L-292
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ME

From: GRAY

Vienna

Dated March 12, 1938

Rec'd 9.45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

70, March 12, noon.

Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets "National Socialist Germany greets its possession National Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible union".

Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and impending arrival Austrian legion.

S.S. and S.A. in undisputed control in Vienna.

Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested.

Himmler and Hess here.

WILEY

PEG HPD

H1121 - 0029

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L 292
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TELEGRAMM empfangen. Wien, den 12.Maerz 1938

Stempel

Amerikanischer Außenminister,

Washington.

Abteilung fuer Europaeische Angelegenheiten
12.Maerz 1938
Auswaertiges Amt.

12 Maerz, mittag.

Zahlreiche Deutsche Bombenflugzeuge fliegen ueber Wien und werfen Flugblaetter folgenden Inhalts ab: "Das Nationalsozialistische Deutschland gruesst sein neues Gebiet das nationalsozialistische Oesterreich und seine neue Regierung in treuer unzertrennbarer Einheit".

Nach staendig umlaufenden Geruechten sollen kleine deutsche Truppenteile in Oesterreich sein und man erwartet Ankunft der oesterreichischen Legion.

S.S. und S.A. haben ohne Zweifel Kontrolle ueber Wien. Polizei traegt Hakenkreuzarmbinden. Schuschnigg und Schmidt angeblich verhaftet.

Himmler und Hess hier.

WILEY

PEG HPD

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L 292

17.11.45

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN M/SGT. 33779426 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. L 292

WOLFGANG E.THORMANN
M/SGT. 33779426

Doc. L-293

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

FROM

GRAY
VIENNA
Dated March 12, 1938
Rec'd 8:52 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

68, March 12, 10 a.m.

The following was given out last night by radio in the name of Miklas:

"Under the pressure of the foreign political relationships and the threat of the military occupation of the country by the German Reich the Federal President has entrusted Federal Minister Seyss-Inquart with the direction of the affairs of the government in accordance with the demand of the German Reich".

WILEY

KLP

H1121-0031

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-293
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telegramm - empfangen:

von Graz
Wien

Datum: 12. Maerz 38
eingegangen 8:52 Uhr

Stempel

Abteilung fuer Europaeische Angelegenheiten 12. Maerz 1938 Auswaertiges Amt

An den Aussenminister

Washington

Eilt
68, 12. Maerz 10 Uhr:

Das Folgende wurde gestern Nacht von Miklas durch den Rundfunk herausgegeben:

Unter dem Druck der aussenpolitischen Beziehungen und der Drohung der militaerischen Besetzung des Landes durch Deutschland hat der Presidant den Minister Seyss-Inquart mit der Uebernahme der Geschaefte der Regierung betraut, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Forderungen des Deutschen Reiches.

Wiley

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-293

16 novenber 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-293

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT
33779426

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.386-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937

H1121-0032

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet, in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space then that is the result of historical development spread over several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for

living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.



B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is NOT possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditures of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increase consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalisation is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonisation; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permenent basis for an economic settlement,

and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those States who base their existence on exports. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in EUROPE, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in EUROPE directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this prupose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in EUROPE.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND has suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favours would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by poor politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:

H1121 - 0034

H1121-0035

a) IRELAND's struggle for independence

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilise the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to ITALY which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an inceasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for BRITAIN whic ITALY is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILESIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45 After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then , dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943/45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943/45. The necessity for action before 1943/45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2 Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, thenthe time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3 It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against GERMANY.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943/45, then the behaviour of FRANCE, ENGLAND, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European war, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without ENGLAND's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by FRANCE through BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with FRANCE, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of GREAT BRITAIN. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that CZECHOSLOVAKIA's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and thata consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of CZECHOSLOVAKIA in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from CZECHOSLOVAKIA and of 1 million from AUSTRIA could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to GERMANY militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to theremoval of CZECHOSLOVAKIA is expected on the part of ITALY; however, it cannot be judge today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the DUCE were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed our our action would decide POLAND's attitude. POLAND will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious GERMANY, with RUSSIA in the rear.

H1121 - 0036

Military participation by RUSSIA must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need to taken into consideration at all in view of JAPAN'S attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of FRANCE by a Civil war - then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA, as GERMANY's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

H1121 - 0037

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in SPAIN, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by FRANCE, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by FRANCE is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN. Should FRANCO be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of ITALY on the BALEARIC ISLES. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in SPAIN, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen ITALY in her fight to hold on to the BALEARIC ISLES. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the BALEARIC ISLES can NOT be tolerated either by FRANCE or by ENGLAND and could lead to a war by FRANCE and ENGLAND against ITALY, in which case SPAIN, if entirely in white (i.e. FRANCO's) hands, could participate on the side of ITALY's enemies. A subjugation of ITALY in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to ITALY via GERMANY. The Fuehrer believes that ITALY's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against FRANCE on the Western frontier and carry out operations against FRANCE from LIBYA against the North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of Franch-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the ALPS to Upper ITALY would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to FRANCE, so that at its frontiers with ITALY and GERMANY, FRANCE will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If GERMANY profits from this war by disposing of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN and the AUSTRIAN questions, the probability must be assumed that ENGLAND - being at war with ITALY - would not decide to commence operations against GERMANY. Without British support a warlike action by FRANCE against GERMANY is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent on the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightening (blitzartig schnell)".

Fieldmarshall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that ENGLAND and FRANCE must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with ITALY would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to Commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von FRITSCH estimated the French forces which would presumable be employed on the ALPINE frontier against ITALY to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the RHINELAND. We should consider the lead which FRANCE has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG - the

four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Fieldmarschall von BLOMBERG drew special attention to the strength of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a MAGINOT line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von FRITSCH mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermended by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH regarding ENGLAND and FRANCE's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of BRITAIN'S non-participation and the consequently he did not believe in military action by FRANCE against GERMANY. Should the MEDITERRANEAN conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in EUROPE, then we should have to commence operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then GERMANY would , for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst GOERING considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in SPAIN. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(in ink)
Certified: (Signed) HOSZBACH

Kirchbach
Oberst. d. A. (Col. General Staff)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386 PS

14 November 1945

I, E. GLAZIER, P/O, 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the avove is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386 PS.

E. GLAZIER
P/O, 37371

H1121 - 0038

H1121 - 0039

Exhibit U.S.A. 61
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 812-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Seal)
The Gauleiter

Salzburg, 22 Aug. 1939
Chiemsee

Personal!

Only direct delivery!

To the
Reich Minister Dr. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART,

VIENNA I

Ballhausplatz 2

Dear Dr. Seyss:

I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you asked me to inform you what I know of those matters, which among others, are the subject of your correspondence with BUERCKEL.

I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that, what has been brought, to my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.

On the 5th of July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich Commissioner Gauleader BUERCKEL if I was in possession of the memorandum of GLOBUS regarding the events of March. I told him that I do not have this memorandum and that I never possessed a single part of it, that I furthermore did not then participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official requests by BUERCKEL I have entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on the 6th July.

If BUERCKEL now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in single originals. I shall specially inform BUERCKEL of this I connect this with the declaration, that I have given-apart from those written explanations-no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms whatsoever regarding you and your attitude an that I have authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.

Since the beginning of our collaboration I have always expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this, especially since considered the political success of the 11th March merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us to collaborate.

As far as GLOBUS is concerned you are fully aware of his species which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you already talked to GLOBUS about the occurrences between the 11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.

With the best regards and

HEIL HITLER!
Yours
signed: Friedl Rainer

2 enclosures.

H1121 - 0040

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 812-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

Copy.

Salzburg, 6 July 1939

To the
Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef BUERCKEL

Vienna I
Parliament

Dear Party Member BUERCKEL!

Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I flew to Berlin to report to Hitler's deputy, Hess, about the events which led to our taking over the government. We did this because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Htler's own, was that the liberation depended more on Austrian matters of state rather than the party. To be more exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading role.

This conception does not, however, correspond to the true proportions of powers and to the conditions of leadership which were completely clear until 12 March 1938. At that time I gave a short report in Klausner's behalf to the deputy of Hitler and also submitted a short summary of the developments since 1934. I made no single copy of this. I did not take part in further actions of this kind since they seemed to me to be too much connected with personal feelings. I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no position existed in the party from which one might have presented oneself to the public; and that there was no man who had the guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German public. He who wanted to direct correctly the political battle of the Austrian nazism had to forego public fame. Leopold did not want to forego that and made such decisive political mistakes that his recall became necessary. The person of Klausner never longed for fame and was therefore not suitable to appear gloriously after the taking over of power. The two powers behind Klausner - I consider the dynamic part of Globocnik and the political part of myself - were bound from the beginning, as collaborators of Klausner's, to put him to the fore.

We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected inspite of our attempts to that effect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr.Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference of his person, but that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far

the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the party.

If I should be asked to describe - without personal interest - the role of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.

Heil Hitler!

Rainer e.h.

1 Enclosure

C O P Y.

(Report given on the 6th July 1939 by Rainer to Buerkel on the events in the N.S.D.A.P. of Austria from ..... to 11th of March 1938 (Anschluss)).

Report on the events in the N.S.D.A.P. of Austria since the beginning of the last stage of battle until the seizure of power on the 11th March 1938.

- -

In 1933 the Party fought a parliamentary battle. By the seizure of power in the Reich it gained considerably in numbers. It started to try to enforce new elections in order to gain admission into the government. By these means it should have taken over the government. The enemies recognized this fact, and the Government Dollfuss proceeded, while tolerating the reds, to force the N.S.D.A.P. from its legal plane in order to render it innocuous. In this the government used legal tricks, thereby practically doing away progressively with the democratic constitution. The first attempts of the government were answered by the Party with an increase of pressure; and the government's breaches of constitution were answered by arbitrary acts with the assumption that it might thus be able to overthrow the government. This assumption was wrong; at that time the government had the backing of all anti-German foreign countries, and it felt sufficiently strong to prohibit the N.S.D.A.P., and confession of adherance to the N.S.D.A.P., and subsequently to treat as high treason the confession in favor of the "Anschluss".

Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the "Alt-Reich"; and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.

There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer REINTHALLER (already appointed Landes-

bauernfuehrer (leader of the country's farmers) by HESS)). He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the N.S.D.A.P. legal status again, thus permitting its political activities,. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed engineer NEUBACHER.

The first attempt to create a legal political organization which was to negotiate with the Government while a secret illegal organization existed, did not succeed; it brought about quarells in almost all Gaus and ended with pressure of the illegal branch against the policy of appeasement of REINTHALLER, and with the latters retirement as Landesleiter (country leader). The successor, NEUBACHER, head of the illegal organization, was not recognized by all the Gaus, because meanwhile the former Gauleader of Lower Austria, Captain LEOPOLD, was released from; and he claimed the country leadership because of his seniority in the party. In Carinthia at about that time, KLAUSNER with his callaborators GLOBOCNIK, RAINER, LONGHIN and PAWLOWSKI had reconstructed and readied the Gau Carinthia. The Gau Carinthia kept away from the quarells of the leaders, and arbitrated the differences between LEOPOLD and NEUBACHER, and finally effected a solution in such a way that NEUBACHER and his adherents recognized LEOPOLD as the country leader; and LEOPOLD appointed NEUBACHER to be his deputy. The points of friction between those two groups were not yet eliminated. Those differences did not remain concealed from the police; and the police got hold of a polemic by the group of Leopold against the group of Neubacher, on the strength of this material they arrested Leopold and Neubacher.

At that time the success of the calm attitude of the Gau Carinthia was crowned by the fact that after these arrests the representatives of all the Gaus came to Carinthia to offer KLAUSNER the country leadership. By order of Klausner Dr. Rainer reported at these conferences the political referendum and developed the political conception as adopted by the Gau Carinthia on the basis of which, as a matter of fact, an agreement was reached. In July 1935 KLAUSNER became the head of the movement without, however adopting the title of country leader because he considered it wrong as long as the country leader LEOPOLD was imprisoned, but he looked upon himself as the speaker of the college of Gauleaders. With the consent of the representatives of all the Gaus, KLAUSNER at that time appointed GLOBOCNIK as co-worker for the organizational part, and RAINER as co-worker for the political part of his task.

In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. SCHATTENFROH then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer RAFFELSBERGER had at this time also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria. In Spring of 1936 SCHATTENFROH was arrested; he had named party member HINTERLEITNER of Linz as his successor as managerial country leader. In March KLAUSNER was arrested in connection with the arrest of about 60 leading Nazis, whereas Dr. RAINER was released. HINTERLEITNER again followed those directives which were set down at the conferences at Carinthia in the Spring of 1935; and in May 1936 he appointed RAINER, GLOBOCNIK and engineer HIEDLER to the country leadership in the following spheres of influence:

Rainer to be chief of the political staff; HIEDLER as chief of the organization; and GLOBOCNIK as liaison officer with the Reich and as organizer of all the auxiliary bases outside of Austria.

H1121-0042

H1121-0043

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 812-PS

21 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 812-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738.

COPY

REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE NSDAP OF AUSTRIA FROM 1933 TO 11 MARCH 1938 (ANSCHLUSS).
(Note: Previous portion of Report was translated separately).
(pp. 5-6)

The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuhrer. These said that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.

Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connection with Dr. Wachter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the "Styrian Heimatschutz" and became a party member when the entire "Styrian Heimatschutz" was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenay who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenay to the Fuhrer as being a trusted person.

At that time the Fuhrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party, On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuhrer at the "Obersalzburg" where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuhrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuhrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler.

(pp.7-10)
Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuhrer named Lt. Gen. (Gruppenfuhrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuhrer for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr. Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.

Regarding internal conditions, it was clear that full recognition of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart. He was also in permanent contact with Capt. Leopold, and there were never any serious conflicts between them. But he also acknowledged the correctness of Dr. Rainer's political interpretations, and the actual leadership of Dr. Rainer in all political actions. The situation was much the same with Glaise-Horstenau who was wholeheartedly for Rainer and Globocnik but always carefully guarded the legal party position of Leopold.

Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as "Staatsrat" (councillor of state) in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called "satisfactory action!" Through all this a new and stronger political position was won in the Austrian system. The National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the political field and became a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into internal Austrian political developments. This complicated political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing pressure from the Reich, led to the talks between the Führer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppen-führer Keppler presented the concrete political demands of the fighting underground movement, which he estimated according to his personal experiences and the information he received. The results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand, as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in thecenter of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis of the "system apparates' (Schuschnigg government) at a time when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.

Another result of the agreement was the appointment by the Führer of Leopold as a member of the Staff of Hess. After a long, personal talk with Klausner, the Führer appointed him as leader of the Austrian National Socialists, upon recommendation of Keppler. """The relationship between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows: Seyss-Inquart acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement the Führer made to him during his state visit in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Führer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere. Seyss-Inquart also acknowledged the free political initiative of the party leader of Austria.

(99. 11-16)

The "Landesleitung" received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the "Landesleitung" from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present atthe first talks which were held at 10a.m. There it was decided that first, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.

"""Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Führer. On the 10th March all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all units leaders. During the night of the 10th to 11th, Globocnik returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer gave the party freedom of action and that he would back it in everything it did.

H1121-0045

Rainer then gave the final instruction for friday, the 11th of March, and explained that three situations might develope within the following days:

1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held, In this case, a great demonstration must be held.

2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.

3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.

On friday, 11 March, the miiister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the "Landesleitung" had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishböck and Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr, Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.

In regard to Rainers proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political, "Front"men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.

On the basis of written evidence which Glaise- Horstenau had brought with him a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuhrer calling for help, were prepared.

Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss- Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer and the statement to the population at 3:00 p.m. and atthe same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers'council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30, Seyss-Inquardt 'phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers has resigned, and Seyss-Inquard answered "No". Rainer informed the "Reichskanzlie" through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Göring through the same channels that the Fuhrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquardt was informed of this by Globocnik and Muhlmann; talks were has between Seyss-Inquardt and Seghuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquardt asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquardt, legalization of the party, and callin up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Indquardt promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuhrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquardt with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muhlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand

H1121 – 0046

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOC.812-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquardt. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himslef because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the "Gruppenführer" Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7.00 p.m. Seyss-Inquardt entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7.30 p.m. : Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquardt as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.

Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The prosposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Blobocnik. After 8.00 p.m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8.30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauloitors of Austria to take over power in all eight "gaus" of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquardt.

With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party. ****

The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Führer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss*Inquardt in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquardt was due to the actual seizure of power by the part on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr Seyss-Inquardt in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Führer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Führer.

Rainer e.h.

6.7.1939

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOC. 812-PS

9 November 1945.

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt., 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from Document No. 812-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt., 33779426

H1121 – 0047

H1121 - 0048

Cited Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1060-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

REICHSGESETZBLATT
TEIL I

1938 16 March 1938 Nr 25

PP 249-250

Supplementary Ordinance to the Law
concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich - of 16 March 1938

On the basic of the law of 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 237) concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, I order:

Paragraph 1

1) The Reichsminister of the Interior is the central office for the accomplishment of the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich.

2) He can delegate his authority to a deputy, whose office is in Vienna and who holds the official title of " Reichs deputy for Austria ".

Paragraph 2

The deputy for the four year plan can delegate authority to the Reichs deputy for Austria.

Paragraph 3

The Reichs deputy for Austria is therefore appointed jointly by the Reichs minister of the interior and the deputy for the four year plan.

Munich 16 March 1938

The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
Goering
General Field Marshal

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1060-PS

November 16. 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 1060-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt.Inf., 0-1335567

H1121-0049

Exhibit U.S.A. 71
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

File Memorandum

on my parting visit with the Chancellor.

(Bundeskanzler)

After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned to the speech of the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler). I said to him that though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent, to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.

The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper "Wiener Zeitung" (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the debate in the Chamber.

I then introduced into the conversation the wide-spread opinion that he had acted under "brutal pressure" in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: "To be honest, no!" It appears to me of importance to record this statement.

In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly.

Vienna, 26 Feb 1938

/s/ Papen

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS

26 November 1945.

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, Tec 4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1544-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
Tec 4, 37446052

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1659-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Cited Nov. 29, 1946

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 303

Second Order concerning Plebiscite and Election
for the Greater German Reichstag
of 24 March 1938

Zweite Verordnung zur Volksabstimmung und zur Wahl
zum Grossdeutschen Reichstag
vom 24. März 1938

On the basis of par. 4 of the Second Decree regarding the Reichstag election law of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, p. 258) the following is decreed in supplement to pars. 8 and 32 of the First Decree of 22 March 1938 for the people's vote and for the election to the Greater German Reichstag:

Article 1

1) The ballot is printed as follows:

PEOPLE'S VOTE AND THE GREATER GERMAN REICHSTAG

BALLOT

Do you agree with the accomplishment, on 13 March 1938, of the

REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH

and do you vote for the list of our Fuehrer

ADOLF HITLER ?

YES

NO

2) The ballot for the qualified voters with the exception of the Austrian qualified voters (par 8 of the First Decree) consists of white or yellow paper.

3) The ballot for the Austrian qualified voters (par 32 section 1 of the First Decree) consists of green paper.

Article 2

1) The ballot for soldiers of the former Austrian Army (par 32 section 2 of the First Decree) is printed as follows:

PEOPLE'S VOTE ON THE 10 APRIL 1938

BALLOT

Do you agree, German Soldier, with the ratification on the 13 March 1938 of the

REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH?

YES

NO

H1121 - 0050

Exhibit U.S.A. 57-filed Nov. 28, 1945
(1760-PS)

Doc. [illegible]

United Mexican States)
Mexico Federal District) SS
Embassy of the United)
States of America)

H1121 - 0051

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German Government officials in the highest categories was necessary by me as Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the circumstances of the period.

In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high officials of the German Government because of the unsettled state of affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the Government, as a matter of further duty I had contact with individuals in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our Government currently informed with regard to developments in the political picture in Germany. During that period, and before the National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an informal character with persons in the National Socialist Party for the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives, but this contact was, before the access to power of that party, with secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof.

Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American citizens and property. In consequence of this responsibility I had to see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the Party came to power, for information purposes.

It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our conversations were long and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve with regard to the aims of the regime.

It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course which they were pursuing nor did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of these high Nazi and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably revealed to other

(1760-PS)

foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may have been, however, the Nazi government officials, almost without exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any concealment of their aims.

(Omitted is a part of this affidavit in which Mr. Messersmith lists the names, and states his impressions of, the following:

1. Hermann Goering
2. General Milch
3. Hjalmar Schacht
4. Hans Frank
5. Wilhelm Frick
6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk
7. Joseph Goebbels
8. Richard Walther Darré
9. Robert Ley
10. Hans Heinrich Lammers
11. Otto Meissner
12. Franz von Papen
13. Walther Funk
14. General Wilhelm Keitel
15. Admiral Eric von Raeder
16. Admiral Karl Doenitz
17. Dr. Bohle
18. Dr. Stuckert
19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen
20. Dr. Davidson)

H1121 - 0052

In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset due undoubtedly to the fact that when I came to Austria it was already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as having no immediate concern in Austria's foreign relations, I received much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained information were the following:

President Miklas
Chancellor Dollfuss
Chancellor Schuschnigg
Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg
Police President and Minister of
Security, Hofrat Skubl.

In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and with whom I was in frequent contact.

Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as Consul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as well as acquiring new Austrian ones.

I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as to details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted by the sum total of information which I received from all sources.

From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished "by whatever means were necessary". Although I cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was "how" and "when".

At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which they later accomplished through force through the methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany -- obtain a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information through statements which they made to me of conversations which they had with high Austrian officials.

H1121 - 0053

In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the [illegible]s resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts. My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl, the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient in all of Europe.

The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the first two of these periods -- in mid-1933 and in early 1934 -- I was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.

During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages during this period were directly primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany.

While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no doubt whatever that these outrages had been contrived and directed by Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of these bomb fragments myself, I recall officially having been told by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when some of those Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had committed these acts.

At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation, reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations from some of these despatches are as follows:

"Trunks containing inflammable material were placed in the three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight. The police charged the Nazis with the Crime.

H1121 - 0054

"An official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna, wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being held, slightly wounding a woman".

Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934.

"During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which are described below, was the source of serious concern to the authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into Austria."

"In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number of other bomb outrages at Braunau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Iram. While the damage to both life and property was small - no lives were lost - the Government admitted its inability to cope with the situation with the existing measures of security . . . .

"The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg, which caused considerable damage. At Morzg, near Salzburg, on May 23, a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in Anleiten, near Ried."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934.

"The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite of the Government's notification regarding the application throughout Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes, now punishable by death, include malicious acts against public order, and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services of the State.

"The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church, which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization opposing the Nazi regime.

"In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop's palace in Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an annex to the Archbishop's palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor damages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion broke windows in the churches and vicarage of St. Paul in Carinthia.

"In Linz, on May 28, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to blow up the electric works at Brannau, causing a temporary suspension of the electric service.

"Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of telephone and newspaper kiosks."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934.

"The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the peace

H1121-0055

H1121-0056

and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an exceedingly important item in Austria's economic life. The attempts to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria, as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers, occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters. After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934.

"The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character. The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less against the railway communications. Additional stores of expolsive materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere."

. . . . . .

"A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi outrages, the school has been closed for one week.

"In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply of explosives bearing labels of "Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld, G.m.b.H.", "Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.", and "Fabrik Wurzendorf", explosive factories domiciled in Germany.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934.

"During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions, attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg.

"A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicarage in Kapfenberg, in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church institutions in different parts of the country.

"A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals, which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and Tyrol."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934.

"A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600 schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion damaged the local vicarage and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway station."

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934.

In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure upon Austria by means of the "Austrian Legion". This organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities.

After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the British Military Attache in Vienna of a conversation which he had had with the German Military Attache in Vienna, General Muff. It may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military Attache that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had had several conversations with Hitler. He said then - in August 1934 - that the Austrian Legion had not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal to the British Military Attache the fact that the Austrian Legion had been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been with the British Military Attache.

The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time and they also kept a discreet surveillance over people entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection therewith. I recall too very definitely from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been successful.

It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto and connived therein.

As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch, a pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared that the

H1121 - 0057

Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich.

For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects and which stated:

"The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:

"During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of Austria's independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.

"The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German 'Ortsgruppen' of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.

"He was also informed that an effort would be made through the easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels or inns."

H1121 - 0058

This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford for the time being to take open action.

That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. Barthlomew's massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be no reference to anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with "Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation". In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.

The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.

Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under reference.

"A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria.

H1121-0059

"The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.

"Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create better contact between the party leadership and its members as well as with respect to new propaganda measures.

"One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the entire Austro-German frontier.

"From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to a uniform and common procedure.

"The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.

"When the next action against the Government takes place these persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

"In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:

"A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is <u>the problem</u>. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

"B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier."

The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.

On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel.

H1121-0060

Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few "nationally-minded" Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.

In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked "Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer". The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen "I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny." Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.

Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the "Grossdeutschum" idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.

Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression, and on one occasion, by mobolizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at would be respected.

The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, the public text is as follows:

> "Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.
>
> "It is therefore declared:
>
> "(1) In the sense of the statement made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government

H1121-0061

H1121 - 0062

recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria:[1]

"(2) Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence:

"(3) The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the said protocols are not hereby affected.

"Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions."

Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the "national opposition" a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duty announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting from an official despatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor Schuschnigg was reported as having with the "moderate Nazis", Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:

"It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts, these conversations will be followed with interest. A major consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that Chancellor Hitler himself has

---

1. On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated with respect to Austria (I quote from Documents on International Affairs, Vol. I. 1935, published by the Royal Institute of National Affairs, (London, 1936) p. 171):

"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an "Anschluss". The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is not supported by the people can continue permanently."

always been in favor of indirect rather than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however, it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25, when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge of overt acts, but through fear - through fear of reprisals when a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come, those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what element of weakness.

"The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore, not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance without the country..."

The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkischer Verein, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.

H1121 - 0063

Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937, Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian Cabinet.

The Leopold memorandum is as follows:

For the Internal Pacification of Austria.

(In Mr. Messersmith's affidavit there appears at this point the body of Captain Leopold's lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold's statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.)

Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian Government, demanding authorization to form a "nationalistic party", which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936, when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less violence.

The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to register Germany's emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von Neurath's visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after the Nazi came into power, he had told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order that he might exercise "a restraining influence" and render service to his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.

Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain, knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, Von Neurath had been just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian Cabinet.

H1121 - 0064

About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called "Committee of Seven", consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss "nationalistic ambitions" with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means whereby the "Nationalists" could be incorporated into the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria's independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

I left Vienna on, July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister's conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest in maintaining Austria's independence and England had expressed her interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be assured of real support. when the Austrian government could no longer expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria's independence, bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness towards Austria and its intention of maintaining its respect for its sovereignty and independence.

(Signed) G. Messersmith

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the
United States of America, duly commissioned
and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this
28th day of August, 1945.

William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States
of America

H1121-0065

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I760-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

GEORGE S MESSERSMITH, wurde zuerst unter Eid gestellt und machte dann die folgenden Aussagen:

Im Zeitraum von I930 bis zum spaeten Fruehjahr I934 war ich General Konsul der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in Berlin. Waehrend dieses Zeitraumes und besonders waehrend des Jahres I933 bis zu meiner Abreise nach Oesterreich im Spaetfruehling I934 hatte mich die Beschaffenheit meiner Arbeit in haeufige Verbindung mit Beamten der deutschen Regierung gebracht, um diese Behauptung zu begruenden, ist es notwendig zu erklaeren, dass diese Beruehrung deutscher hochgestellter Regierungsbeamten mit mir und einigen meiner hauptsaechlichen Mitarbeiter infolge der Lage der Dinge zu jener Zeit erforderlich war.

Im Zeitraum unmittelbar bevor die Nationalsozialistische Partei an die Macht gelangt war, war es notwendig meinerseits und seitens einiger meiner Mitarbeiter, Verbindung mit hochgestellten Beamten der deutschen Regierung zu unterhalten infolge der verwirrten Verhaeltnisse, die durch die unsichere politische Lage existierten. Dies brachte fuer amerikanische Firmen Schwierigkeiten aller Art mit sich, welche die Einmischung des Generalkonsulates im Dienstwege notwendig machten. Ausser dieser Verbindung mit Regierungsbeamten hatte ich infolge meiner Amtstaetigkeit weiterhin Verbindungen mit Personen aller Parteien in Deutschland, um mich, und damit auch unsere Regierung laufend von den Entwicklungen des politischen Bildes in Deutschland zu unterrichten. Waehrend dieses Zeitraumes bevor die Nationalsozialistische Partei an die Macht kam hatte ich deshalb inoffizielle Verbindungen mit Leuten in der Nationalsozialistischen Partei, um Informationen ueber ihre Zwecke und Ziele zu erhalten. Dieser Kontakt bestand jedoch nur von dem Machtantritt di dieser Partei und mehr mit untergeordneten als erstrangigen Mitgliedern.

Sofort nach Machtantritt der nationalsozialistischen Partei zu Beginn des Jahres I933 wurden von der neuen Regierung allerlei willkuerliche Schritte unternommen, sowie auch von verschiedenen Bureaus und untergeordneten Dienststellen, welche die Rechte und den Besitz von amerikanischen Staatsbuergern beruehrten und ich hatte infolge meiner offiziellen Aufgabe als Generalkonsul die vorerste Pflicht, amerikanische Buerger und deren Eigentum zu schuetzen.

Infolge dieser Verantwortlichkeit musste ich beinahe alle hochgestellten Mitglieder der deutschen Regierung, mit Ausnahme von Hitler, und eine grosse Anzahl von deutschen Beamten unter Ministerrang sehen.

Die Beschaffenheit meiner Pflichten war derartig, das s ich einen betraechtlichen Teil meiner Tage mit Besuchen solcher Beamten verbrachte, um die Beschuetzung von amerikanischen Interessen und Eigentum zu besprechen. Zwecks Einholung von Informationen waren mir einige dieser untergeordneten Beamten schon vor dem Machtantritt der Partei bekannt. Es ist schwer, in einem Dokument dieser Art hinreichend zu erklaeren, unter welchen Umstaenden diese Beamten der deutschen Naziregierung oft Anlass fanden, ganz frei ueber Sachen der Nazipolitik im allgemeinen zu besprechen und ganz ohne Vorbehalt die Zwecke und Ziele der Naziregierung zu eroertern. Oft waren unsere Besprechungen schwierig und lang auf Grund der Angelegenheiten, welche ich vorzulegen hatte, und in welchen ich eine feste Stellung behaupten musste. Am Ende von solchen amtlichen Besprechungen sprachen sie haeufig offen und ohne Vorbehalt ueber die Ziele des herrschenden Systems. Es ist umso wichtiger, dies im Anfange meiner Aussage zu erwaehnen, weil ich zu keiner Zeit vor diesen Nazibeamten die Tatsache verbarg, dass ich keinerlei Anteil an ihren Ansichten hatte, ich zoegerte auch nicht, ihnen zu sagen, was ich fuer die Gefahren in ihren Richtungslinien, wenn sie befolgt, sah, nicht nur fuer Deutschland allein, sondern auch fuer Europa und den Rest der Welt.

H1121-0066

Ihre freimuetige Ausdrucksweise mir gegenueber war um so interessanter im Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass ich nie zoegerte, die Rechte der Vereinigten Staaten und Ihrer Buerger im staerksten Masse zu betonen, wenn dieselben verletzt wurden. Man muss mit den Verhaeltnissen, der Zeit mit der Wesensart und der Psychologie dieser hohen und der untergeordneten Nazis bekannt sein, um die Tatsache zu wuerdigen, dass ich aufrichtig in meinen Ansichten war und nicht zoegerte, dieselben zu aeussern und zu betonen, wie sehr wir fuer die Rechte unseres Landes und unserer Buerger einstehen, was sie veranlasste, mich zu achten und mir mehr zu enthuellen, als wahrscheinlich anderen fremden Vertretern.

Was auch immer die Gruende gewesen sein moegen, die Naziregierungsbeamten waren fast ohne Ausnahmem von den hoechsten bis zu den niedrigsten, mit denen ich Beziehungen hatte, in meisten Faellen erstaunlich offen in ihren Unterredungen, und ohne ihre Ziele zu verbergen. Unter den Leuten welche ich oefter sah, und auf welche ich mich auf viele meiner folgenden Aussagen beziehe, waren die folgenden:

I. Hermann Goering: Goering wurde sofort nach Machtantritt der Nazis I Innenminister von Preussen und hatte als socher die Polizei und in mancher Beziehung auch die inneren Angelegenhaiten des uebrigen Deutschlands unter sich. Er war Oberhaupt der Gestapo, der Polizei und der Verwaltungsorganisation von Preussen. Kurz nachher wurde er Minister der Luftwaffe und machte es in mehreren Gespraechen ganz klar, dass Deutschland die staerkste Luftwaffe der Welt aufbauen wuerde, damit besitze es dann eine der staerksten Waffen um ihre anerkannte Politik ausfuehren zu koennen. Ich fand in Goering einen der wenigen Maenner des Nazi Regimes und in mancher Beziehung der einzige Mann, mit dem eine verstaendige Unterredung gehalten werden konnte und welcher in gewissen Punkten zumindest einer Ueberzeugung zugaenglich war. Er war eine starke Persoenlichkeit, voller Hassgefuehl und Vorurteilen und beseelt von einer Entschlossenheit wie er auch oft bemerkte, die Schande des ersten Weltkrieges auszuloeschen.

2. General Milch: General Milch war kein Nazi vor der Machtuebernahme der Partei 1933, Er war Leiter der deutschen Lufthansa gewesen, der bedeutendsten deutschen Luftfahrt-Gesellschaft, welche Flugverkehr in allen Teilen Deutschlands, in verschiedenen Teilen Europas und sogar im fernen Osten unterhielt. Er war ein ausserordentlich faehiger Mann und Goering brachte ihn als seinen ersten Mitarbeiter ins Luftfahrtministerium mit und machte ihn zum General und damit seinen Entschluss zur Durchfuehrung zu bringen, die deutsche Luftwaffe so schnell als moeglich aufzubauen.

3. Hjalmar Schacht: Schacht war ohne Zweifel einer der findigsten Finanzmaenner seiner Zeit, nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch in Europa. Er wurde in den Vereinigten Staaten geboren und sprach fliessend Englisch. Er hegte grosse Freundschaft und Verstaendnis fuer die Vereinigten Staaten. Er war einer derjenigen, die in den letzten Monaten 1932 zusammen mit anderen Finanzmaennern und mit bestimmten Industriellen verantwortlich dafuer waren, dass die Schulden der NSDAP abbezahlt wurden und dass dieselbe zur Macht kam. Schacht war ein ausserordentlich ehrgeiziger Mann und glaubte, dass er deutscher Reichspraesident unter den Nazis werden koennte. Er und seine Kameraden glaubten, dass es ihnen dadurch, dass sie die Nazis zur Macht verholfen haetten, moeglich sein wuerde, das herrschende System zu ueberwachen und Deutschland fuer ihre eigenen Ziele, die in vieler Hinsicht nicht die Ziele des Nazi-Systems waren, zu formen. Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass das Nazi-System nur durch das Finanzgenie und die Findigkeit Schachts in der Lage war, sich in den ersten Jahren nach der Machtuebernahme zu halten; denn ohne die finanziellen Unternehmungen Schachts waere das Wiederaufruestungs- und andere Programme der Nazis, die zu wirtschaftlicher und politischer Herrschaft ueber Europa fuehrten, nicht moeglich gewesen.

4. Hans Frank: Er war einer der fanatischsten, entschiedensten und aufrichtigsten Nazis und einer der Radikalsten von Anfang an. Ich kann diese Behauptungen auf Grund von Unterhaltungen, die ich mit ihm hatte, machen.

H1121 - 0067

H1121 - 0068

5. Wilhelm Frick: Er war einer der entschiedensten und fanatischsten Nazis, ebenso wie Frank, der von Anfang an nicht die wahren Ziele des Nazi-Systems verbarg.

6. Graf Schwerin von Krosigk: Er war einer der Maenner, die keine Nazis waren, bevor die NSDAP zur Macht kam; hat sich aber aus Zweckmaessigkeitsgruenden mit dem System verbunden. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass er anfaenglich nicht die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Ziele der Nazis anerkannte, aber ungeachtet dessen, wurde er durch seine persoenliche Tuechtigkeit, eines der wirksamsten Werkzeuge.

7. Joseph Goebbels: Nach Hitler war Goebbels der fanatischste, Rueck-sichtsloseste und schamloseste aller Nazifuehrer; seine Klugheit und Geschicklichkeit waren unbestreitbar. Goering und Goebbels waren die zwei nahestehendsten Paladine Hitlers vom Anfang der Bewegung an und blieben es auch spaeterhin von allen Nazifuehrern, die Hitler nahestanden, war keiner gefaehrlicher als Goebbels. Er war verschroben und nichts konnte ihn in seinen Handlungsweisen auf irgend einem Gebiet zurueckhalten. Ich weiss das von Unterhaltungen, die ich mit ihm hatte.

8. Richard Walther Darre: Darree war kein grosses Geisteskind, aber ein Fanatiker, und einer der Hauptfuehrer des inneren Rates der NSDAP. Obwohl er selbst keine Politik machte, war er doch einer von denjenigen, die wegen ihrer Unbarmherzigkeit ein glaenzendes Werkzeug zur Durchfuehrung der Nazipolitik abgaben.

9. Robert Ley: Ley war ein Fanatiker, und hatte einen guten Verstand; seine Hauptaufgabe lag auf em Gebiet des Arbeitswesens. Er war aeusserst unbarmherzig was auch seine Taten, die alle genau aufgezeichnet sind, beweisen.

IO. Hans Heinrich Lammers: Er war einer der Beamten der frueheren deutschen Regierungen, der aus Zweckmaessigkeitsgruenden eines der wirkungsvollsten Werkzeuge des Nazisystems wurde. Er war vollstaendig vertraut mit dem deutschen burokratischen System und war von unschaetzbarem Wert fuer die Naziherrschaft von Beginn an, indem er ihr seinen Verstand und sein Wissen zur Verfuegung stellte.

II. Otto Meissner: Meissner, genau wie Lammers, war ein alter Beamter, dessen Laufbahn die eines Intriganten und Nuetzlichkeitspolitikers war. Er war verschlagen, schlau und teilweise auch gescheit und wurde, in der ersten Zeit von den Nazis als Werkzeug gebraucht, um die gesteckten Ziele zu erreichen, ausserdem wurde er wegen seiner engen Verbindungen zum fruehren Praesidenten Hindenburg und wegen des absoluten Vertrauens, das Hindenburg in ihn hatte, verwandt. Meissner war ein uebelwollender Mensch und er ist einer derjenigen, die dafuer verantwortlich sind, dass die NSDAP zur Macht kam und deren Vorhaben gefoerdert hat, als sie an der Macht war.

I2. Franz von Papen: Jeder Bericht ueber von Papen muss vollstaendig sein. Es genuegt zu bemerken, dass seine Handlungweise nur von Zweckmaessigkeitsgruenden geleitet wurde. Er war kein Nazi als die Nationalsozialisten zur Macht kamen. Er blieb fuer eine Weile Gegner der Nazis, nachdem sie bereits an der Macht waren. Er war ausersehen worden fuer das Blutbad in der Sankt Bartholomaeusnacht im Juni I934. Trotz alldem, wurde er eines der wirkuhgsvollsten Werkzeuge der Nazis, besonders auf diplomatischem Gebiet, er wurde dazu bestimmt, die Un eingeschraenktheit und Selbststaendigkeit anderer Staaten zu untergraben. Von Papen hatte kein Gewissen, und obzwar er vielleicht nicht mit gewissen Dingen uebereinstimmte, die die Nazis taten, arbeitete er doch mit dem gleichen Eifer fuer sie und ihre Ziele, wie andere hohe Beamte der Partei, Hitler selbst mit einbegriffen.

I3. Walther Funk: Er war Schriftleiter einer der fuehrenden Finanzzeitungen Berlins vor der Uebernahme durch die Nazis und hat sehr wenig offene Sympathie fuer sie gezeigt, als sie an der Macht waren. Er wurde sofort von Goebbels in die Parteiorganisation hineingezogen und spaeter wurde er zu einem begeisterten Natioanlsozialisten und eines der wirkungvollsten Werkzeuge der Partei wegen seiner unzweifelhaften Faehigkeiten auf verschiedenen Gebieten.

I4. General Wilhelm Keitel: Er war bei der Machtuebernahme der Nazis einer der fuehrenden Generaele der deutschen Armee, der keine Sympathie fuer das Nazisystem hatte, der aber glaubte, dass er gut dazu zu gebrauchen sei, der deutschen Armee neue Macht zu geben und Deutschlands Stellung in Europa.

Aus Unterhaltungen, die ich mit Keitel hatte, glaube ich zu entnehmen, dass er zu Anfang des Nazisystems keine Sympathie fuer die Naziplaene gegen die Selbstaendigkeit anderer europaeischer Staaten hatte. Damals hatte er nur ein Interesse daran, das Nazisystem dazu zu benutzen, mehr Macht fuer die deutsche Armee zu bekommen und die Stellung Deutschlands in Europa wiederherzustellen. Als es augenscheinlich wurde, dass das Ziel der Nazis in greifbare Nahe kam und dass Deutschland Europa beherrschen konnte, wurde er zu einem bereitwilligen Genossen der Nazis in all ihren Taten.

I5; Admiral Erich von Raeder: Admiral von Raeder war bei der Machtuebernahme einer der hervorragendsten Offiziere der deutschen Flotte. Die oben gemachten Angaben ueber General Keitel treffen ebenfalls auf Raeder zu. Er war zu allererst daran interessiert, die deutsche Flotte wieder aufzubauen und bediente sich zu diesem Zweck der Nationalsozialisten. Genau wie Keitel, wurde er von dem Nazigedanken zu Herrschen erst viel spaeter erfuellt, als diese von dem Gedanken einer vollstaendigen Beherrschung, die im Bereich des Moeglichen schien, wie berauscht waren.

I6. Admiral Karl Doenitz: Admiral Doenitz war nicht immer geistig ausgeglichen. Er war kein Nationalsozialist als die Partei and die Macht kam. Trotzdem wurde er einer der ersten hohen Offiziere von Armee und Flotte und war in vollkommener Uebereinstimmung mit der Begriffslehre und den Zielen der Nazis.

I7. Dr. Bohle: Er war ein sehr intelligenter und findiger Kopf, ein leidenschaftlicher Nationalsozialist, der dazu benutzt wurde, die Taetigkeit der Nazis in den verschiedenen Laendern zu leiten, besonders im Bezug auf Propagandafragen. Er war ein ueberzeugender Nazi.

I8. Dr. Schuckert: Er war ein ehemaliger Beamter, der sich zur Weltanschauung der Nazis hingezogen fuehlte und der sofort nach der Machtuebernahme einer der fuehrenden Maenner wurde. Als Unterstaatssekretaer fuer Erziehung fuehrte er die ruecksichtslosen Massnahmen zur vollkommenen Kontrolle der Kirche, der Schulen und Universitaeten im Lande durch.

I9. Dr Krupp von Bohlen: Kein Nazi und vielleicht niemals vollstaendig mit der Nazi Ideologie einverstanden, wurde er eines ihrer vollkommenen Werkzeuge in der Durchfuehrung des Wiederaufruestungsprogramms in Deutschland. Dies tat er, wie er dachte, es wuerde Deutschland auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiete fuehrend machen. Meine Untehaltungen mit Bohlen und meine Kenntnisse seiner persoenlichen Einstellung, nachdem ich Deutschland verlassen hatte, berechtigen mich zu der Annahme, dass er tatsaechlich niemals Sympathien fuer den groesseren Teil der Nazibestrebungen und sicherlich keinerlei Sympathien fuer die soziale Weltanschauung hegte.

20. Dr. Davidson: Er war frueher ein Beamter des Auswaertigen Amtes und blieb auch nach der Machtuebernahme dort. Soweit ich es beurteilen kann, stand er den politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Zielen der Nazis niemals wohlwollend gegenueber. Er blieb im Auswaertigen Amt nur, um ein Brotstelle zu haben, und er war eine der besten Nachrichtenquellen fuer mich.

Im Spaetfruehling oder Fruehsommer I934, das genaue Datum ist mir entfallen, verliess ich meinen Posten als Generalkonsul in Berlin und ging nach Wien, wo ich bis zum Spaetfruehling I937 blieb. Waehrend meines Aufenthaltes in Oesterreich hatte ich vertrauliche Unterredungen offizieller und privater Natur, mit dem hoechsten Beamten der oesterreichischen Regierung und auch mit vielen der untergeordneten und niedrigen Beamten. Ich hatte gleich zu Beginn mit diesen Beamten der oesterreichischen Regierung zweifellos so engen Kontakt, weil es bei meiner Ankunft in Oesterreich schon wohl bekannt war, dass ich ein ausgesprochener Gegner alles dessen, was Nazi-Regierung und Nazifuehrer anbetraf, war. Obwohl ich Minister eines Landes war, vondem in Oesterreich angenommen wurde, dass es keine direkten Interessen an der oesterreichischen Aussenpolitik haette, war es mir deshalb moeglich, viele Nachrichten von den verschiedenen oesterreichischen Beamten ueber die Entwicklung deutsch-oesterreichischer Beziehungen und der Beziehung Oesterreichs zu anderen europaeischen Laendern, zu erhalten. Unter denen, die ich oft sah und von denen ich Nachrichten uebermittelt bekam, befanden sich:

Praesident Miklas
Kanzler Dollfuss
Kanzler Schuschnigg
Aussenminister Berger-Waldenegg
Polizeipraesident und Sicherheitsminister Hofrat Skubl.

H1121-0069

Ich moechte noch ergaenzend hinzufuegen, dass sowohl in Berlin als auch in Wien eine grosse Anzahl Reporter waren, von denen viele besonders tuechtig waren und mit denen ich oft in Beruehrung kam.

Abschliessend moechte ich noch bemerken, dass ich waehrend meines Aufenthaltes in Oesterreich ziemlich viele Reisen nach Berlin unternahm und dort bei vielen Gelegenheiten die gleichen Persoenlichkeiten sah und sprach, die ich waehrend meiner Taetigkeit als Generalkonsul kennen gelernt hatte. Auf diese Weise erhielt ich meine deutschen Nachrichtenquellen aufrecht und schuf mir neue oesterreichische.

Ich fuehle mich daher voellig imstande, mit der notwendigen Glaubwuerdigkeit ueber die Tatsachen zu berichten, die in diesem Dokument nachstehend aufgefuehrt sind. Die bestimmten Unterredungen und Ereignisse, ueber die ich hier berichte, sind ganz bestimmte Tatsachen, die ich auch als Tatsachen berichte. In Bezug auf viele habe ich meine Erinnerung aufgefrischt an Hand von Einzelheiten aus zeitgenoessischen Berichten und Briefen, die ich waehrend dieses Zeitabschnittes schrieb. Die Meinungen, die ich ausspreche, sind meines Erachtens voll begruendet durch alle die Nachrichten, die ich von allen Quellen erhielt.

Gleich zu Beginn des Antritts der Naziregierung wurde mir sowohl von hohen als auch von untergeordneten Regierungsbeamten gesagt, dass der Anschluss Oesterreichs an Deutschland eine politische und wirtschaftliche Notwendigkeit sei und dass diese Einverleibung durchgefuehrt werden wuerde, "was fuer Mittel auch dazu angewendet werden muessten". Obwohl ich keine genauen Plaetze und Zeitpunkte angeben kann, kann ich versichern, dass jeder einzelne der deutschen Beamten, die ich obenstehend angegeben habe, mit Ausnahme von Schacht, von Krosigk und Krupp von Bohlen mir das gleiche an verschiedenen Orten und zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten mitgeteilt hat. Ich kann versichern, dass ein jeder in Deutschland, der irgendeine Ahnung hatte, was vorging, klar verstand, dass Hitler und die Naziregierung sich diesem Ziel unwiderruflich verschrieben haben und der einzige Zweifel, der je in Unterhaltungen oder Schriftstuecken bestand, war der des "wie" und "wann".

Als die Naziregierung 1933 zur Macht kam, war Deutschland natuerlich viel zu schwach, um irgend welche Gewaltsdrohungen gegen irgendein Land wagen zu koennen, so etwa wie die Nazis 1938 drohen konnten. Stattdessen war es die offen zugegebene und kundgegebene Politik der Naziregierung, die gleichen Ergebnisse, die sie spaeter durch Gewalt erreichten, jetzt durch Verfahren, welche sich in Deutschland als so erfolgreich erwiesen hatten, zu erreichen. Naemlich: sich einen Stuetzpunkt in der Regierung anzueignen, am liebsten im Innenministerium, das die Polizei kontrolliert, und dann die Widerstandselemente schnellstens auszumerzen. Waehrend meines Aufenthaltes in Oesterreich wurde mir von Kanzler Dollfuss, Kanzler Schuschnigg, Praesident Miklas und anderen hohen Beamten der oesterreichischen Regierung immer wieder mitgeteilt, dass die deutsche Regierung einen dauernden und unaufhoerlichen Druck auf die oesterreichische Regierung ausuebte um zu erreichen, dass eine gewisse Anzahl von Ministern mit Nazieinstellung in die Regierung aufgenommen werden. Der englische und franzoesische Geschaeftstraeger in Wien, mit denen ich in dauernder und naher Beruehrung war, bestaetigten dies an Hand von Unterhaltungen, die sie mit hohen oesterreichischen Beamten hatten.

Um die oesterreichische Regierung zu zwingen, ihre Bedingungen anzunehmen, war den Nazis jedes erreichbare Mittel recht, wirtschaftlicher Druck, Propaganda und als wichtigstes von allen, Terrorhandlungen miteinbegriffen.

H1121-0070

Meine Information bezueglich dieser terroristischen Gewalttaetigkeiten erhielt ich teilweise aus amtlichen Bekanntmachungen der oesterreichischen Regierung, teilweise aus verantwortlichen Nachrichtenquellen und in einem betraechtlichen Ausmasse von Skubl, dem Polizeipraesidenten und spaeteren Minister fuer oeffentliche Sicherheit, mit welchem ich regelmaessig zusammen kam und mit dem ich naeher bekannt war. Hier sollte noch hinzugefuegt werden, dass die oesterreichische Geheimpolizei unter Skubls Befehl eine der tuechtigsten in ganz Europa war.

Die Gewalttaetigkeiten traten beinahe dauernd in Erscheinung, aber waehrend dreier, deutlich hervortretenden Perioden erreichten sie ihren Hoehepunkt. Im Verlaufe der beiden ersten dieser Perioden - Mitte 1933 und Anfang 1934 - war ich noch in Berlin. Waehrend dieser Periode wurde mir von hohen Nazibeamten gelegentlich einer Besprechung mit denselben mitgeteilt, dass diese Terrorwellen von ihnen angestiftet und geleitet seien. In diesen meinen Unterredungen mit den hohen Nazibeamten fand ich keine Verschleierung der Tatsache, dass sie fuer diese Taetigkeiten in Oesterreich verantwortlich waren. Dieses Gestaendnis stimmte genau mit der Nazithese ueberein, naemlich, dass Terror notwendig ist und dazu benuetzt werden muss, um den Willen der Partei nicht nur Deutschland, sondern auch anderen Laendern aufzuzwingen. Ich erinnere mich ganz deutlich daran, dass General Milch einer derjenigen war, welche sich offen darueber aussprachen, dass diese Gewalttaetigkeiten in Oesterreich von der Nazipartei geleitet seien und der seiner Besorgnis diesbezueglich Ausdruck gab, ebenso sein Nicht-Einverstaendnis mit dieser bestimmten Politik der Partei.

Waehrend der Welle terroristischer Ereignisse im Mai und Juni 1934 hatte ich bereits meine Pflichten als amerikansicher Geschaeftstraeger in Wien uebernommen. Die Bombenattentate dieses Zeitabschnittes waren in erster Linie auf Eisenbahnen, Sommerfrischen und die katholische Kirche gerichtet, welch letztere gemaess Nazianschauung eine der staerksten Organisationen war, die ihnen Widerstand entgegensetzte. Ich erinnere mich jedoch, dass diese Gewalttaetigkeiten bestimmt waehrend einiger Tage, waehrend der Zusammenkunft Hitler's mit Mussolini in Venedig Mitte Juni 1934, stark nachliessen. Zu dieser Zeit unterstuetzte Mussolini die oesterreicische Regierung in starker Weise und war an der Aufrechterhaltung der oesterreichischen Unabhaengigkeit und der Hoheitsrechte, sowohl als auch der Niederhaltung des Nazi-Einflusses und der Nazi-Betaetigung in Oesterreich stark und tief interessiert. Zu dieser Zeit konnte sich Hitler einen Bruch mit Mussolini noch nicht erlauben und erklaerte sich zweifellos mit einer kurzfristigen Beendigung dieser Bombenattentate, worauf Mussolini ausdruecklich bestand, einverstanden, weil Hitler persoenlich fuer dieses Treffen mit Mussolini eine moeglichst guenstige Atmosphaere haben wollte. Das vollstaendige Unterbleiben der Bombenanschlaege waehrend der Hitler - Mussolini Konferenz wurde sowohl von mir als auch von oesterreichischen Behoerden und allen Beobachtern damals als ein offenes Zugestaendnis Hitlers und der deutschen Regierung dafuer angesehen, dass die Anschlaege planmaessig und vollstaendig vorbereitet und angestiftet waren und von Deutschland ueberwacht wurden.

Ich kann mich jetzt nicht mehr an die Einzelheiten der Terroranschlaege erinnern, aber sie sind genau in den damaligen Gesandschaftstelegrammen berichtet worden. Diese Berichte gruenden sich auf persoenliche und haeufige Beruehrung mit hohen oesterreichischen Beamten und viele der genauen Einzelheiten, die ich von dem Chef der oesterreichischen Polizei, Dr. Skubl, erhielt. Waehrend keinerlei Zweifel darueber bestand, dass diese Ausschreitungen von Deutschland gefuehrt und angeordnet waren, so war genuegend Beweismaterial ueber den Ursprung der Ausschrei-

H1121 - 0071

tungen durch die Tatsache vorhanden, dass Bombenstuecke, die die oesterreichische Polizei gesammelt hatte, zeigten, dass sie in Deutschland hergestellt waren und von Deutschland nach Oesterreich eingefuehrt worden waren. Obwohl ich mich nicht erinnere, diese Bombenstuecke selbst gesehen zu haben, so erinnere ich mich doch genau daran, dass mir von hohen oesterreichischen Staatsstellen erzaehlt wurde, dass diese sie gesehen haetten und dass kein Zweifel ueber ihren Ursprung bestehe. Ein weiterer Beweis, dass diese Ausschreitungen von Deutschland geleitet waren, obwohl in den meisten Faellen die Bomben tatsaechlich von oesterreichischen Nazis gelegt wurden, zeigten damalige Aufzeichnungen der Wiener Polizei und Gerichte, dass wenn einige dieser Nazis verhaftet wurden, dieselben stolz erklaerten, sie haetten diese Taten begangen.

Ich oder Gesandschaftsrat A.W. Kliefoth haben wegen ihrer Bedeutung ueber diese Ausschreitungen berichtet. Anfuehrungen von einigen dieser Mitteilungen lauten folgendermassen:
"Es wurden Koffer, die leicht entzuendbare Stoffe enthielten, in den drei Hauptbahnhoefen Wiens gelassen und der Mechanismus so eingestellt, dass sie gleichzeitig am 6. Mai abends explodieren mussten. Der Schaden war sehr gering. Die Polizei beschuldigte die Nazis der Verbrechen. "
"Eine oeffentliche, amtliche Mitteilung vom 10. Mai gab bekannt, dass am vorhergehenden Abend eine Bombe in der Naehe der Philadelphia-Bruecke in Wien explodiert war und dass zwei Personen verwundet wurden.
Am gleichen Abend explodierte in einem der oertlichen Biergaerten, in dem ein Piknik der Heimwehr abgehalten wurde, eine Bombe und verwundete eine Frau leicht."
Offizielle Depesche von Wien datiert 15. Mai 1934.
"Waehrend der letzten Woche war die Fortsetzung von terroristischen Naziaktionen eine Quelle schwerer Sorgen fuer die Regierungsstellen, indem Nazis oeffentliche Plaetze und Bahnlinien bombten, um den oesterreichischen Fremdenverkehr zu schaedigen, von denen einige unten beschrieben sind. Dieser Terror wurde gemaess eines wohl organisierten Planes durchgefuehrt, der zweifellos von Naziagenten in Deutschland geleitet wurde. Die Explosivstoffe, die die Nazis in der letzten Woche verwandten, waren laut des Aeusseren Amtes in Deutschland hergestellt und nach Oesterreich geschmuggelt worden."
Die Beheorden gaben auch in einer offiziellen Erklaerung vom 24. Mai eine Anzahl von anderen Bombenattentaten in Braunau, Bad Ischl und Dorf an der Pram zu. Waehrend der Schaden an Leben und Eigentum gering war - Leben wurden nicht eingebuesst - so gab die Regierung doch ihre Unfaehigkeit zu, mittels der bestehenden Sicherheitsmitteln ueber die Lage Herr zu werden.
"Am 25. Mai bestaetigten die Behoerden offiziell eine weitere Bombenexplosion, die am 23. Mai im Hause des Erzbischofs von Salzburg betraechtlichen Schaden verursachte. In Morzg, in der Naehe von Salzburg, zerstoerte eine Bombenexplosion am 23. Mai einen Blumenstand und verursachte Schaden in Hoehe von 10.000.- Schillingen. Ein neun Jahre altes Kind wurde in Anleiten bei Ried ernstlich verletzt."
Amtliche Depeschen von Wien, datiert 29. Mai 1934:
"Die terroristischen Nazigewalttaten hielten in der letzten Woche an trotz der Regierungserklaerung hinsichtlich der Anwendung des Standrechtes fuer gewalttaetige Verbrechen an der Oeffentlichkeit in ganz Oesterreich. Diese Verbrechen, die jetzt mit Tod bestraft wurden, umschlossen auch boeswillige Taten gegen die oeffentliche Ordnung, Schaedigung der Eisenbahn, des Telegraphensystems, des Telefonsystems und des drahtlosen staatlichen Dienstes."
"Die Entwicklung der neuerlichen Attentaten war, dass viele Taten gegen das Eigentum der Roemisch-Katholischen Kirche, die in den Augen der Nazis der staerkste Widerstand gegen das Nazisystem war, gerichtet wurden."

H1121 - 0072

"Ausser der missglueckten Bombenexplosion an dem erzbischoeflichen Palast in Salzburg wurde einige Tage frueher, am 20. Mai eine Bombe im Nebengebaeude des erzbischoeflichen Palastes in Feldkirch zur Entzuendung gebracht, die geringen Schaden hervorrief. Die Polizei beschuldigte die Nazis der Attentate und verhaftete eine Anzahl Verdaechtiger. Eine Explosion zerbrach in der Nacht vom 27. Mai Fenster in den Kirchen und Pfarrhaeusern von St. Paul in Carinthia."

"Am 26. Mai explodierte eine Bombe in Linz vor dem Eingang einer der Schulen und brach 44 Fenster. Die Schule war zur Zeit der Attentatsveruebung leer. In der gleichen Nacht wurde ein Versuch unternommen, die elektrischen Werke in Braunau zu sprengen, eine Sache, die voruebergehende Stoerung in der Stromversorgung verursachte."

"Andere Attentate, die von den Zeitungen nicht berichtet wurden, schlossen ein: einen Versuch am 30. Mai, eine der Donaubruecken zu sprengen, eine Bombenexplosion in einem der volkstuemlichen Kaffehaeuser und zahlreiche Telefonzellen und Zeitungsstaende zu sprengen."

Offizielle Depesche von Wien, datiert 4. Juni 1934:

"Der nationalsozialistische Terror in Oesterreich, der vor einigen Wochen langsam und vorsichtig begann, erreichte in der Zeit vom 8. bis 11. Juni in schweren und recht bedenklichen Ausbruechen seinen Hoehepunkt. Diese Ausbrueche bedrohten nicht nur den Frieden und die Sicherheit des Landes, sondern auch den auslaendischen Fremdenverkehr, der ueberaus wichtig fuer das Wirtschaftsleben Oesterreichs ist. Die Versuche, die Bahnlinien bei Wien und in anderen Teilen Oesterreichs zu zerstoeren, wie auch die terroristischem Attentate in den Haupttouristzentren beschaeftigte die Aufmerksamkeit der Regierung ueber alles andere hinaus. Nach einer Anzahl von wichtigen Kabinettsitzungen wurden neue Massnahmen unternommen, um dem Terrorismus entgegen zu treten und diese Angelegenheit bildete auch den Gegenstand diplomatischer Aussprachen zwischen Oesterreich und Deutschland."

Offizielle Nachricht aus Wien, datiert 13. Juni 1934:

"Die Gewalttaetigkeiten, die in Oesterreich waehrend der am 23. Juni beendigten Woche veruebt worden sind, waren beinahe so zahlreich wie in der Woche vorher, jedoch nicht so heftig in ihrem Charakter. Die Angriffe waren wie zuvor auf die Quartiere nazi-feindlicher Vereinigungen und Personen, oeffentliche Versorgungswerke, jedoch weniger gegen den Eisenbahnverkehr gerichtet. Mehrere zusaetzliche Sprengstofflager wurden in Wien und an anderen Stellen entdeckt." .....

"Eine kuerzlich von Terroristen in der Wiener Hochschule fuer Landwirtschaft verursachte Explosion lief auf einen Sachschaden von ungefaehr 40.000.- Schilling hinaus. Auf Grund dieser Nazi-Gewaltakte wurde die Schule fuer die Dauer von einer Woche geschlossen.

Anlaesslich eines verursachten Bombenattentates gegen das Postamt in Bregenz, der Hauptstadt der Provinz Vorarlberg, beschlagnahmte die Polizei einen Vorrat von Sprengstoffen, die die Aufschriften von "Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld, G.m.b.H.", "Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co." und "Fabrik Wurzendorf", alles in Deutschland gelegene Sprengstoff-Fabriken, trugen."

Amtliche Nachricht aus Wien, datiert 25. Juni 1934:

"Waehrend der am 30. Juni beendigten Woche fanden weniger terroristische Gewalttaetigkeiten von besonderer Bedeutung statt, aber die Anzahl kleiner Gewaltakte, Bombenexplosionen, Angriffe auf Elektrizitaets- und Wasserwerke und das Eisenbahnsystem hatten sich nicht vermindert. Die hauptsaechlichen Angriffe waren auf katholische Stiftungen, ehemalige Nationalsozialisten und die Stadt Salzburg gerichtet. Der Zweck im letzterwaehnten Falle war, die auslaendischen Touristen vom Besuche der Salzburger Sommermusikfestspiele abzuschrecken.

Eine Bombe, die in der Roemisch-Katholischen Diezoese in Kapfenberg in der Provinz Steiermark am 24. Juni explodierte, fuehrte zum Tod des Kaplans, Pfarrer Franz Eibel. Verschiedene andere Personen wurden leicht verletzt. Der Tod war durch Terrorismus verursacht, wenn auch verschie-

H1121 - 0073

dene Faelle von Angriff vorlagen. Ebenso kamen Angriffe auf andere kirchliche Institutionen in verschiedenen Landesteilen vor."
"Eine Reihe von Gewalttaetigkeiten wurden am 28. Juni aus Salzburg und den anliegenden Touristenverkehrsmittelpunkten berichtet. Bomben wurden auf dem Marktplatz und anderen Stellen zur Explosion gebracht und es wurden Versuche gem acht, die elektrischen und Eisenbahn-Verbindungen in die Luft zu sprengen. Diese Gewalttaten waren zu dieser Zeit besonders gegen Salzburg gerichtet im Hinblick auf die bevorstehenden Sommerfestspiele, welche gewoehnlich Tausende von nichtdeutschen Touristen herbeizogen. Aehnliche Angriffe erfolgten am gleichen Tag in den Provinzen Vorarlberg und Tirol."
Amtliche Nachricht aus Wien, datiert 3. Juli 1934:
"Eine Reihe von geringeren Gewaltakten wurden aus allen Teilen Oesterreichs am Sonntag, den 15. Juni berichtet. Ein grosser Vorrat von Sprengstoffen wurde aus einer Werkstatt in Gloggnitz gestohlen; der Direktor dieses Unternehmens wurde zu einer Geldstrafe in Hoehe von 600 Schilling und zwei Wochen Haft wegen Vernachlaessigung der Bewachung dieser Vorraete verurteilt. In Unterkirchen beschaedigte am 17. Juni eine Bombenexplosion die oertliche Diezoese und die Elektrizitaetswerke. Am 18. Juni verletzte eine Bombenexplosion eine Person in Innsbruck und in St. Kathrein wurde ein Haus beschaedigt. In Wien wurde am 18. Juli eine oeffentliche Fernsprechstelle beschaedigt und in Brand gesteckt. Der Taeter, ein Nationalsozialist, wurde sofort von der Polizei verhaftet. In Edlach, einer ungefaehr 100 km von Wien entfernten Sommerfrische, wurde ein Versuch zur Sprengung der Eisenbahnschienen gemacht. Ein aehnlicher Versuch wurde in einer Tiroler Bergbahnstation unternommen."
Amtliche Nachricht aus Wien, datiert 26. Juli 1934:
"Im Zusatz zu diesen Gewalttaten versuchten die Nazis durch Verwendung der "Oesterreichischen Legion" einen Druck auf Oesterreich auszuueben. Diese Organisation, eine militaerische Streitmacht von mehreren tausend Mann, war nahe der oesterreichischen Grenze in Deutschland untergebracht, als eine dauernde und direkte Bedrohung Oesterreichs mittels Gewalttaten. Sie wurde ganz ausser Frage von der Naziregierung Deutschlands sanktioniert, da sie anders gar nicht haette bestehen koennen und war von ihr bewaffnet worden. Sie war aus oesterreichischen Nazis zusammen gesetzt, die aus Oesterreich nach dem Begehen zahlreicher Verbrechen dort geflohen waren, und aus Oesterreichern in Deutschland, die sowohl das muessige Leben als auch die Bezahlung durch Deutsche Behoerden als sehr anziehend fanden."

H1121 - 0074

Nach dem Juli Putsch, im August I934, benachrichtigte mich der britische Militaerattache in Wien von einer Unterhaltung, die er mit dem deutschen Militaerattache General Muff gehabt hatte. Es sei hier bemerkt, dass, soweit ich weiss, General Muff in Deutschland eine recht einflussreiche Persoenlichkeit war, die eine vorherrschende Rolle in der deutschen Gesandtschaft in Wien spielte. General Muff erzaehlte dem britischen Militaerattache, dass er gerade in Deutschland gewesen sei und drei Tage mit Hitler in Berchtesgaden verbracht habe, in welchen er einige Unterhaltungen mit Hitler gehabt habe. Er sagte dann -im August I934 - dass die oesterreichische Legion noch nicht aufgeloest sei und dass Hitler ausfuerhlich mit ihm ueber die Legion gesprochen habe. General Muff betrachtete es nicht als der Muehe wert, dem britischen Militaerattache, die Tatsache zu verheimlichen, dass die oesterreichische Legion bewaffnet war und dass die Nazis die Legion bewaffnet hatten. Ich besuchte General Muff spaeter selbst und empfing den gleichen Eindruck diese Tatsachen betreffend, obgleich er nicht so offen und deutlich in seinen Feststellungen mir gegenueber war wie mit dem britischen Militaerattache.

Die Ereignisse des Putsches am 25. Juli I934 sind zu gut bekannt, um sie in dieser Aussage zu wiederholen. Ich moechte hier nur sagen, dass kein Zweifel darueber bestehen kann, dass der Putsch von Nazibeamten von Deutschland aus, mittels ihrer Organisation in Oesterreich, die sich aus deutschen und oesterreichischen Nazis zusammensetzte, befohlen und organisiert worden war. Dr. Rieth, der deutsche Gesandte in Wien, war durchaus vertraut mit allem, was geschehen wuerde und was geplant war. Die deutsche Gesandtschaft befand sich unmittelbar der britischen Gesandtschaft, und die oesterreichische Geheimpolizei ueberwachte sehr streng alle Personen, die die deutsche Gesandtschaft betraten. Die Englaender hatten zu dieser Zeit ihren eigenen Geheimdienst in Wien und ueberwachte ebenfalls die Leute diskret, die die deutsche Gesandtschaft betraten. Es wurde mir von beiden - englischen und oesterreichischen Beamten - gesagt, dass eine Anzahl von Leuten, die die deutsche Gesandtschaft haeufig besucht hatten, spaeter von oesterreichischen Gerichten dafuer schuldig befunden wurden, dass sie in den Putsch verwickelt gewesen seien. Darueber hinaus hatte ich persoenlich ein wachsames Auge auf Dr. Rieths Betaetigung, und ich zweifelte auf Grund all meiner Informationen niemals daran, dass Dr. Rieth in enger und ununterbrochener Fuehlung mit Naziagenten - es waren Deutsche und Oesterreicher - in Oesterreich stand. Dr. Rith konnte nicht unvertraut mit dem Putsch und den damit verbundenen Einzelheiten gewesen sein. Ich erinnere mich auch zu genau an meine Unterhaltungen mit den hoechsten Beamten der oesterreichischen Regierung, in deren Verlauf sie mich dahingehend informiert hatten, dass Dr. Rieth in Fuehlung mit von Rintelen gewesen war, der jemals Plaenen der Nazis, Kanzler Dollfuss nachfolgen sollte, fuer den Fall, dass der Putsch erfolgreich war.

Es kann moeglich sein, dass Dr. Rieth persoenlich den Plaenen fuer den Putsch nicht sympathisch gegenueber stand, aber es steht ausser Frage, dass er durchaus vertraut mit ihnen war, und dass er seine Zustimmung dazu gegeben haben muss und damit einverstanden war.

Da dieser Putsch so wichtig war und einen ausgesprochenen Versuch darstellte, die oesterreichische Regierung zu stuerzen, und da er die Ermordung des oesterreichischen Kanzlers zur Folge hatte, nahm ich die Gelegenheit wahr, selbst einige verschiedene Zeugnisse zu ueberpruefen, die zeigen, dass der Putsch nicht nur mit Kenntnis der deutschen Regierung unternommen, sondern von ihr ersonnen war. Ich fand aus und fand es bestaetigt, dass nahezu ein Monat vor dem Putsch Goebbels zu Signor Cerutti, dem italienischen Gesandten in Berlin, sagte, dass binnen eines Monats eine Naziregierung in Wien bestehen werde. Am Abend vor dem Putsch erschien ein Flugbaltt in den Berliner Strassen, welches offenkundig machte, dass die Naziregierung volle Kenntnis davon hatte, was fuer den naechsten Tag in Wien geplant war. Es wurde ein Versuch seitens der deutschen Behoerden unternommen, dieses Flugblatt zu unterdruecken. Dieser Versuch war teilweise erfolgreich, aber Kopien waren zu dieser Zeit erhaeltlich, und ich

H1121-0075

erinnere mich, dass ein Beamter unserer Gesandtschaft in Berlin, dessen Namens ich mich nicht mehr entsinne, mir sagte, dass er eine Kopie davon gesehen habe. Am 25. Juli erschienen auch Aufsaetze in einigen deutschen Zeitungen, die aufzeigten, dass sie bezueglich des Zeitpunktes, an dem der Putsch stattfinden sollte, informiert waren, Ich will mich nicht in Einzelheiten verlieren bezueglich der Art der Beweise, aber nach den geschichtlichen Aufzeichnungen und den Tatsachen soweit sie mir persoenlich bekannt waren zu dieser Zeit, kann keine Frage darueber bestehen, dass der Putsch von der deutschen Regierung in Berlin und Muenchen ersonnen und unmittelbar geleitet worden war.

Waehrend der zwei Jahre, die dem Misserfolg des Putsches vom 25. Juli folgten,verblieben die Nazis in Oesterreich verhaeltnismaessig ruhig. Es ereigneten sich sehr wenig terroristische Akte Ende 1934 und, wenn ich mich recht entsinne, auch im Jahre 1935 und dem groesseren Teil von 1936. Diese Untaetigkeit stand im Einklang mit Richtlinien von Berlin wie unmittelbare Beweise bestaetigen, die hierueber zu jener Zeit zu meiner Kenntnis gelangten. Fruehzeitig im Januar versah mich der oesterreichische Aussenminister, Berger-Waldenegg, mit einem Dokument, das ich in jeder Hinsicht als genau betrachtete und das folgendermassen lautete:

"Der Deutsche Gesandte hier, von Papen wurdedrei mal von Kanzler Hitler zwecks laengerer Unterhaltungen gelegentlich seines letzten Besuches in Berlin empfangen, er nahm diese Gelegenheit wahr auch Schacht und von Neurath einen Besuch abzustatten. Waehrend dieser Unterhaltung wurden die folgenden Richtlinien gegeben:"

"Waehrend der naechsten zwei Jahre kann nichts unternommen werden, was Deutschland aussenpolitische Schwierigkeiten bereiten koennte. Aus diesem Grundemuss alles vermieden werden, was den Anschein erwecken koennte, Deutschland wolle sich in die innerpolitischen Angelegenheiten Oesterreichs einmischen. Kanzler Hitler will somit auch aus diesem Grunde nicht versuchen, in der gegenwaertigen schweren Krisis in der Nazionalsozialistischen Partei in Oesterreich zu intervenieren, obwohl er davon ueberzeugt ist, dass durch ein Wort von ihm Ordnung in die Prtei gebracht werden koennte. Dieses Wort aber will er aus aussenpolitischen Gruenden um so weniger geben, als er ueberzeugt ist, dass die fuer ihn erwuenschten Endziele auch ueber einen anderen Weg erreicht werden koennen. Natuerlich, erklaerte Kanzler Hitler dem Deutschen Minister hier, sei dies nicht als eine Interessenlosigkeit and der Idee der Oesterreichischen Unabhaengingkeit anzusehen. Vor allem auch kann Deutschland zum gegenwaertigen Zeitpunkt keine Parteimitglieder aus Oesterreich zurueckziehen und muss daher, ungeachtet der Devisenschwierigkeiten, jede Anstrengung machen, um den verfolgten Nationalsozialisten in Oesterreich Hilfe zu leisten.Folgendes Endergebnis wurde erreicht: Handelsminister Schacht gab schliesslich seine Genehmigung, dass von jetzt ab jeden Monat RM 200.000. - fuer diesen Zweck zur Seite gesetzt werden sollen (Unterstuetzung von Nationalsozialisten in Oesterreich). Mit der Kontrolle und Ueberwachung dieser monatlichen Summe wurde der Ingenieur Reinthaler betraut, der durch die Tatsache seiner Alleinkontrolle der Gelder, einen entschiedenen Einfluss auf die Parteianhaenger haben wuerde. Auf diese Weise wuerde es moeglich sein, die zur Zeit vorherrschenden Schwierigkeiten und Spaltungen in der oesterreichischen Nationalsozialistischen Partei auf die schnellste und einfachste Weise zu beendigen."

"Man gab Herrn von Papen gegenueber auch der Hoffnung Ausdruck, dass die kuerzliche gebilligte Gruendung von deutschen Ortsgruppen der nationalsozialisteischen Partei in Oesterreich (die sich aus deutschen Buergern in Oesterreich zusammensetzt) so eingerichtet werden koennte, dass es nicht den Anschein habe, dass Deutschland plane, sich in die innerpolitischen oesterreichischen Angelegenehtien einzumischen."

"Er wurde auch darueber unterrichtet, dass man dies durch Milderung der Auslandspressen anstreben werde, besonders im Hinblick auf die westlicher gelegenen, oesterreichischen Alpenabschnitte in der Weise, dass dem

H1121-0076

deutsch-oesterreichischen Alpenverein eine besondere Rolle dabei zufallen sollte. Die Milderung der Auslandspresse war natuerlich nur denjenigen gebilligt, die sich verpflichteten, die westlicher gelegenen oesterreichischen Alpengebiete zu besuchen, zu bestimmten Staedten zu gehen und in bestimmten Hotels oder Gasthaeusern zu wohnen."

Diese Politik der Nazis war von Zweckmaessigkeitsueberlegungen allein diktiert. Das grundsaetzliche Trachten, den Anschluss zu erzielen, verblieb vollstaendig unveraendert. Die brutale Ermordung des oesterreichischen Kanzlers Dollfuss und der ausser Frage stehende unmittelbare Angriff auf die oesterreichische Oberhoheit durch den Putsch, der von der deutschen Regierung von Deutschland aus geleitet war, hatte die oeffentliche Meinung in Oesterreich und Europa so erschuettert, dass die Nazis es sich fuer den Augenblick nicht leisten konnten offen zu handeln.

Dass die Anschlusspolitik vollkommen unveraendert blieb, wurde mir von Franz von Papen bei seiner Ankunft in Wien als deutscher Gesandter bestaetigt. Man wird sich erinnern, dass er diese Ernennung als deutscher Gesandter annahm, obwohl er wusste, dass er fuer Erschiessung in dem Bartholomaeus Blutbad am 30. Juni ausersehen war. Als er mir protokollgemaess kurz nach seiner Ankunft in Wien einen Besuch abstattete beschloss ich, dass waehrend dieses Besuches keine Anspielung auf irgend etwas Wichtiges gemacht werden wuerde, und ich begrenzte die Unterhaltung strenggenommen auf nebensaechliche Dinge, was ich tun konnte, da er mich in meinem Buero besuchte. Ich betrachtete es als zweckmaessig, meinen Gegenbesuch einige Wochen zu verzoegern, um es von Papen klar zu machen, dass ich einerseits nicht mit ihnen sympathisierte, und dass ich andererseits nicht mit den Zielen seiner Berufung in Oesterreich vertraut war. Als ich von Papen in der deutschen Gesandtschaft besuchte, begruesste er mich mit den Worten: " Jetzt sind Sie in meinem Gesandtschaft und ich kann die Unterhaltung fuehren." In zynischster und schamlosester Art und Weise fuhr er dann fort, mir zu erzaehlen, dass ganz Suedeuropa bis zu der tuerkischen Grenze Deutschlands natuerliches Hinterland sei, und dass er dazu berufen sei, die deutsche oekonomische und politische Kontrolle ueber dieses ganze Gebiet fuer Deutschland zu erleichtern. Er sagte trocken und ungeschminkt, dass das Erreichen der Kontrolle ueber Oesterreich der erste Schritt hierzu sei. Er erklaerte mit Bestimmtheit, dass er in Oesterreich war, um die oesterreichische Regierung zu untergraben und zu schwaechen und von Wien aus, an einer Schwaechung der Regierungen in anderen Staaten im Sueden und Suedosten, zu arbeiten. Er sagte, dass er seinen Ruf als guter Katholik ausnuetzen werde, um Einfluss auf gewissen Oesterreicher, wie Kardinal Innitzery zu diesem Endzweck auszuueben. Er sagte, dass er mir das erzaehlen, weil die Deutsche Regierung diesem Ziel, Kontrolle ueber Suedosteuropa zu erhalten, verpflichtet sei, und dass sie nichts zurueckhalten koenne und dass unsere eigenen Politik und die Politik Frankreichs und Englands nicht realistisch sei.

Da ich ihn in der deutschen Gesandtschaft besuchte, waren die Umstaende so, dass ich ihm zuzuhoeren hatte. Ich war natuerlich vorbereitet, zu hoeren, was er mir zu sagen hatte, obwohl ich bereits wusste, wie seine Auftraege waren. (?Translator) Nichtsdestoweniger war ich erschuettert, ihn so trocken zu mir zu sprechen zu hoeren und als er geendet hatte, erhob ich mich und sagte, wie erschuettert ich darueber waere, dass ein beglaubigter Vertreter eines Staates, von dem man annahm dass er auf freundlichem Fusse mit Oesterreich stand, zugibt, dass er beabsichtige, sich in Betaetigung einzulassen, um die Regierung bei der er beglaubigt war, zu untergraben und zu zerstoeren. Er laechelte nur und sagte, dass diese Unterhaltung nur zwischen uns sei, und dass er natuerlich zu anderen nicht so offen ueber seine Ziele sprechen wuerde. Ich bin im Hinblick auf diese Unterhaltung in Einzelheiten gegangen, weil sie kennzeichnend fuer die unbedingte Offenheit und Unumwundenheit ist, mit der hohe Nazibeamte von ihren Nazizielen sprachen. Nazibetaetigungen, die in dieser Zeitspanne gezwungen waren, im Geheimen zu arbeiten, wurden keineswegs vernachlaessigt. Die Partei war fuer eine Weile, als Folge der energischen Massnahmen, die man gegen den Putsch ergriff, und infolge des oeffentlichen Unwillens, sehr geschwaecht. Mit dem Wiederaufbau wurde jedoch bald wieder begonnen. Im Oktober 1934 uebergab mir der oester-

H1121 - 0077

reichische Aussenminister, Berger-Waldenegg das folgende Memorandum, das wie er mir sagte, der oesterreichischen Regierung von einer Person unterbreitet worden war, die an der Versammlung teilnahm, auf die ich jetzt weiter eingehen werde. Am 29. und 30. September I934 wurde in Bad Aibling eine Versammlung der Fuehrer der Nationalsozialistischen Partei in Bayern abgehalten. Die Versammlung beschaeftigte sich hauptsaechlich mit dem Wiederaufbau der oesterreichischen nationalsozialistischehen Partei und im besonderen mit Massnahmen, die zu diesem Zwecke in Tirol getroffen werden sollten.

"Es wurden Massnahmen beschlossen bezueglich der Anwendung von Mitteln, um bessere Fuehlung zwischen Parteifuehrung und den Parteimitgliedern herzustellen, ebenso bezueglich neuer Werbemassnahmen."

"Unser Hauptpunkt an der Tagesordnung bezog sich auf vorbereitende Massnahmen um die Macht in Oesterreich zu uebernehmen. Es wurde beschlossen, allen Parteihauptquartieren in Oesterreich Weisungen zu erteilen, in Vorbereitung neuer terroristischer Handlungen. Das notwendige Material jedoch ist nicht ueber die deutsche Grenze nach Oesterreich zu bringen bevor neue Richtlinien herausgegeben worden sind, sondern soll an praktischen Plaetzen auf deutscher Seite entlang der gesamten deutsch-oesterreichischen Grenze angesammelt werden."

"Aus einem Bericht, den die Parteifuehrer ueber die Lage in Wien und Obersteiermark erhielten, ist festgestellt worden, dass Uebereinkommen mit den Kommunisten und den Sozialisten hinsichtlich eines einheitlichen und gemeinsamen Vorgehens getroffen worden sind. "

"Die Agenten der Parteileitung in Deutschland haben Befehle erhalten und zwar in allen Bezirken Oesterreichs, Listen von all denjenigen Personen vorzubereiten, die dafuer bekannt sind, dass sie die gegenwaertige Regierung taetig unterstuetzen und mit derselben eng zusammen arbeiten."

"Sobald man beginnt gegen die Regierung vorzugehen, so ist gegen diese Leute genau so brutal zu verfahren, wie gegen alle anderen Personen - ohne Unterschied der Partei - die bekannt dafuer sind, Gegner des Nationalsozialismus zu sein. In einem Bericht der Parteileiter fuer Oesterreich wurden folgende Grundsaetze betont:

A."Die Uebernahme der Macht in Oesterreich verbleibt die Hauptaufgabe der oesterreichischen nationalsozialistischen Partei. Oesterreich ist fuer das Deutsche Reich von viel groesserer Bedeutung und groesserem Wert als die Saar. Das oesterreichische Problem ist <u>das Problem.</u> Alle Kampfmittel sind geheiligt durch das Ziel, dem sie dienen werden."

B."Wir muessen bei jeder sich bietenden Gelegenheit gewillt zum Verhandeln erscheinen, muessen aber gleichzeitig fuer den Kampf ruesten. Der neue Kampfabschnitt wird besonders schwerwiegend sein, und diesmal werden zwei Terrorschwerpunkte bestehen, einer entlang der deutschen Grenze und der andere an der jugoslawischen Grenze entlang."

Die oesterreichische Legion wurde in Deutschland in Bereitschaft gehalten. Obwohl sie einige Meilen hinter die oesterreichische Grenze versetzt wurde, verblieb sie unaufgeloest, trotz der Verpflichtung, sie aufzuloesen. Die oesterreichisehe Regierung erhielt von Zeit zu Zeit genaue Nachricht darueber, die sie mir zukommen liess, und ich hatte dieselbe direkte Nachricht, von verlaessigen Personen, die von Deutschland nach Wien kamen und die die Legion tatsaechlich gesehen hatten.

H1121 -0078

Deutsche Betaetigungen bestanden aber an der Oberflaeche hauptsaechlich aus Bestrebungen den Beistand von hervorragenden Maennern durch heimtueckische Anstrengungen aller Art zu gewinnen, einschliesslich der Benutzung der deutschen diplomatischen Gesandtschaft in Wien, die damit verbundenen Vorteile, sowie deren Personal. Von Papen als deutscher Gesandter , bewirtete haeufig und verschwenderisch. Er nachertessichffast jedem Mitglied des oesterreichischen K inetts und erzaehlte ihnen, wie mehrere von ihnen mir spaeter sagten, dass Deutschland im Laufe der Zeit die Oberhand gewinnen wuerde, und dass sie sich der gewinnenden Seite anschliessen sollten, wenn sie sich Macht und einflussreicher Stellungen zu unter deutscher Kontrolle zu erfreuen wuenschten. Oeffentlich und nach aussen hin versicherte er natuerlich feierlich, dass Deutschland die oesterreichische Unabhaengigkeit achten wuerde, und dass alles was er wuenschte, sei gewisse Mitglieder der oesterreichischen Regierung los zu werden, wie den Kanzler Schuschnigg und Starhemberg als Fuehrer der Heimwehr, sowie andere, um sie dann "nationalgesinnten" Oesterreichern zu ersetzen, was natuerlich Nazis bedeutete. Von Papens ganzes grundsaetzliches Streben war, den Anschluss herbeizufuehren.

Anfangs I935 unterrichtete mich der oesterreichische Aussenminister, Berger-Waldenegg, dass von Papen im Verlauf einer Unterhaltung bemerkt hatte:"Ja, Sie haben jetzt Ihre franzoesischen und englischen Freunde und Sie koennen Ihre Unabhaengigkeit ein bischen laenger behalten." Der Aussenminister erzaehlte mir diese Bemerkung natuerlich in deutsch, aber das vorher gesagte ist eine genaue Uebersetzung. Der Aussenminister erzaehlte mir, dass er von Papen erwidert haette:"Ich bin gluecklich, Ihre eigene Meinung aus Ihrem eigenen Mund zu hoeren, die sich mit dem dec deckt, was Ihr Vorgesetzter gerade in der Saar gesagt hat und was zu verleugnen, Sie sich so grosse Muehe gegeben haben. Von Papen schien schrecklich verwirrt, als er sich bewusst wurde, was er gerade gesagt hatte und versuchte seine Feststellungen zu bemaenteln, Wieraber Berger-Waldenegg mir sagte, geriet er in immer tieferes Wasser. Unzweifelhaft errang von Papen einigen Erfolg, insbesondere mit Leuten wie Glaise - Herstenau und anderen, die lange den "Grossdeutschen" Gedanken beguenstigt hatten, die aber nichts destoweniger durch das Schicksal der katholischen Kirche sehr beunruhigt waren. Ohne Gewissensbisse und ohne Bedenken nutzte von Papen seinen eigenen und den Ruf seiner Frau als gluehende und ergenben Katholiken aus, um die Befuerchtungen dieser Oesterreicher in dieser Beziehung zu beschwichtigen.

Entwicklungen im Herbst I935 und Fruehjahr I936 gaben Deutschland Gelegenheit, enschiedenere Schritte in der Richtung zu unternehmen, Oesterreich zum Nationalsozialismus zu bekehren. Italien, das Oesterreich Unterstuetzungszusicherungen entschiedenster Art gegen deutsche Angriffe von aussen her gegeben hatte, indem es bei einer Gelegenheit mobilisierte, zweifellos dadurch deutsche Angriffsplaene gegen Oesterreich zurueckgehalten hatte, liess sich auf das abessinische Abenteuer ein. Dies und die Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes im Jahre I936 brachte Europa gaenzlich aus dem Gleichgewicht. Der franzoesische und englische Gesandte unterrichteten mich, dass sie schon im August I935 ihre Regierungen auf Grund ihrer Unterhaltungen mit dem oesterreichischen Aussnminister davon in Kenntnis gesetzt hatten, dass falls ein Donaupakt zustande kommen sollte, dieser rasch unterzeichnet werden muesse, denn die oesterreichische Regierung wuerde sich gezwungen sehen, mit Deutschland zu verhandeln, sogar dann, wenn sie kein Vertrauen haette, dass ein solches Abkommen auch geachtet werden wuerde.

Das Ergebnis all dieser Dinge war, das oesterreichisch-deutsche Uebereinkommen vom II. Juli I936, der deutsche Text lautete wie folgt:
"Ueberzeugt davon, dass sie damit einen wertvollen Beitrag zu der friedlichen Entwicklung Europas leisten und in dem Glauben, dass sie damit den verschiedenen, gemeinsamen Interessen der beiden deutschen Staaten am besten dienen, haben die Regierungedes Detutschen Reiches und die oesterreichische Bundesregierung beschlossen, normale und gegenseitige freundliche Beziehungen wieder herzustellen.

"Es wird daher erklaert:

" (I) Im Sinne der Feststellung die der Fuehrer und Reichskanzler am 2I. Mai I935 machte, erkennt die deutsche Regierung die volle Oberhoheit der oesterreichischen Bundesregierung an.

H1121 - 0079

H1121 - 0080

(Anmerkung I)
Vol. I 1935 veroeffentlicht vom koeniglichen Institut fuer nationale Angelegenheiten (London 1936) Seite 171):
I. Im 1935 hatte Hitler mit Bezug auf Oesterreich in seiner Rede vor dem Reichstag festgestellt (ich zitiere aus Dokumenten fuer internationale Angelegenheiten).
Weder Deutschland beabsichtigt, sich in die innerpolitischen Angelegenheiten Oesterreichs einzumischen noch wuenscht es, Oesterreich an sich zu bringen, oder einen Anschluss herbeizufuehren. Das Deutsche Volk und die deutsche Regierung haben aber den wohlverstaendlichen Wunsch der dem einfachen Gefeuhl fuer Solidaritaet, das eine Folge gemeinsamer Abstimmung ist, entspringt, naemlich dass das Selbstbestimmungsrecht garantiert werden sollte, nicht nur fuer fremde Voelker sondern fuer Deutsche ueberall. Ich selbst glaube, dass keine Regierung dauernd fortbestehen kann, die nicht auf oeffentlicher Zustimmung beruht und die nicht vom Volk unterstuetzt ist.
2. "Jede dieser beiden Regierungen soll die innerpolitischen Bedingungen des anderen Landes, einschliesslich der Frage des oesterreichischen Nationalsozialismus, als eine innere Angelegenheit dieses Landes ansehen, auf die sie der direkten noch indirekten Einfluss ausueben wird. "
3." Die Allgemeinpolitik der oesterreichischen Bundesregierung und besonders ihre Politik gegenueber Deutschland soll ununterbrochen von dem Grundsatz geleitet sein, dass Oesterreich sich als einen Deutschen Staat betrachtet. Das Roemische Protokoll von 1934 zusammen mit seinen zusaetzlichen Klauseln vom Jahre 1936 und die oesterreichischen Beziehungen zu Italien und Ungarn, als Partner in diesem Protokoll, werden hierbei nicht beruehrt. "
"In Erkenntnis der Tatsache, dass die Lockerung der Spannung, die von beiden Parteien angestrebt wird, nur erreicht werden kann, wenn gewisse zusaetzliche Vorbedingungen von beiden Laendern erfuellt worden sind, wird die Reichsregierung und die oesterreichische Bundesregierung mit einer Reihe von Einzelmassanhmen diese notwendigen Vorbedingungen schaffen."
Noch wichtiger als die Bedingungen des Uebereinkommens, die in einer offiziellen Mit teilung bekannt gegeben wur den, war das gleichzeitige unzeremonielle Abkommen, dessen wichtigste Bestimmungen waren, dass Oesterreich (I) eine Reihe von Persoenlichkeiten, die das Vertrauen des Kanzlers geniessen aber freundlich zu Oesterreich sind, zu Kabinettstellen berufen wird.
(2) " dass Oesterreich Mittel finden wuerde, der "nationalen Opposition" eine Rolle im politischen Leben und innerhalb des Rahmens der Vaterlaendischen Front zu geben und (3), " dass Oesterreich Straferlass fuer alle Nazis mit Ausnahme solcher Personen, die schwerster Verbrechen ueberfuehrt worden waren, garantieren wuerde. Dieser Straferlass wurde von der oesterreichischen Regierung als Pflicht verkuendet, und Tausende von Nazis wurden freigelassen; und das erste Eindringen Deutschnationaler in die oesterreichische Regierung wurde erreicht durch die Ernennung von Dr. Guido Schmidt als Staatssekretaer fuer ausserpolitische Angelegenheiten und von Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau als Minister ohne Portefeulle.

H1121 - 0081

Die Bedeutung dieser Vereinbarungen kann am besten durch die woertliche Wiedergabe eines offiziellen Schriftstueckes klargestellt werden, welches ich im Oktober 1934 schrieb, als Bedenken ausgedrueckt wurden wegen einer Unterredung, die Kanzler Schuschnigg mit den "gemaessigten Nazis" Reinthaller und Riehl gehabt haben soll. Seinerzeit habe ich folgenden Bericht abgegeben:

"Es ist jedoch klar, dass diese Unterhaltungen in Anbetracht gewisser, wohlbekannter Tatsachen mit Interesse verfolgt werden. Ein wichtiger Punkt, der nicht unbeachtet bleiben wird, ist die Tatsache, dass Reichskanzler Hitler selbst immer eine indirekte Handlung einer direkten vorgezogen hat, um Oesterreich in den deutschen Raum zu bringen. Seine Absicht war es, Oesterreich mit Abgeordneten der NSDAP. zu durchsetzen. Es ist ein Beweis politischer Verschlagenheit, denn verschiedene neutrale Beobachter halten es fuer sicher, dass, wenn einmal eine kaempfende nationalsozialistische Minderheit - so klein sie auch sein moege - in der Regierung vertreten ist, diese bald der Vergangenheit angehoeren wird. Es ist ziemlich schwer, zu erklaeren, warum es so ist, da eine vollstaendige Wuerdigung vieler Tatsachen, die sich in Deutschland und Oesterreich abspielen, notwendig ist, um alles zu verstehen. Man koennte zur Erklaerung einen kurzen Auszug aus der Terrorpolitik, die eine der fundamentalen Grundsaetze des Nationalsozialismus ist, geben. Sogar schon vor dem 25. Juli, als die NSDAP. noch gesetzlich verboten war, war es sehr schwer, die Polizei und die Gerichte zum Einschreiten gegen Nationalsozialisten, die Terrorhandlungen oder Anschlaege gegen die Regierung begingen, zu bewegen. Diese Untaetigkeit ist nicht durch Sympathie mit der Bewegung oder durch ungenaue Kenntnis von feindseligen Handlungen hervorgerufen worden, sondern durch Angst - Angst vor Vergeltungsmassregeln falls eine nationalsozialistische Regierung ans Ruder kommen sollte und, wenn diese einmal eingesetzt sei, dann wuerden die Leute, die gegen Nationalsozialisten vorgegangen sind, selbst wenn sie es in Erfuellung ihrer Pflicht getan haben, mit Grausamkeit und Unduldsamkeit bestraft werden, genau wie der Nationalsozialismus seine Gegner in Deutschland behandelt hat. Die entschlossene Haltung der Regierung nach dem 25. Juli staerkte die Verwaltung der Gerichte und Sicherheitspolizeikraefte und diese veraenderte Haltung wiederum war nicht nur das Ergebnis des Gefuehls im Lande, dass der Nationalsozialismus jetzt nicht kommen wuerde, sondern auch das Ergebnis von Handlungen seitens der Kraefte, die fuer die Unabhaengigkeit Oesterreichs mobil gemacht wurden.

Falls die Verhandlungen, die die Regierung mit den nationalsozialistischen Verbaenden fuehrt, diese Angst wieder heraufbeschwoeren oder falls die Haltung der Regierung gegenueber dem Nationalsozialismus etwa geschwaecht werden sollte und sogar eine indirekte oder untergeordnete Beteiligung an der Regierung in Frage kaeme, dann wuerde zweifellos diese Angst in viel staerkerer Form wieder auftauchen und auch ein Gefuehl der Schwaeche wuerde auftreten.

Die Tatsache, dass diese Verhandlungen stattfinden, ist daher im wesentlichen nicht als ein stoerender Faktor in der Innen- und Aussenpolitik Oesterreichs anzusehen. Sollten aber diese nationalsozialistischen Vertreter in die Regierung (X) , waeren die schlimmsten Befuerchtungen berechtigt, nicht nur fuer die innerpolitische Lage in Oesterreich, sondern auch aussenpolitisch koennte dies Mittelpunkt eines Unruheherdes werden xxx ."

Die Fortsetzung dieses Abkommens war die einzige, in Anbetracht aller Tatsachen und vorher eroerterter Geschehnisse zu erwartende Moeglichkeit. Die Nazis nahmen die aktiven Kampfhandlungen wieder auf unter der Fuehrung eines gewissen Hauptmanns Leopold, von dem als sicher bekannt

H1121 - 0082

war, dass er oft mit Hitler in Verbindung trat. Das Programm der Nazis war jetzt, eine Einrichtung zu schaffen, mit Hilfe welcher sie ihre Kampfhandlungen in Oesterreich offen und mit gesetzlicher Gutheissung fortsetzen konnten. Verschiedene Vereine, die wohl eine rechtliche Grundlage hatten, aber doch nur eine Hanhabe waren, durch die die Nazis in Oesterreich sich zusammenschliessen und spaeter Aufnahme als eine Einheit in die vaterlaendische Front suchen konnten, wurden in Oesterreich gegruendet. Der bedeutendste dieser Vereine war der Ostmaerkische Verein, dessen Pate der Innenminister Glaise-Horstenau war. Durch Einfluss von Glaise-Horstenau und des nazifreundlichen Neustaedter Stuermer wurde dieser Verein von den Gerichten als gesetzmaessig erklaert. Ich habe das Obenstehende ausdruecklich betont, weil es zeigt, inwieweit die Lage in Oesterreich schon zerfallen war als ein Ergebnis der geheimen und offenen Nazi-Taetigkeit, die von Deutschland aus geleitet wurde.

Es wurde sogar noch offiziellere Anerkennung der Nazis gefordert. Hauptmann Leopold legte im Januar 1937 eine Aktennotiz ueber neue Forderungen der Nazis vor, die, obwohl nicht offiziell bestaetigt, doch der oesterreichischen Regierung bekannt waren und von ihr besprochen wurden. Die Leopold'sche Aktennotiz hat folgenden Wortlaut:

Fuer die innere Befriedigung Oesterreichs.

Die gemeinsame Erklaerung der oesterreichischen Bundesregierung und der deutschen Reichsregierung vom 11. Juli 1936 war ein Staatsakt von weitreichender Bedeutung. Wir sind ueberzeugt davon, dass die Geschichtsschreibung in der Zukunft diese staatsmaennische Voraussicht, mit der das Abkommen rechtzeitig geschlossen wurde, voll loben wird. Nachdem es sich um einen diplomatischen Akt hoher Bedeutung handelt, war die Oeffentlichkeit nicht davon in Kenntnis gesetzt worden und wird auch nichts davon erfahren. Wir oesterreichischen Nationalsozialisten waren zuerst ueber den Abschluss (des Abkommens) und seinen Inhalt ueberrascht. Wir warteten in voller Disziplin auf die Abklaerung der innerpolitischen Wirkung des Abkommens, die von der Oeffentlichkeit ganz allgemein gemaess der Amnestie-Verkuendung erwartet wurde. Erst als oeffentliche Reden zeigten, die von fuehrenden Persoenlichkeiten an Organisationen, deren ordnungsgemaesses Verhalten nicht so sicher war als unseres, gehalten wurden, dass in innerpolitischer Hinsicht - mit Ausnahme der Veroeffentlichung der Amnestie - keine Aenderung in dem Kampf zu erwarten war, entschlossen wir uns unseren Willen kund zu tun, naemlich den Kampf, wenn noetig, fortzufuehren. Wir wollten vor allem beweisen, dass wir den Kampf allein fuehren konnten, dass wir ihn lange Zeit ohne auslaendischen Einfluss und Hilfe gefuehrt hatten und dass wir auf diese Tatsache stolz waren. Es fehlte nicht an Verdaechtigungen, die von der Bevoelkerung gegen uns erhoben wurden oder an Versuchen, uns in der anti-deutschen Presse zu beleidigen. Nach der ersten Ueberraschung fing ein Angriff von allen Seiten an. Unter Fuehrung der tschechischen und schweizerischen Judenpresse wurde die Fabel des "trojanischen Pferdes" erfunden, um Argwohn und Zweifel in Bezug auf die Absicht des Abkommens vom 11. Juli aufkommen zu lassen und die dazu ausersehen war, eine Gegenwirkung unter den Parteigaengern der oesterreichischen Regierung zu schaffen.
Jetzt ist einige Zeit vergangen und beide Teile koennen klar sehen. Durch das Abkommen vom 11. Juli erkennt das Deutsche Reich die volle Selbststaendigkeit Oesterreichs an und wiederholt die Erklaerung des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers, dass das Deutsche Reich niemals Oesterreich mit Gewalt einverleiben wird. Der "Anschluss" von Oesterreich an Deutschland wird daher niemals von Deutschland angestrebt werden und es ist ausschliesslich Sache des oesterreichischen Bundesstaates, diese Frage zu entscheiden, ebenso wie ueber die Regierungsform und Verfassung zu beschliessen.

H1121 - 0083

Es wurde ebenso erklaert, dass die oesterreichischen Nationalsozialisten keinerlei Einfluss von seiten des deutschen Reiches ausgesetzt werden wuerden. Nachdem das gleiche fuer das gesamte innerpolitische Gefuege zutrifft , ist die Befriedigung oder die Fortfuehrung des Kampfes eine innerpolitische Angelegenheit, ueber die die Bundesregierung entscheiden muss. Daher kann auch kein Zweifel darueber bestehen, dass beide Parteien die Moeglichkeiten haben, die Meinungsverschiedenheiten, die solange bestanden haben und so schwere Opfer forderten, formell zu begleichen. Zugunsten dieser Moeglichkeit spricht die Tatsache, dass der erste Punkt dieses Kampfes, die Wirkung auf die Aussenpolitik und damit die dauernde Gefahr eines Zwischenfalls und die Gefahr, die gesamten deutschen Interessen zu schaedigen, fuer immer ausgeschaltet ist.

(In der eidlichen Erklaerung von Herrn Messersmith erscheint an diesem Punkt die in die Laenge gezogene Note des Hauptmann Leopold. Sie enthaelt Hauptmann Leopolds Ausfuehrung ueber die gegenwaertige Lage in Oesterreich.
Sie enthaelt die folgenden Forderungen:

1.) Erlass aller Strafen und Entziehungen, die fuer nationalsozialistische oder nationale Taetigkeit oder Sympathie verhaengt worden sind.
2.) Gleiche Behandlung fuer Nationalsozialisten einschliesslich Freiheit politischer und kultureller Betaetigung.

Abschaffung von Gesetzen und Zwangsmassnahmen, die von der Regierung gegen Nazibetaetigung angewandt worden waren. Das Schreiben empfiehlt Zusammenarbeit auf Grund von politischen Grundsaetzen, ausserdem: Ausdehnung der Vaterlaendischen Front, Aenderungen im Kabinett, Buendnis mit dem Reich, gemeinsamer rassischer Stamm als politisches Ziel und Anwendung von antisemitischen Massnahmen, eine fruehzeitige Volksabstimmung ueber den Anschluss.)

Spaeter wurde der oesterreichischen Regierung eine Bittschrift von Leopold ueberreicht, in der die Genehmigung gefordert wurde, eine "nationalistische Partei" zu bilden, die als eine Einheit in die politische Front uebernommen werden sollte. Es war eine Partei, die durch ihre Buergen als offenkundig nationalsozialistisch gekennzeichnet war. Es wurde ein Druck ausgeuebt, um die Ausnahme dieser Forderungen zu erreichen, in dem viele Protestkundgebungen stattfanden und Propaganda in Umlauf gesetzt wurde, was alles in und von Deutschland bezahlt wurde. Gleich nach dem 11. Juli, naemlich schon am 29. Juli 1936, als die Olympische Fackel durch die Strassen Wiens getragen wurde, fanden gewalttaetige Nazi-Unruhen statt. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an bis zur Zerstoerung der oesterreichischen Sebstaendigkeit fanden immerfort Verhaftungen und Prozesse von Personen statt, die angeklagt waren, illegale Zeitschriften verteilt oder illegale Protestversammlungen abgehalten zu haben; diese Vorfaelle waren immer von vielen Zeitungsartikeln von mehr oder minder grosser Heftigkeit begleitet.

Die oesterreichische Regierung versuchte diesem Druck in der Weise entgegen zu arbeiten, dass sie eine Betaetigung zugunsten einer Wiedereinsetzung der Habsburger beguenstigte. Waehrend seines Besuches in Wien Ende Februar 1937 hat von Neurath die Gelegenheit wahrgenommen, Deutschlands staerkste Gegnerschaft einer solchen Bewegung gegenueber kund zu tun. Ich erinnere mich an von Neurath's Besuche besonders gut. Ich hatte ihn gut gekannt und war befreundet mit ihm, waehrend ich in Berlin stationiert war. Damals und nachdem die Nazis zur Macht kamen, hatte er Botschafter Dodd und mir selbst gesagt, dass er als Aussenminister im Amt geblieben sei, um in der Lage zu sein, einen "einhaltenden Einfluss" auszuueben und seinem Vaterland so zu dienen. Das

H1121-0084

mag wohl die urspruengliche Absicht von Neurath gewesen sein, aber sehr bald schon wurde er zu einem der vollendetsten und in gewisser Hinsicht wirkungsvollsten Werkzeuge der Nazis. Falls er nicht einverstanden gewesen sein sollte mit ihren Taten, so hat er doch jedenfalls die letzten Handswerkzeuge geliefert die halfen, sie durchzufuehren.
Ich hatte ihn in Berlin gut gekannt und war zu kleinen Gesellschaften in seiner Wohnung geladen. Als er 1937 nach Wien kam, wurden von der oesterreichischen Regierung eine Anzahl von Festlichkeiten und Empfaengen gegeben, zu denen das Diplomatische Korps geladen wurde. Als er mich bei diesen Empfaengen traf, behandelte er mich mit grosser Kuehle, ja sogar mit Verachtung, da er meine ausgesprochene Abneigung gegen das Programm, dem er sich verschrieben hatte, kannte. Und diese Art, mich mit Verachtung und offener Geringschaetzung zu behandeln, war wahrscheinlich seine Art, sich selbst und seine eigenen Empfindungen gegen Schande zu decken. Kurz nach dem Besuch von Neurath sagte mir Bundeskanzler Schuschnigg waehrend unserer Unterhaltungen, dass in seinen Besprechungen mit von Neurath waehrend dessen Besuches derselbe ebenso gemein gewesen waere wie Habicht oder Frauenfeld gewesen seien, wenn sie die deutschen Ansprueche fuer Hinzuziehung von Nazis in das oesterreichische Kabinett besprochen haetten.
Ungefaehr zur selben Zeit machte Schuschnigg einige Zugestaendnisse, um den Druck seitens der Nazis zu mindern. Er nannte den sogenannten "Siebener Ausschuss", der sich unter anderen aus Dr. Jury und einem Manne namens Tavs zusammensetzte, um mit ihm das "Nationalistische Streben" zu besprechen. Im Juni, nach dem Besuch von Glaise-Horstenau, General Kraus und Leopold bei Hitler in Berlin und nachdem die Nazis ihre Taetigkeit verstaerkt hatten, beauftragte Schuschnigg Seyss-Inquart und Dr. Pembauer damit, Mittel und Wege zu finden, damit die "Nationalisten" in die Patriotische Front eingegliedert werden koennten. Dr. Seyss-Inquart selbst war ein hervorragender Wiener Rechtsanwalt, der seit langem ein intimer, persoenlicher Freund des Kanzlers Schuschnigg war. Der Kanzler persoenlich erzaehlte mir wiederholt und bei verschiedenen Anlaessen, dass Dr. Seyss-Inquart haeufig versucht habe, ihn davon zu ueberzeugen, dass die Zulassung der Nazis in das Oesterreichische Kabinett den Interessen Oesterreichs am besten dienen wuerde, dass es den deutschen Druck auf Oesterreich beheben werde und dass er (Seyss-Inquart) immer den aufrichtigen Wunsch habe, die Unabhaengigkeit Oesterreichs zu erhalten. Ich hatte wenig persoenliche Fuehlung mit Seyss-Inquart, aber ich wusste von verschiedenen, unbedingt zuverlaessigen Quellen, dass Seyss-Inquart in Wirklichkeit, obwohl er diese Proteste beim Kanzler erhob, mit dem ihn diese intime Freundschaft verband und die der Kanzler mit seinem Vertrauen zurueckzahlte, vollstaendig unaufrichtig war. Es war zu dieser Zeit bekannt und ich wusste es auch, dass er haeufig Fuehlung mit hohen Beamten der Deutschen Regierung hatte und dass er mit Hitler selbst in Beruehrung gekommen war. Meine diesbezuegliche Information stammte nicht nur von oesterreichischen Quellen, sondern auch von Bekannten in Deutschland. Es gibt nur eines, was zu Gunsten von Seyss-Inquart in jener Zeit gesagt werden kann, und zwar, dass er vielleicht deutschen Beteuerungen glaubte, die man ihm machte, naemlich, dass die oesterreichische Unabhaengigkeit geachtet werden wuerde. Es ist aber immerhin schwer zu verstehen, wie ein Mann wie Seyss-Inquart, der fuer seine juristische Faehigkeit und seine Intelligenz bekannt war, sich durch diese Beteuerungen taeuschen liess. Die Wahrscheinlichkeiten sprechen dafuer, dass er wenigstens anfangs seine Freundschaft mit Kanzler Schuschnigg dazu benutzte, um bei der Zerstoerung der Unabhaengigkeit seines Vaterlandes mitzuhelfen und um auf diese Weise einen Platz fuer sich selbst zu erlangen.

Ich verliess Wien am 11. Juli 1937, um den Posten eines Unterministers des Aeussern in Washington zu uebernehmen. Ich verliess demzufolge Wien

H1121 - 0085

bevor sich die endgueltige Tragoedie ereignete. Der endgueltige Ausgang war jedoch damals schon vorauszusehen. Der Inhalt meiner Unterhaltungen mit dem italienischen Minister machte es klar, dass Italien Oesterreich militaerisch nicht laenger gegen einen deutschen Angriff verteidigen konnte oder wollte. Es war ebenso klar, dass Oesterreich dem deutschen Druck nicht allein widerstehen konnte. Obwohl Frankreich sehr definitive Zusicherungen betreffs seiner Interessen an der Erhaltung der oesterreichischen Unabhaengigkeit gegeben und England das gleiche Interesse bekundet hatte, so war die oesterreichische Regierung doch immer weniger in der Lage, wirklicher Unterstuetzung sicher zu sein. Als die oesterreichische Regierung nicht mehr laenger auf die volle militaerische Unterstuetzung Italiens rechnen konnte, wusste sie, dass ihr Schicksal besiegelt war. Hitler war somit frei, ganz nach seinem Willen in Oesterreich zu arbeiten. Die einzige, ungeloeste Frage war, wann er handeln wuerde und wann er es fuer angebracht fand. Das Werk des Zerfallens, das in diesen Ausfuehrungen weiter behandelt wird, hatte bereits seine Wirkung erzielt. Fruehzeitig im Jahre 1938 offensichtlich beruhigt, dass England und Frankreich sich nicht ruehren wuerden und in der Gewissheit, dass Italien sich ihm nicht widersetzen konnte und sich auch nicht widersetzen wollte, holte Hitler zum letzten Schlage gegen die Unabhaengigkeit Oesterreichs aus. Er brachte damit ein Geschehen zum Hoehepunkt, das in die Geschichte als eine Reihe von hinterlistigen, heimtueckischsten, ungerechtfertigten aber all zusammen genommen, wirkungsvollen Massnahmen eingehen wird, um, sie waren darauf abgesehen, eine Staatsoberhoheit zu untergraben und das Ende einer unumschraenkten Staatsgewalt herbeizufuehren. Im Verlauf dieser Machenschaften und Vorgaenge beteuerte die Nazi-Regierung nichtsdestoweniger und unaufhoerlich ihre Freundschaft zu Oesterreich und die Absicht, ihre Achtung fuer Oesterreichs unumschraenkte Staatsgewalt und Unabhaengigkeit zu bewahren.

(Gezeichnet:) William L. Brewster

Vizekonsul der Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika

Unterzeichnet und vor mir vereidigt

(signed) William L. Brewster

ein Vizekonsul der Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika

qualifiziert in Mexico, D.F.,
Mexico, den 28. Tag im August 1945

(Siegel des amerikanischen Konsulardienstes)
Mexico D.F., Mexico

CERTIFICATE OF
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1760-PS

21 November 1945

I, MARGOT BOATWRIGHT, 046273, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1760-PS.

MARGOT BOATWRIGHT
046273

H1121 - 0086

Exhibit U.S.A. 73
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The OKW is asking the Fuhrer's decision, concerning the following proposals:

Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.

1.) To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

2.) Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

a.) through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria,

b.) through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,

c.) through travelling agents.

3.) Such news could be:

a.) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K.

b.) (Rolling stock) is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.

c.) Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is the case).

d.) The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have called up reinforcements.

e.) Custom officials report about the immenient maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden.

4.) Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

5.) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

6.) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.

7.) An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the Reich-Chancery.

Signed - Keitel.

14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone, that the Führer has given his approval in all points.

Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellory.

9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in Munich

H1121-0087

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1775-PS

8 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1775-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 72
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and (illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgetreide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)) and by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

H1121-0088

14 February:

At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstosse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt General Goering.

11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

H1121-0090

of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

21-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQ I, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

H1121-0092

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

H1121-0093

25 September:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head (Totenkopf) SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 September:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast..

27 September:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

28 September:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

H1121-0094

29 September:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939

23 August:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

- - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts in Document No. 1780-PS.

Ludwig Hartman
T/4
37446052

H1121 - 0095

H1121-0096

Exhibit U.S.A. 62
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

PARTIAL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2219-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

To the General Field Marshal
Sir:

At Present in Vienna, 14 July 1939

If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism (aktivismus) this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER. And if some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of the party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931. I probably would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends had to fight against the whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him have of me.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

13 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of DOCUMENT 2219-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

H1121 - 0097

Exhibit U.S.A. 67
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOC. 2246-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

EXCERPT OF LETTER OF VON PAPEN TO
HITLER

(3 last paragraphs)

Subject: Report on Danube situation.

The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances (Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention to offer him the porte folio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient psychological manipulations, with slowly intensifyed pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realisation of some of our projects. In discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the concordat of July 11. I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the fatherland front (VaterlÄndischen Front) but nevertheless refraining from putting National-socialists in important positions for the time being. However such positions are to be occupied only by personalities, having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.

(Signature) von Papen

- - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOC. 2246-PS

- - - - - - - - - -

6 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Excerpt of Doc. 2246-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1121 - 0098

Exhibit U.S.A. 64
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2247-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary
on Special Mission

At present Berlin W.9 17 May 1935
Lennestr. 9

Mein Führer:

* * * * *

1st Page - 1st sentence of the 2nd paragraph

The news, which I communicated to you the day before yesterday, that the Austrian Government would proclaim its intention to arm through an autonomous act and simultaneously on 2 June would announce a Starhemberg regency becomes more and more likely.

* * * * *

2nd page- 2nd paragraph to end of letter

I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnig and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of the NSDAP. in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP. in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors the GreaterGermany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces.
There should follow a gradual disintegration of the barriers erected between the two countries. The rearmament of the army would have to be effected in close cooperation with the German army even if material aid from Germany would be limited.
A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European situation and especially on our relationship with England.
One may object, that Mr. Schuschnig will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.
Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnig against Starhemberg through the use of "Go betweens". The possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnig will finally say "No" and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse by that but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria would be revealed - Without prejudice to other interests. Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government (Bundesregierung), Mr. Schuschnig will grasp this last straw - always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria.
Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our active intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the

French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.
Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary.
The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister) shares the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to discuss it with you, my Fuehrer.

(Signed) Papen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2247-PS

21 November 1945

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt., 01558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2247-PS.

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st Lt.
0-1558904

H1121-0099

Exhibit U.S.A. 63
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2248-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Extraordinary Emissary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
the German Reich in Special Mission. Vienna, July 27, 1935.

To the Führer and Chancellor
BERLIN
by courier.

Contents:
One year after the death of
the Bundeskanzler Dollfuss.
Review and Outlook.

(Page two, last sentence of 1st paragraph:)

It seems to me to be expedient to use this incident ourselves also to draw the balance.

(Page 1-146, last paragraph to end of document :)

National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology. If to-day it is contended in Austria that the N.S.D.A.P. is only a centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups of people of a different political make-up, the answer must rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not have been brought about in a different way. But when the creation of the people's community in the Reich will be completed, Nationalsocialism could, in a much wider sense than this is possible through the present party organization - at least apparently - , certainly become the rallying point for all racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot be achieved to-day with any centralized tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nürnberg Party Day designated as "The German Day" as in old times and the proclamation of a nationalsocialistic peoples' front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokeman, the legitimistic Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the "Anschluss": The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this task;"

(signed :) Papen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2248-PS

I, ERNST W. COHN, PFC, 33925738, USA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 2248-PS.

9 November 1945.

ERNST W. COHN
PFC, USA
33925738

H1121-0100

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Referred to
Nov. 29, 1945

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 237

Law concerning the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 13, 1938

Gesetz über die Wiedervereinigung Oesterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich.

The Reich Government has ordained the following law, which is hereby proclaimed:

ARTICLE I. The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938, ordained by the Austrian Federal Government, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich. It has the following text:

By virtue of Article 3, Section 2, of the Federal Constitutional Law concerning extraordinary measures in the constitutional field (B.G.Blatt, I, No. 255, 1934), the Federal Government has ordained:

Article 1. Austria is a province of the German Reich.

Article 2. On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite shall be held for German men and women of Austria over twenty years of age on the question of reunion with the German Reich.

Article 3. In the plebiscite the majority of the votes cast shall decide the issue.

Article 4. The necessary regulations for the implementation and supplementing of this Federal Constitutional Law shall be provided by decree.

Article 5. This Federal Constitutional Law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Federal Constitutional Law.

Vienna, March 13, 1938.

ARTICLE II. The laws at present in force in Austria shall remain in ofrce until further notice. The introduction of Reich law into Austria will be effected by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor or by the Reich Minister to whom he may delegate this power.

ARTICLE III. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in consultation with the other Reich Ministers concerned, is empowered to issue the legal and administrative regulations necessary for the implementation and supplementing of this law.

ARTICLE IV. This law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

Linz, March 13, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; GOERING, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior; VON RIBBENTROP, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. HESS, Deputy Fuehrer.

H1121-0101

H1121-0102

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS

17 November 1945

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2307-PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON,
046312

H1121-0103

Cited 11/Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2310-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247

Erster Erlass des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers ueber die Ein fuehrung deutscher Reichsgesetze in Oesterreich.

First Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Introduction of German Reich Law in Austria, March 15, 1938.

By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), I order:

SECTION 1. (1) The sphere of validity of the official gazettes of the Reich shall be extended to the province of Austria.

(2) Reich laws which are proclaimed after the effective date of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl I, p. 237), shall be valid for the province of Austria unless their application to the province of Austria is expressly held in abeyance.

SECTION 2. From the effective date of this decree, the following shall be applied in substance in the province of Austria:

1. The Reich flag law of September 15, 1935 (RGBl I, p. 1145), with the provision that Jews shall be forbidden to raise the Reich and National Flag and to disply the Reich colors;
2. The law against formation of new parties of July 14, 1933 (RGBl I, p. 479);
3. The law for the preservation of unity of party and state of December 1, 1933 (RGBl I, p. 1016), as amended by the law of July 3, 1934 (RGBl I, p. 529);
4. The law concerning Reich governors of January 30, 1935 (RGBl I, p. 65) with the provision that instructions of Reich ministers to the Reich Governor in Austria shall require, until further notice, the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior;
5. The order for implementation of the Four-Year Plan of October 18, 1936 (RGBl I, p. 887);
6. The Reich law concerning the compulsory registration of members of the German State abroad of February 3, 1938 (RGBl I,p.113).

SECTION 3. (1) Regulations for effecting the transition shall be issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior or by the Reich Governor in Austria with the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior.

(2) By this means regulations of the Reich and regulations of the province of Austria can be assimilated in one another.

(3) Incompatible regulations of the province of Austria shall be invalidated.

SECTION 4. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

Vienna, March 15, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. 2310-PS

19 November 1945

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2310-PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON
046312

Cited Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2311-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 245

Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Administration of Oath to the Officials of the Province of Austria, March 15, 1938.

Erlass des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers ueber die Vereidigung der Beamten des Landes Oesterreich.

By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, (RGBl I, p. 237), I issue the following order:

SECTION 1. Public officials of the province of Austria shall take an oath of office upon entrance into service.

SECTION 2. The oath of office of public officials reads: "I swear that I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of the German Reich and People, and that I shall observe the laws and conscientiously fulfill the duties of my office, so help me God."

SECTION 3. The officials at present in office shall be sworn in forthwith in accordance with Section 2.

Jewish officials shall not be sworn in.

Section 4. A person is Jewish if he is descended from at least three racially full-blooded Jewish grandparents. A grandparent is automatically considered a full-blooded Jew if he belonged to the Jewish congregation.

A Jewish half-breed descended from two full-blooded Jewish grandparents is considered a Jew:

a) If he belonged to the Jewish congregation on September 16, 1935, or became a member of it thereafter.
b) If he was married to a Jew on September 16, 1935, or entered into marriage with one thereafter.

SECTION 5. Anyone who refuses to take this oath shall be removed from office.

SECTION 6. The legal and administrative regulations necessary to the implementation of this law shall be issued by the Reich Governor (Austrian Provincial Government).

SECTION 7. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

Vienna, March 15, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2311-PS

19 November 1945

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2311-PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON,
046312

H1121-0104

Cited Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2313-PS
OFFICE OF THE U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 254

Order for the Transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, March 17, 1938

Verordnung zur Uebernahme der Oesterreichischen National Bank durch die Reichsbank.

By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl. I, p. 237), I order:

Section 1. The administration of the Austrian National Bank shall be transferred to the Reichsbank.

Section 2. The Austrian National Bank shall be liquidated, and its assets placed by the Reichsbank to the Account of the Reich.

Section 3. In taking over operations, the Reichsbank shall transfer to its staff the entire personnel of the Austrian National Bank, with due regard for legal and contractual rights.

Section 4. This order shall enter into force upon its proclamation.

Berlin, March 17, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior.

Count SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, Reich Minister of Finance.

Dr. HJALMAR SCHACHT, Reich Minister and President of the Reichsbank

---

21 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2313-PS

I, Felix Edward Sharton, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2935-PS

Felix Edward Sharton
046312

H1121-0105

H1121-0106

Referred to Nov. 28, 1945
Not offered in evidence

Partial Translation of Document No. 2367-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

Voelkischer Beobachter
South German Edition
Nr. 123/124 Saturday and
Sunday 2 and 3 May 1936.

Voelkischer Beobachter
Sueddeutsche Aufgabe
123/124 Aufgabe Samstag 2
Sonntag 3, Mai 1936.

(page 1)

****

The Führer takes the work now amid the cheers of the whole of Germany.

****

(page 2.,Col 4, 3rd paragraph)

The lies that Germany will pounce upon Austria tomorrow or the day after are being spread again(jeers and laughter of the crowd). I ask myself; Who are those elements who do not want peace and mutual understanding, who must stir up and sow distrust continuously, who are they in reality?

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION (Partial)
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2367-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, LT(jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true transkltion of document no. 2367-PS.(Partial translation only made of above document)

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt(jg) USNR
391590

Doc.
2385 PS

H1121-0107

Exhibit U.S.A. 68 - Filed Nov. 28, 1945

Mexico City, D. F.)
) ss.
Mexico

United Mexican States)
Mexico, Federal District)
Embassy of the United) ss
States of America)

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, being first duly sworn deposes and says:

During the years 1933 and 1934, while I served as Counsul General of the United States of America in Berlin, I was in close touch because of my duties and because of the necessities of the times with the diplomatic representatives not only of England and France but with those of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Turkey and Holland. I saw the Chiefs of these Missions, most of whom were also close friends of mine, almost every day, as well as some of their principal subordinates once or twice a week and in many cases oftener. In Austria where I went towards the middle of 1934 as Minister, my contacts with the diplomatic representatives of these countries was if anything even closer and more frequent.

I also had frequent contact during my duty in Germany with many high ranking Germans, including Goering, Goebbels, Frank, Schacht, von Papen, Funk, Lammers, Darré, Ley and many others of the same category and in secondary categories. This contact was made necessary by the nature of my duties and in the protection of our interests. While serving in Germany and in Austria, I also kept in close touch with many of the leading diplomatic and political figures in most parts of Europe with the exception of Russis where I happened at the time not to have any specific contact. These contacts which I maintained with diplomatic and political figures in other countries was based on previous associations and I kept in close contact through various trips which I made from time to time and more particularly through confidential correspondence and through mutual friends. From all these sources I obtained an intimate familiarity with the aims and methods of German diplomacy from 1933 until I returned to the United States to assume a position in the Department of State about the middle of 1937.

As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate Southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objective in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of Southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and they did not at that time speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to Southeastern Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that "it must be our granary" and that "even with Southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany". After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in Southeastern Europe. In a conversation with von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, von Papen frankly stated to me that "Southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's Hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria is the first on the program." As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, von Papen in Vienna and his colleague von Mackensen in Budapest, were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.

H1121-0108

The Nazis planned to gain their aims by force, preferably by the threat of force alone if possible, and by war if needed. At the beginning, however, - that is in the first two years of the Nazi regime - the Nazis wanted peace to give themselves time - that is time to arm - then to divide and isolate their intended victims. I have often heard prominent Nazis say in 1933 and 1934, and I translate literally, "We must have peace until we are ready". By the late summer of 1938, they felt themselves ready.

Immediately after the Nazis came into power they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact, the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me; first, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; and second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in Southeastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but preferably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time. In 1934 from a high ranking General in the German Army, whose name I cannot recall for the moment, I learned that they planned to build 1200 planes that year, which was a huge air force for that period and something in terms that no one had thought of before in any country. The rapid development of this air program was obvious to everyone for one could not go out on the streets in Berlin or in any other City of importance in Germany without seeing pilots and air force trainees in evidence everywhere. They were given special privileges and special housing in order to encourage young men to enter the air training program. The rearmament program as a whole, it should be emphasized, proceeded with unbelievable rapidity. It proceeded more quickly, as high Nazi leaders themselves stated to me, than they themselves believed would be possible. It proceeded more rapidly than even informed and trained foreign observers in Germany would have believed possible even though they knew the resources of the German industrial machine.

At the same time that this rearmament program was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, etc. In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as follows:

> "..... Everything that is being done in the country today has for its object to make the people believe that Germany is threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance with German

H1121-0109

> desires and ambitions. Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the German people will be with them when they want to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry through their objects ..."

Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed to so disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless against German aggression. I well remember one conversation I had with Goebbels in the earliest period of the Nazi Government, in which I expressed the opinion that they could never get away with their program in Europe. His reply was "But you don't know what we can do by creating dissension - without anything being done specifically on our part or which can be laid to our door, we will get these people to fight among themselves and so weaken themselves that they will be an easy prey for us". I can still recall the cynical manner in which he specifically indicated the "sore spots" in Austria and in Czechoslovakia and in other countries and on which by insidious means German agents could arouse dissension and get the peoples in the countries themselves disunited.

From surface appearances and judging from historical standards only, the obstacles to the achievement of the Nazi objectives were formidable indeed. Completely aside from the difficulty of bringing about complete coordination within Germany and complete control, and in carrying through such a huge military program, there were these definite obstacles in the political and diplomatic field. In 1933 France was the dominant military power on the Continent. In the interest of security she had formed within the framework of the League of Nations, a system of mutual assistance both in the West and in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented b the Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslovia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were allied in the Little Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had a special interest in Austrian independence which she made definitely clear. From 1934 to 1936, France and Italy each proposed and endeavored to sponsor political and economic accords to strengthen the powers of resistance of the eastern European countries to German designs. Throughout all of Southeastern Europe, France and Italy both were active through their diplomatic machinery in strengthening the position of these countries and of their independence. The most important of these arrangements were the proposed East Locarno Pact, inspired by France and intended to include all countries in the East, ranging from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea, and the proposed Danubian Pact which had for its principal objective strengthening the economic position of the countries of Southeastern Europe by promoting mutual trade relations between Austria and the other countries which had recently been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up these alliances and understandings, to create division among members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers, and to divide all of them from France on whose military power the security of these smaller states in the last analysis rested. To some of these countries, particularly Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, Nazi Germany made extravagant and often inconsistent promises

H1121-0110

of territorial and economic rewards as a price for cooperation in the German program of aggression against their neighbors. To other countries, especially France and England, Nazi Germany offered the attractive prize of peace and security as the price of giving Germany a free hand in Southeastern Europe. To allay the fears of its neighbors until Germany had completed its military and diplomatic preparations, Germany cleverly proceeded step by step, always giving solemn assurances that the immediate objective was her last. In making these promises she was uninhibited by any scruples as to the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interests to do so. Although these statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas publicly.

In this specific connection I quote from a letter which I wrote to Under Secretary of State Phillips in Washington, dated March 24, 1934:

> "Her (Germany's) agreement with Poland is only one of a series of agreements which she would like to make to follow out her policy of gaining time and allaying suspicion, but when one realizes what a callous attitude those in power here take now towards agreements of any kind, and hears what they have to say about them, one realizes that they mean nothing more than what they are intended for, i.e. a part of her policy to keep the peace and maintain the status quo until she is prepared to gain her ends through force if they cannot be achieved otherwise".

In the last analysis, however, it was not faith in Germany's promises but fear of German might and possible aggressive action which induced Germany's neighbors, particularly the small ones, to progressively acquiesce in her designs. The huge German rearmament program, which was never a secret, and which was openly announced in the spring of 1935, and Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, all done with only mild protests from France and England, and the failure of the League to stop Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, convinced the peoples of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe that France either could not or would not resist German expansion in the East, that England would not take any positive steps to stop Germany, and that the only thing that was left to them was to make the best possible deal with Nazi Germany.

These considerations to be sure did not convince all people and all political leaders among Germany's neighbors. The Nazis made plain, however, that any opposition which remained would be helpless. She continued the program of stirring up internal dissensions wherever they existed in other countries and openly aided sympathetic Nazi and Fascist and anti-Government groups, particularly in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Such briefly was the general plan of "German diplomacy" and political action and economic action during these years. I had occasion to follow the details of its operation from close observation during the years 1933 to 1937.

H1121-0111

Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

> "...The major factor in the internal situation in the last week has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. ... There is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria. ... The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25."

Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.

I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:

> "....Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are 'diplomats of the old school'. They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."

At this point in this statement I should set forth the following. When the Nazi Party took over in Germany it represented only a small part of the German population. It dominated all of Germany and rapidly assured itself of that domination by means of organization and terror, the details of which are an historical record and need not be set forth here. At the beginning of 1933, although a few of the Nazi leaders, such as Hitler and Hess and Goering, recognized the idea of world domination, they spoke little of it. At the beginning the great mass of the Party and the regime

H1121-0112

itself had for its open objective the domination of Southeastern Europe. Literally this meant to them at the outset absorption of Czechoslovakia and Austria and complete political and economic control of the other countries down to Turkey. They always excluded mentioning Turkey so as not to greatly disturb Great Britain. As the domination of the Germans increased within Germany as the military program progressed and as the German people increasingly became imbued with the Nazi spirit, and more rapidly than even the most fanatic Nazis had believed possible, their power increased incredibly within and without Germany. Within Germany there was an attitude of complete apathy so far as resistance was concerned. Without Germany in the smaller countries which felt themselves threatened, the fear constantly became greater. It was this growing sense of power and the realization of the fear and lack of measures of resistance from the outside that rapidly caused the Nazi idea to expand with respect to domination over Europe and in fact over the world.

In this connection it must also be borne in mind that most of the higher officers of the German Army during the first years of the Nazi regime lent their aid to the Nazi regime only because they believed that under such a regime they would be able to rebuild the German Army which they had not been able to do under previous German Governments and thus restore the power of Germany in Europe and in the world. At the outset it is probable that only a few of these Generals shared the territorial aggressive idea of the Nazis, but increasingly as the Army saw its power growing from the lower ranks to the upper they became imbued with these aggressive designs just as much as the Nazis.

For a time France and Italy endeavored to counter these moves by Germany, described in the preceding paragraphs. In 1934, Barthou, the very able and discerning French Foreign Minister, endeavored to promote an East Locarno Pact to guarantee the territory of all the Eastern and Southeastern European countries and to provide a guarantee against external aggression by mutual assistance pacts supported by France and Russia. France also continued her efforts to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers which had previously been members of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Italy sought to organize a more limited economic bloc of Austria, Hungary and Italy.

The Nazi German Government made every effort to prevent the carrying through of these accords. To Yugoslavia, for example, Germany made promises of support for Yugoslavia's ambitions with regard to Italian territory, particularly Trieste, as well as to a share of Austria. Germany's object was by sowing discord between Yugoslavia and Italy to prevent France from reaching an agreement with both of them and hence to frustrate all hopes of bringing an East Locarno Pact into being. In October 1934, I reported from Vienna, as follows:

> "...The Foreign Minister called attention to the reports which they have with respect to the intensive diplomatic activities of Germany in Warsaw, in Belgrade, in Sofia, and in Budapest. They have information, he told me, from a very reliable source that the present German policy is to create hopes and unrest, particularly in Belgrade and Sofia, so that when King Alexander goes to Paris he will face the French with a situation which will make it impossible for them to reach any agreement with Italy. The Wilhelmstrasse believes, according to the Minister's information, that if Barthou has no success at Rome the present French Ministry will

H1121-0113

have to resign on his return and a stronger left Ministry formed, with which the Wilhelmstrasse can reach some agreement. The Foreign Minister said that he did not think the Germans would succeed in this, or that a failure of the French-Italian conversations would necessarily result in a change in the French Cabinet. He did say, however, that the French-Italian agreement would be difficult because he had just learned this morning that King Alexander had been very successful during his Sofia visit which ended just a few days ago..."

To offset any moves in the direction of economic cooperation among the Danubian States, Germany made lavish but frankly insincere promises of economic support, on condition of cooperation with her. During my tour of duty in Germany, a Nazi economist named Deutz (I believe this is the correct spelling of his name) sought me out frequently. He did not occupy a very high position in the Government but was used as one of the active instruments by high Nazi leaders in Southeastern Europe. He made frequent trips to Yugoslavia, to Hungary and also on occasion to Rumania. For some reason which I could never fully determine he sought me out frequently and on returning from these trips he would tell me frankly what he had been doing and of the promises he had made of economic gains as reward for cooperating with Germany. At the same time, he, of course, cynically told me that Germany had no intention of carrying through these promises and remarked: "How dumb these people are to believe in such promises".

At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries thsmselves and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed to so weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program. Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein party in the elections in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments and most effective ones which Nazi Germany used as the fear in Yugoslavia, in particular, of a restoration of the Hapsburgs was very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to demand the recall of van Hackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of Communism and communist Russia. In Rumania she aggravated the existing anti-semitism, emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Rumanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the Fascist Iron Guard through Codreneau.

Such "diplomatic" measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them to actively ally themselves with Nazi Germany. Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany. This became so obvious from direct information which I had that I wrote in September 1934, from Vienna, as follows:

H1121-0114

"...The attitude of the Yugoslavs has been most disturbing. There is no question but that the Germans have complicated the already difficult problem existing between Italy and Yugoslavia by promising the Yugoslavs territorial and other advantages. There are a lot of people in Yugoslavia who feel that the present Government in Germany will stay, that it will be able to force its will on the rest of Europe and that their best bet is to play with Germany for they will get most out of it in that way in the end. This section of opinion in Yugoslavia believes that Austria will eventually succumb to Germany and that when this comes Yugoslavia will get a good slice of present Austrian territory and in addition have German support against Italy which will eventually lead to her realizing what now seems unrealizable aspirations in other directions. This sentiment in Yugoslavia explains the benevolent attitude shown towards the Nazi refugees from Austria after July 25. Yugoslavia is therefore definitely playing the dog in the manger. She will not break with France for the present and burn her bridges there, nor with the other States of the Little Entente, but she is definitely playing with Germany and it would appear that at the moment is inclined to place more dependence of Germany than on French help. The attitude of Poland has naturally encouraged Yugoslavia and what they believe to be the wavering attitude of Hungary is an additional element of encouragement to them..."

In Hungary the same attitude was becoming increasingly obvious. In the same letter I wrote from Vienna in September 1934, with respect to developments in Hungary, I quote as follows:

"...In Hungary the revisionist feeling is stronger than perhaps in any of the other Succession States, and it is this feeling which has the major influence in shaping Hungarian policy. Hungary has been flirting with Germany for some time as you know, but doing it very discreetly. The Hungarians feel very friendly towards Austria. They much prefer to see Austria independent. They don't want German domination in Austria or Southeastern Europe. They infinitely prefer the status quo, even without the treaty revision, to German domination in Austria and eventually over them. But they fear Germany and they are afraid that the present Government in Germany will be able to maintain itself, and this means in their minds definite German penetration to the Southeast. The events of June 30 and July 25 caused a real revulsion of feeling in Hungary and strengthened the feeling that they wanted to see Austria remain independent, but the feeling of fear of Germany has more recently made headway again.

"Kanya, the Foreign Minister, was in Berlin, I think now several months ago, and I know that he saw Hitler, Schacht, Neurath, and Blomberg. He came back to Hungary with the feeling that the present regime would be able to maintain itself, and strengthened therefore in his policy of maintaining an equivocal position. Hungary therefore must be considered among the States constantly wavering and endeavoring to carry water on both shoulders..."

H1121-0115

Poland, prompted by her territorial designs on Teschen, and fearful of being caught in a war between Germany and Russia, almost openly began to follow the German line, and particularly with respect to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In the fall of 1935, I reported from Vienna in this connection as follows:

> "...The part which Poland is playing at this time and has been playing for some months is a very dangerous one and, in the opinion of many, not a creditable one. Poland owes her existence to France and England, and it was Czechoslovakia, whose country they now want to help divide up, who helped to make possible the new Poland. In her eagerness for prestige and additional territory she is willing to turn on her old friends and to play a rather sorry role...
>
> "...The Czechoslovakian Minister here informs me that Czechoslovakia has an arbitration treaty with Poland which in the first paragraph covers all disputes which might arise. When some time ago the Poles arbitrarily dismissed some twenty Czechs from responsible positions in Poland and no arrangement of the difficulties could be found, the Czech Government proposed arbitration, and to this day the Polish Government has not replied and refused to take any action. The Poles have an air line between Warsaw and Vienna which passes over Czechoslovakia, and when that was instituted the Czechs agreed with the reservation that when they wished to institute a line over Poland the Poles would agree. The Polish line has been in operation for some time, and when the Czechs recently wished to institute a commercial line over Poland the Poles refused to give permission. The Czechs retaliated by taking action which stopped the Polish Vienna-Warsaw route. It is well known that the Czechs are giving the Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia schools, etc., while the Poles are refusing to do anything of this kind for the Czechs in Poland. It seems to be a deliberate dog-in-the-manger policy which cannot give any confidence in the Polish procedure..."

The effect was to make these countries apathetic to the annexation of Austria and cooperative in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. I reported in October 1935, in this respect as follows:

> "...Yugoslavia, because of the fear of her minorities, prefers Anschluss to Hapsburg restoration in Austria, in the vain hope that this might avoid catastrophe for her. Anschluss would not avoid catastrophe for Yugoslavia, but only postpone it and make it more sure. Hungary remains fundamentally pro-German, due to the false idea that her revisionist hopes will get satisfied in that direction sooner than others. She does not realize that the revisionist satisfaction which she hopes to get from Germany would only be the forerunner of later loss of sovereignty. The fact that there are Hungarians who realize that this turning to Berlin is the sure road to ruin does not keep Hungary from putting her foot on this road.
>
> "Because Czechoslovakia has entered into a military agreement with Russia, and Rumania is about to do the

H1121-0116

> same, and Yugoslavia is considering it, Berlin is trying to convince Poland and Hungary that this is a Soviet threat to them. The real object, of course, is to get their cooperation in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the fastening of the yoke on Austria as the first step towards progress to the Southeast..."

As the Nazi leaders of Germany realized, however, that these limited and uncertain gains were not sufficient to insure the success of her program, they did not lessen their rearmament at home so as to increase terror and fear. Austria and Czechoslovakia might easily have been saved and her neighbors persuaded to combine with them in mutual self defense if England and France at that time, with or without Italy's assistance, had shown adequate evidence of resisting the German program. Nazi leaders at that time were most insistent and persistent in endeavoring to determine the reactions to their program in Italy and in France and to a certain extent in the United States. They were eager to know to what degree these countries would resist their program. They had no regard as to what the smaller countries of Europe might feel or think or do. Their physical power was already so great that that was no longer a matter of concern to them. I recall conversations with Nazi leaders at this stage, when I happened to see them in Germany on trips from Vienna to Berlin, during which they showed a childish eagerness to get my reaction to what they were doing and when I told them that they were precipitating a war in which Germany would be defeated and her power in Europe destroyed, not for generations but perhaps for centuries, they laughed in my face and said that England and France and we would do nothing and they knew it.

Germany succeeded in preventing any such combinations by creating divisions and by persuading France and England to acquiesce, as the price of peace, in the German expansion in Southeastern Europe, in exchange for precarious security in the West.

While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia. The Nazis made little effort to conceal their motives in supporting Italian colonial adventures. In the summer of 1935, I was informed by a person whose name I do not recall at this time but who was thoroughly informed as to all developments in Germany, that the Nazis were eagerly awaiting an Italian-Abyssinian war to give them a free hand in Central Europe. I reported at the time:

> "...He emphasized that in the party it was definitely reckoned with that war between Italy and Abyssinia was inevitable, and that this would cause disturbances in the European situation which the regime felt it must be free to reap all benefit from..."

Germany, of course, did take advantage of the situation to force Austria into the July 11, 1936 accord, which, as I have explained in a separate affidavit, was the first critical step in the disintegration and eventual downfall of Austria.

The Nazis fully realized, however, the necessity for the neutralization of France and England, as a part of their strategic preparation for war, and they left no stone unturned to achieve it. Almost from the beginning of the Hitler regime, the Nazis sought to make a deal with France. The terms of the deal with France were

H1121-0117

security for France in the West in exchange for freedom of action for Germany in the East. Very soon after coming to power, Hitler announced that apart from the Saar, Germany coveted no territory of France and thereafter he often repeated these assurances, particularly on the occasion of each new treaty violation or act of aggression in the East. Acceptance of the deal would of course reduce France to a second-rate power. To gain French acquiescence, the Nazis made powerful appeals to all classes of French society. To the left, they played on the profound pacifist sentiment of the masses. To the right, they emphasized the fear of communism, fears which took several forms, either that the Nazis, after the reoccupation of the Rhineland, were invulnerable in the West and could be stopped in the East only by the Red army, or conversely (after the purge of the Russian army in 1937) that Russia could not fight Germany, but intended to let France and England exhaust themselves in a war with Germany and then arise in the end the only victor.

To England, the Nazis made substantially the same arguments, and appealed in addition to those who disapproved of French military hegemony and the alleged inequalities of the Versailles Treaty. As an evidence of their alleged desire to reach a permanent understanding with England, Germany "accepted" a naval limitations treaty and dangled before the eyes of the British Government the prize of a Locarno Air Pact.

In order to assure wider acceptance of these arguments, Germany did not hesitate to attempt to arrange to involve England and France elsewhere in order to give Germany a freer hand in Eastern Europe. Germany actively supported Italy in both her Abyssinian and Spanish adventures, thereby embroiling Italy with France and England. By means of an understanding with Italy announced in 1936, and by the formation of the anti-Comintern Pact with Japan at about the same time, Germany created such potential dangers for England in the Mediterranean and in the Far East as to discourage England from continuing to maintain the commitments undertaken by her in Eastern Europe.

These German measures with respect to France and England were surprisingly effective. The French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Francois Poncet, who was married to a member of one of the powerful industrial families of France, was persuaded that German military might could not be matched and as I learned from friends in the French Foreign Office, sent home many defeatist reports. As early as the fall of 1935, I learned from these same friends and others that France was preparing to abandon its commitments in the Southeastern part of Europe in exchange for promises of security within her own borders. The Nazis appeared to have equal success in undermining British sentiment. The "conversion" of Lord Lothian and the attitude of the London Times beginning in 1935 are a matter of historical record. The attitude of such conservatives was naturally reflected in British diplomacy.

Germany was ready. She had completed her rearmament program. She had sown discord among her intended victims in Eastern Europe.

H1121-0118

She had won tacit English and French acceptance for German expansion in the East in exchange for a promise of peace in the West. Germany was ready now to march. The rest is written history.

/s/George S. Messersmith

Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned, and qualified, in Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 30th day of August, 1945.

/s/ William L. Brewster

William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States
of America

Service No. 6809
Tariff No. 38
No fee prescribed.

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945
Not offered in evidence.

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2461-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 124, no. 21a.

Official German Statement of the meeting of the Führer and Reich Chancellor with the Austrian Bund Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden(on 12 February) from 12 to 15 February 1938.

The Austrian Bund chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in company of the Austrian state secretary for foreign affairs Dr. GUIDO SCHMIDT and the German ambassador VON PAPEN paid today a visit to the Führer and Reich Chancellor at OBERSALZBERG at his invitation in presence of the foreign Reich minister VON RIBBENTROP. This unofficial meeting originated from the mutual desire to discuss all questions pertaining to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria.

* * * * * * * * * ** *

At the conference which took place between the Führer and Reich chancellor and the Bund chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg at the OBERSALZBERG at BERCHTESGADEN on 12 February. All questions of relationship between the German Reich and Austria were discussed in detail. Purpose of this discussion was to eliminate difficulties due to the execution of the agreement of 11 July 1936.

It was agreed that both parties are resolved to stick to the principles of this agreement and consider some a basis for a satisfactory development of the relationship between the two countries.

In this sense both parties, after the discussion of 12 February 1938, have agreed to the immediate execution of measures to guarantee to effect such close and friendly relationship between both nations as it is proper for the history and total interest of the German nation. Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation.

The Austrian government issued a similar communication.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2461-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2461-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1121-0119

FULL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2985-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Mexico City, D.F.) Vereinigte Mexikanische Staaten,)
) ss. Mexiko, Federal District Gesandschaft) ss.
Mexico) der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.)

GEORGE S. MESSERSCHMITH, nachdem er vorher eingeschworen ist, sagt aus:

Waehrend der Jahre 1933 und 1934, im Dienst der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika als General Konsul in Berlin, war ich in enger Verbindung, in Anbetracht meiner Plichten und der Notwendigkeit der Zeiten entsprechend mit den diplomatischen Vertretern nicht nur Englands und Frankreichs, sondern auch mit denen von Jugoslawien, der Tschechoslowakei, Polen Ungarn, Oestreich, Bulgarien, Rumaenien, Griechenland, Tuerkei und Holland. Ich sprach die Chefs dieser Missionen fast taeglich, die meisten von ihnen waren gleichzeitig gute Freunde von mir, aber sprach auch deren Hauptuntergeordneten ein oder zweimal in der Woche und in vielen Faellen oefters. In Oesterreich, wohin ich gegen Mitte von 1934 als Gesandter versetzt war, wurde meine Verbindung mit den diplomatischen Vertreter dieser Laender womoeglich noch enger und lebhafter.

Ich stand auch in haeufiger Verbindung waehrend meiner Dienste in Deutschland mit vielen hochgestellten Deutschen, einschliesslich Goering, Goebbels, Frank, Schacht, von Papen, Funk, Lammers, Darre, Ley und anderen derselben sowie zweitrangiger Kategorie. Diese Verbindungen waren erforderlich auf Grund meiner Dienstpflichten und zum Schutze unserer Interessen. Waehrend meiner Dienste in Deutschland und Oesterreich habe ich auch enge Verbindung mit vielen fuehrenden diplomatischen und politischen Persoenlichkeiten aus allen Teilen Europas aufrecht erhalten mit der Ausnahme Russlands, wo

H1121-0120

ich keine spezielle Verbindung zu derzeit hatte. Diese Verbindungen, die ich mit den diplomatischen und politischen Persoenlichkeiten anderer Laender aufrecht erhielt, basierte sich auf frueherern Umgang, und ich erhielt diese enge Verbindung aufrecht durch verschiedene Reisen, die ich von Zeit zu Zeit un ternahm und besonders durch vertrauliche Korrespondenz und durch gemainsame Freunde. Durch all diese Quellen erhielt ich eine intime Kenntnis der Ziele und Methoden der deutschen Diplomatie seit 1933 bis zu meiner Rueckkehr nach den Vereinigten Staaten, wo ich Mitte 1937 ainen Posten im Department of State antrat.

Schon 1933, waehrend meines Dienstes in Deutschland, haben die deutschen und Nazi Verbindungen, welche ich mit den hoechsten und weniger hohen Schichten hatte, ganz offen Deutschlands Bestreben zugegeben, den Sued-Osten Europas von der Tschechoslowakei bis zur Tuerkei zu beherrschen, Wie sie ganz offen eingestanden, war der Zweck der territorialen Ausbreitung im Falle Oesterreichs und der Tschechoslowakei . Der angebliche Zweck in dem Anfangsstadium des Nazi Regimes fuer das suedoestliche Europa war politische und oekonomische Kontrolle und man sprach zu dieser Zeit nicht so unumwunden von wirklicher Absorbierung und Zerstoerung der Souveraenitaet. Ihre Bestrebungen waren jedoch nicht mit dem Suedoestlichen Europa begrenzt. Seit fruehesten m Anfang von 1933 und sogar bevor die Nazis zur Macht gelangten, sprachen bedeutende Nazis ganz frei von der Ukraine und sagten: "sie muss unsere Kornkammer werden" und dass "sogar mit dem suedoestlichen Europa unter unserer Kontrolle, Deutschland braucht und muss den groesseren Teil der Ukraine besitzen, um die Moeglichkeit zu haben, die Menschen des Gross-Deutschland zu ernaehren."

Nachdem ich Deutschland Mitte 1934 verlassen hatte, um meinen Posten in Oesterreich anzutreten, erhielt ich noch fortlaufende Berichte bezueglich Deutschlands Absichten im Suedosten Europas.

H1121-0121

In einer Unterredung mit von Papen, kurz nach dessen Ernennung zum Oesterreichischen Gesandten 1934, erklaerte er mir ganz offen, dass "der Suedosten Europas bis zur Tuerkei Deutschlands Hinterland ist, und ich bin beauftragt, diese Aufgabe, es in den Bereich zu bringen, durchzufuehren. Oesterreich ist zunaechst auf dem Programm. Wie ich durch meine diplomatischen Kollegen erfuhr, haben von Papen und seine Kollegen in Wien von Mackensen in Budapest ganz oeffentlich schon seit 1935 die Idee der Zergliederung und des endgueltigen Einverleibens der Tschechoslowakei verbreitet.

Die Nazis hatten geplant, ihre Ziele durch Gewalt zu erreichen, vorzugsweise, wenn moeglich, durch die Drohung von Gewalt alleine, doch wenn noetig durch Krieg. Jedoch zum Anfang, d. h. in den ersten zwei Jahren des Nazi Regimes, brauchten die Nazis Frieden, um sich selber Zeit, d. h. Zeit zum Ruesten zu geben und um dann ihre beabsichtigten Opfer zu zersplittern und zu isolieren. Ich habe wiederholt prominente Nazis in den Jahren 1933 und 1934 sagen hoeren und ich uebersetze woertlich: "Wir brauchen Frieden bis wir mit den Vorbereitungen fertig sind." Im Spaetsommer 1938 glaubten sie fertig zu sein. Sofort mit ihrem Machtantritt begannen die Nazis ein ungeheueres Ruestungsprogramm. Das war eines der hauptsaechlichsten sofortigen Ziele der Nazi-Regierung. Ueberhaupt die zwei dringendsten Ziele der Nazi-Regierung mit Machtantritt sollten sein und waren, gemaess ihren eigenen Worten, wie sie mir oft sagten, in erster Linie die Wiederherstellung kompletter und absoluter Machtgewalt ueber Deutschland und das deutsche Volk, damit es in jeder Hinsicht ein williges und faehiges Instrument der Regierung wuerde, um ihre Absichten durchzufuehren; und in zweiter Linie die Wiederherstellung einer ungeheuren bewaffneten Macht innerhalb Deutschlands, um das politische und wirtschaftliche Programm fuer den Suedosten Europas und fuer Europa ueberhaupt noetigenfalls mit Gewalt durchfuehren zu koennen, jedoch vorzugshalber mit der Drohung von Gewaltanwendung. Es war bezeichnend, dass sie von Anfang an

H1121-0122

bei der Durchfuehrung dieses zweiten Zieles immer den Bau einer ueberwaeltigten Luftwaffe betonten. Goering und Milch haben wiederholt zu mir, oder in meiner Gegenwart, gesagt, dass die Nazis sich auf die Luftwaffe zu konzentrieren entschlossen haben, die als Terrorwaffe Deutschland am wahrscheinlichsten in eine beherrschende Lage versetzen wuerden und welche Waffe am leichtesten und in kuerzester Zeit entwickelt werden koenne. 1934 habe ich von einem hohen General der deutschen Armee gehoert, ich kann mich auf seinen Namen im Augenblick nicht besinnen, dass man beabsichtige, in diesem Jahr 1200 Flugzeuge zu bauen, was eine ungheure Luftwaffe zu dieser Zeit vorstellte und ein Begriff war, den man sich bis dahin in keinem Land vorstellen konnte. Die rapide Entwicklung des Luftprogrammes war fuer jeden offensichtlich, denn man konnte nicht in den Strassen Berlins oder irgend einer anderen bedeutenden Stadt Deutschlands gehen, ohne dass Piloten oder auszubildende Flieger in Erscheinung traten. Man gab ihnen besondere Vorrechte und besondere Wohnmoeglichkeiten um die jungen Menschen zu ermutigen, dem Luftausbildungsprogramm beizutreten. Das Aufruestungsprogramm ganz allgemein, es muss betont werden, ging mit unglaublicher Geschwindigkeit vorwaerts. Es ging viel rascher als, wie hohe Nazi Fuehrer mir selber sagten, sie selbst es fuer moeglich geglaubt haetten. Es ging sogar schneller vor sich, als die gut unterrichteten und ausgebildeten auslaendischen Beobachter in Deutschland es fuer moeglich gehalten haetten, obwohl sie die zur Verfuegung stehenden Mittel der deutschen Industrie kannten.

Gleichzeitig mit dem Fortschreiten des Aufruestungsprogrammes unternahm die Nazi Regierung alle erdenklichen Schritte, um das deutsche Volk im psychologischen Sinne fuer den Krieg vorzubereiten. Zum Beispiel sah man durchweg in Deutschland ueberall junge Deutsche von jedem Alter beschaeftigt in militaerischen Uebungen, Drill,

H1121-0123

Feldmanoevern, Uebungen im Werfen von Handgranaten erc. In diesem Zusammenhang sandte ich eine offizielle Mitteilung von Berlin im November wie folgt:

> ".....Alles was heute in dem Land getan wird, hat den Zweck die Leute glauben zu machen, dass Deutschland wesentlich in jeder Hinsicht seiner Lebensnotwendigkeiten von ausseren Einfluessen und von anderen Laendern bedroht ist. Man unternimmt alles, dieses Gefuehl auszunuetzen, um zu militaerischen Ausbildungen und Uebungen anzuspornen, und unendlich viele Schritte werden unternommen, um das deutsche Volk zu einer harten, zaehen Rasse zu entwickeln, welche in der Lage ist, allem was kommt zu widerstehen. Der kriegerische Geist waechst andauernd. Anders kannes nicht kommen. Die heutigen Fuehrer Deutschlands haben keinen Wunsch fuer Frieden, sofern es nicht ein Friede ist, welchen die Welt auf Kosten vollstaendiger Erfuellung der Wuensche und Erstrebungen der Deutschen macht. Hitler und seine Helfershelfer wunschen wirklich und aufrichtig im Augenblick den Frieden, aber nur um die Moeglichkeit zu haben fertig zu werden, um Gewalt anzuwenden, wenn es letzten Endes als erforderlich erachtet wird. Sie bereiten ihren Weg so vorsichtig vor, dass meiner Meinung nach kein Zweifel besteht, dass das deutsche Volk mit ihnen mitmacht, wenn sie Gewalt anwenden wollen und wenn sie glauben, dass sie die erforderlichen Mittel haben, ihre Ziele durchzufuehren....."

Man hat militaerische und psychologische Vorbereitungen mit diplomatischen Vorbereitungen verbunden, die darauf hinauszielten ihre beabsichtigten Opfer uneinig zu machen und zu isolieren, um sie gegen deutsche Angriffe verteidigungslos zu machen. Ich erinnere mich gut an eine Unterredung mit Goebbels aus der fruehesten Zeit der Nazi Regierung, in der ich zum Ausdruck brachte, dass sie niemals ihr europaeisches Programm erreichen wuerden. Er erwiderte darauf: "Aber Sie wissen nicht, was wir durch das Schaffen von Uneinigkeit erreichen koennen,- ohne dass etwas spezifisches von uns aus gemacht wird, oder was uns zum Vorwurf gemacht werden koennte, werden wir die Voelker dazu kriegen, unter sich zu kaempfen und sich so zu schwaechen, dass sie eine leichte Beute fuer uns werden." Ich kann mir noch ganz genau die zynische Art zurueckrufen, in der er besonders auf die "wunden Stellen" in Oesterreich und in der Tschechoslowakei und anderen Laendern hinwies, und welche durch verraeterische Methoden deutscher Agenten Zwietracht hervorrufen koennten und es erreichten,

H1121-0124

H1121-0125

dass die Voelker dieser Laender sich selbst entzweiten.

Bei oberflaechlichem Anschein und vom historischen Standpunkt alleine beurteilt, waren die Widerstaende fuer die Erreichung der Nazi Ziele bestimmt ganz bedeutend. Ganz abgesehen von den Schwierigkeiten, eine vollstaendige Einordnung und absolute Kontrolle innerhalb Deutschlands zu erreichen und ein solch gewaltiges militaerisches Programm durchzufuehren, gab es noch die entschiedenen Widerstaende auf dem politischen und diplomatischen Gebiet. Im Jahre 1933 war Frankreich die hervorragendste militaerische Macht auf dem Festland. Fuer seine Sicherheit hatte es innerhalb des Rahmens des Voelkerbundes sich ein System gegenseitiger Hilfsleistung sowohl im Osten wie im Westen errichtet. Der Locarno Pakt von1928, ergaenzt durch die Franzoesisch-Belgische Allianz, garantierte den territotialen status quo im Westen. Jugoslavien, die Tschechoslowakei und Rumaenien waren in der "kleinen Entente" verbuendet, und jedes dieser Laender wieder war mit Frankreich durch gegnseitige Unterstuetzungspakte verbuendet. Seit 1922 waren auch Frankreich und Polen fuer den Fall auswaertiger Angriffe verbuendet. Italien hatte ein besonderes Interesse an der Oesterreichischen Unabhaengigkeit, was es ganz entschieden klar machte. Seit 1934 bis 1936 haben sich Frankreich und Italien vorgeschlagen und bemueht, politische und wirtschaftliche Uebereinkommen zu foerdern, um die Widerstandskraft der Osteuropaeischen Laender gegenueber deutschen Absichten zu staerken. Frankreich und Italien waren beide bemueht, das gesamte suedoestlich Europa durch diplomatische Mittel in der Lage und Unabhaengigkeit seiner Laender zu staerken. Das wesentlichste dieser Vorkehrungen war der vorgesehene oestliche Locarno Pakt, der von Frankreich eingefloesst war und beabsichtigte, alle oestlichen Laender von der Ostsee bis zum Adriatischen Meer und zum Schwarzen Meer einzuschliessen, und der vorgeschlagene Donau Pakt, dessen Hauptaufgabe darin lag, die wirtschaftliche Lage der Laender suedosteuropas zu staerken durch das

Befuerworten gegenseitiger Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Oesterreich und den uebrigen Laendern, welche frueher Teile des oesterreichisch-ungarischen Reiches waren.

Nazi Deutschland unternahm einen starken diplomatischen Feldzug, um diese Buendnisse und Verstaendigungen abzubrechen, um eine Spaltung unter den Mitgliedern der Kleinen Entente und den anderen Osteuropaeischen Maechten hervorzurufen, und um alle von Frankreich abzusondern, von dessen militaerischer Macht die Sicherheit dieser kleineren Staaten letzten Endes abhing. Einigen dieser Laender, besonders Jugoslawien, Ungarn und Polen, machte Nazi-Deutschland aussergewoehnliche und oft widersprechende Versprechungen von territorialen und wirtschaftlichen Belohnungen als Preis fuer die Zusammenarbeit mit dem deutschen Angriffsprogramm gegen ihre Nachbarn. Anderen Laendern wiederum, besonders Frankreich und England, bot Nazi Deutschland den verfuehrerischen Preis des Friedens und der Sicherheit als Gegenleistung fuer das Gewaehren an Deutschland einer freien Hand fuer Suedosteuropa . Um die Befuerchtungen seiner Nachbaren zu vertreiben, bis Deutschland seine militaerischen und diplomatischen Vorbereitungen beendet hatte, ging es klug von Schritt zu Schritt vor, indem es immer feierliche Versicherungen abgab, dass seine unmittelbaren Ziele seine letzten seien. Indem es diese Versprechungen machte, war es ungehemmt von irgendwelchen Skrupeln bezueglich der Unverletzlichkeit internationaler Verpflichtungen. Hochgestellte Nazis, mit denen ich offizielle Verbindung aufrecht zu erhalten hatte, besonders solche Leute wie Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darre und andere, spotteten wiederholt ueber meine Ansicht, bezueglich des bindenden Charakters von Abmachungen, und sie haben mir ganz offen bestaetigt, dass Deutschland solange internationale Abmachungen einhalten wuerde, wie es in seinen Interessen laege. Obwohl diese Feststellung mir gegenueber und wie ich sicherlich annehme auch anderen gegenueber so offen gemacht wurden, haben diese

H1121-0126

Nazi Fuehrer wirklich nicht irgendwelche Geheimnisse preisgegeben, denn bei vielen Gelegenheiten haben sie diese Ideen oeffentlich zum Ausdruck gebracht.

In diesem besonderen Zusammenhang quotierte ich aus einem Bref datiert vom 24. Maerz 1934, den ich an den Unterstaatssekretaer Phillips in Washington geschrieben habe:

> " Sein (Deutschlands) Uebereinkommen mit Polen ist nur eines einer Reihe von Uebereinkommen, welche es gerne machen moechte, im Verfolg seiner Politik Zeit zu gewinnen und Verdacht zu stillen, aber wenn man sich vergenwaertigt, welche abgebrochene Haltung die Machthaber hier gegnueber Vereinbarungen jeder Art einnehmen und hoert, was sie darueber zu sagen haben, das heisst es ist ein Teil seiner Politik, den Frieden und den status quo aufrecht zu erhalten, bis es vorbereitetist, sein Endziel durch Gewalt zu gewinnen, wenn dieses nicht anders erreichbar ist."

Jedoch letzten Endes war es nicht Vertrauen auf Deutschlands Versprechungen, sondern Furcht vor Deutschlands Macht und moeglicher Angriffshandlungen, welche seine Nachbarn veranlasste, besonders die kleineren, sich nach und nach seine Vorhaben gefallen zu lassen. Das ungeheuere deutsche Aufruestungsprogramm welches niemals ein Geheimniss war und welches ganz oeffentlich im Fruehjahr 1935 bekannt gegeben war, Deutschlands Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes, all das mit nur schwachen Protesten von Frankreich und England, sowie das Versagen des Voelkerbundes, Mussolinis Abessinisches Abenteuer aufzuhaltem, ueberzeugte die Voelker der kleineren Staaten Osteuropas, dass Frankreich der deutschen Ausbreitung im Osten entweder nicht Widerstand leisten konnte oder wollte, dass England keine positiven Schritte unternehmen wuerde Deutschland auf zuhalten, und dass ihnen nichts anderes uebrig blieb, als die bestmoegliche Abmachung mit Nazi Deutschland zu machen.

Ganz gewiss haben diese Ueberlegungen nicht alle Leute und alle politischen Fuehrer der Nachbarn Deutschlands ueberzeugt. Die Nazis jedoch machten es klar, dass jede Opposition, die noch da war, hilflos dastehen wuerde. Das Programm der Stiftung inneren Unfriedens wurde fortgefuehrt, wo immer es solchem in anderen Laendern gab, und Gruppen

H1121-0127

H1121-0128

von Nazis, Faszisten und Regierungsoppositionen, ganz besonders in Jugoslawien, Ungarn, Rumaenien, Oesterreich und der Tschechoslowakei, wurden ganz offen unterstuetzt.

Das war in Kuerze der allgemeine Plan der "Deutschen Diplomatie" und der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Taetigkeit waehrend dieser Jahre. Ich hatte die Gelegenheit die Einzelheiten dieser Operationen durch genaue Beobachtungen waehrend der Jahre 1933 bis 1937 zu verfolgen.

Oesterreich und die Tschechoslowakei waren die ersten auf dem deutschen Angriffsprogramm. Schon 1934 begann Deutschland, die Nachbarn dieser Laender durch Versprechungen von Anteilen an der Beute zu werben. Insbesondere bot man Kaernten den Jugoslawen an. Bezueglich der Jugoslawischen Reaktion berichtete ich zu der Zeit:

> ".....Der Hauptfaktor der internen Lage der letzten Woche war die Zunahme der Spannung in Hinblick auf die Oesterreichischen Nazi Fluechtlinge in Jugoslawien.....
> Es besteht nur sehr geringer Zweifel, dass Goering auf seiner Tour durch die verschiedenen Hauptstaedte Suedosteuropas vor sechs Monaten den Jugoslawen sagte, dass sie Teile von Kaernten erhalten wuerden, sobald eine Nazi Regierung in Oesterreich zur Macht kaeme..... Diese in Jugoslawien gesaehte Nazi Saat war ganz genug, um Aergernisse zu verursachen und es gibt zweifellos viele Leute dort die eine gute Portion Wohlwollen diesen Nazi Fluechtlingen entgegenbringen, welche sich nach den Tagen des 25. Juli nach Jugoslawien begaben."

Deutschland machte ansehnliche Versprechungen territorialer Gewinne an Ungarn und Polen, um deren Mitarbeit zu gewinnen oder zumindest deren Duldung der vorhergesehenen Zersplitterung der Tschechoslowakei. Wie ich von meinen diplomatischen Kollegen in Wien erfuhr, haben von Papen und von Mackensen in Wien und Budapest 1935 die Idee der Aufteilung der Tschechoslowakei verbreitet, vermittels welcher Deutschland Boehmen, Ungarn die Slowakei und Polen das Uebrige erhalten sollten. Das hat nicht eines dieser Laender getaeuscht, denn sie wussten, dass die Absicht von Nazi Deutschland darin lag, alles zu nehmen.

Die deutsche Nazi Regierung zoegerte nicht, widerspruchsvolle Versprechungen zu machen, sobald es im Interesse ihrer unmittelbaren

Ziele lag. Ich erinnere mich, dass mir der jugoslawische Gesandte in Wien 1934 oder 1935 sagte, dass Deutschland Ungarn Versprechungen jugoslawischer Gebietsteile und zu gleicher Zeit Jugoslawien Versprechungen ungarischer Gebietsteile gemacht hatte. Dieselbe Information wurde mir von dem ungarischen Gesandten in Wien spaeter gegeben.

Ich sollte hier in diesem Bericht hervorheben, dass die Leute, die diese Versprechungen machten nicht nur waschechte Nazis, sondern mehr konservative Deutsche waren, die schon begonnen hatten, sich willig dem Nazi Programm zur Verfuegung zu stellen. Ich schrieb am 10. Oktober 1935 von Wien dem Department of State in einem offiziellen Bericht wie folgt:

> ".....Europa wird nicht wegkommen von der Fabel, dass Neurath, Papen und Mackensen nicht gefaehrlichr Leute sind und dass sie Diplomaten der alten Schule seien. Sie sind tatsaechlich sklavische Instrumente des Regimes und nur deshalb, weil die Aussenwelt sie als harmlos betrachtet, ist es ihnen moeglich, wirkungsvoller zu arbeiten. Es ist ihnen moeglich Uneinigkeit zu saehen, gerade weil sie die Fabel hervorstreichen, dass sie nicht in Sympathie mit dem Regime seien."

Zu diesem Punkt dieses Berichtes sollte ich das Folgende anfuehren. Als die Nazi Partei Deutschland uebernahm, repraesentierte sie nur einen kleinen Teil der deutschen Bevoelkerung. Sie beherrschte ganz Deutschland und versicherte sich sehr schnell dieser Beherrschung mittels Organisation und Terror, deren Einzelheiten eine historische Wahrheit sind und hier nicht nachher angefuehrt werden brauchen. Zu Beginn 1933, obwohl einige der Nazi fuehrer wie Hitler Hess und Goering die Idee einer Weltbeherrschung anerkannten, sprachen sie nur wenig davon. Zu Anfang hatte die grosse Masse der Partei und des Regimes selber als ihr erklaertes Ziel die Beherrschung von Suedosteuropa. Buchstaeblich bedeutete es fuer sie von Anfang an die Ein verleibung von der Tschechoslowakei und von Oesterreich, und die absolute politische und wirtschaftliche Kontrolle aller anderen Laender bis herunter zu der Tuerkei. Sie haben immer vermieden die Tuerkei zu erwaehnen, um nicht Gross Britannien zu sehr auf-

H1121-0129

H1121-0130

zuruetteln. Mit der Zunahme der Beherrschung der Deutschen innerhalb Deutschlands, mit dem Fortschritt des militaerischen Programms und mit der wachsenden Durchdringung des Nazi Geistes im Deutschen Volk, rascher sogar als es die fanatischsten Nazis es fuer moeglich gehalten haetten, nahm auch ihre Machtstellung innerhalb und ausserhalb Deutschland unglaubhaft zu. Innerhalb Deutschlands war eine Haltung completer Apathie, was die Widerstandsbewegung betraf. Ausserhalb Deutschlands wuchs staendig die Furcht der kleinen Laender, die sich bedroht fuehlten. Dieses wachsende Gefuehl von Macht, die Verwirklichung von Furcht und das Fehlen von Widerstandsmassnahmen der Aussenwelt waren es, Welche die Nazi Idee veranlassten, sich so rasch in Bezug auf eine Beherrschung ganz Europas und tatsaechlich der ganzen Welt auszubreiten.

In diesem Zusammenhang muss man auch in Erinnerung behalten, dass die Mehrzahl der hoeheren Offiziere der deutschen Armee waehrend der ersten Jahre des Nazi Regimes ihre Hilfsleistungen diesem nur deshalb gewaehrten, weil sie glaubten, dass es ihnen unter diesem Regime moeglich sein wuerde, was ihnen unter der frueheren Regierung nicht moeglich war naemlich die deutsche Heeresmacht wieder aufzubauen und somit die Machtstellung Deutschlands in Europa und in der ganzen Welt wieder herzustellen. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass zu Anbeginn nur wenige dieser Generaele die territoriale Angriffsidee der Nazis teilten, aber wie die Armee ihre Macht wachsen sah, wurden sie zunehmend von den niederen bis zu den hoeheren Raengen erfuellt, genau so viel wie die Nazis, von den Angriffsplaenen.

Eine Zeit lang bemuehten sich Frankreich und England diesen deutschen Bemuehungen entgegenzuwirken, wie es in den vorhergehenden Paragraphen beschrieben worden ist. 1934 bemuehte sich Barthou, der sehr faehige und weitsichtige Franzoesische Aussenminister, einen oestlichen Lucarno Pakt zu befuerworten, um die Gebiete aller

oestlichen und suedoestlichen Europaeischen Laender zu garantieren und eine Garantie gegen aussere Angriffe zu schaffen durch gegenseitige Unterstuetzungspakte gestuetzt von Frankreich und Russland. Frankreich setzte auch seine Bemuehungen fort eine wirtschaftliche Uebereinkunft zwischen Oesterreich und den anderen Donau Staaten, die frueher Mitgleider der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie waren, zu beguenstigen, waehrend Italien versuchte, einen etwas begrenzteren wirtschaftlichen Block von Oesterreich, Ungarn und Italien zu organisieren.

Die deutsche Nazi Regierung machte alle Anstrengungen, um die Durchfuehrung dieser Uebereinkunft zu verhindern. Jugoslawien zum Beispiel, machte Deutschland Versprechungen bezueglich Unterstuetzungen seiner Erstrebungen auf italienisches Gebiet, besonders Triest, so wie auch eines Anteils von Oesterreich. Deutschlands Absicht beim Saehen von Unstimmigkeiten zwischen Jugoslawien und Italien war, Frankreich daran zu verhindern zu einer Uebereinkunft mit beiden von ihnen zu gelangen und damit jede Hoffnung fuer die Schaffung eines oestlichen Locarno Paktes zu unterbinden.

Im Oktober 1934 berichtete ich aus Wien wie folgt:

> ".....Der Aussenminister wies auf Berichte hin, welche vorlagen in Bezug auf die intensive diplomatische Taetigkeit Deutschlands in Warschau, in Belgrad, in Sofia und in Budapest. Man haette Information von sehr zuverlaessiger Quelle, wie er mir sagte, dass die augenblickliche deutsche Politik dahin ginge, Hoffnungen und Unruhen zu schaffen, besonders in Belgrad und Sofia, sodass wenn Koenig Alexander nach Paris ginge, er den Franzosen gegenueberstaende in einer Lage, die es fuer sie unmoeglich machen wuerde, zu irgend einem Uebereinkommen mit Italien zu kommen. In der Wilhelmstrasse glaubt man, gemaess der Informationen des Ministers dass, sofern Barthou in Rom keinen Erfolg haette, das gegenwaertige franzoesische Ministerium bei seiner Rueckkehr zurueecktreten muesse und ein staerkeres linksgerichtetes Ministerium gebildet wuerde, mit welchem die Wilhelmstrasse eine Uebereinkunft treffen kann. Der Aussenminister sagte, dass er nicht glaube, die Deutschen wurden darin Erfolg haben, noch dass ein Misslingen der franzoesische-italienische Unterhaltung noetigerweise einen Kabinettswechsel in Frankreich ausloesen wuerde, Jedoch sagte er, dass das franzoesisch-italienische Uebereinkommen schwierig waere, denn er haette gerade an

H1121-0131

diesem Morgen erfahren, dass Koenig Alexander mit seinem Besuch in Sofia sehr erfolgreich war, welcher gerade vor wenigen Tagen beendet wurde....."

Als Gegenmassnahme fuer irgend welche Bemuehungen in Richtung einer wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit der Donau Staaten, machte Deutschland freigebige, aber offensichtlich unaufrichtige Versprechungen wirtschaftlicher Unterstuetzungen als Bedingung fuer eine Zusammenarbeit mit ihm. Waehrend meiner Dienstreise in Deutschland besuchte mich oefters ein Nazi Wirtschaftler namens Deutz (ich glaube den Namen richtig geschrieben zu haben). Er hatte keine sehr hohe Stellung in der Regierung, aber er wurde von den hohen Nazi Fuehren als eines der aktiven Instrumente fuer den Suedosten Europas benutzt. Er machte haeufig Reisen nach Jugoslawien, nach Ungarn und auch gelegentlich nach Rumaenien. Aus irgendwelchen Gruenden, die ich nie sicher feststellen konnte, suchte er mich oft auf, und nach der Rueckkehr von diesen Reisen erzaehlte er mir ganz offen, was er getan hatte und von gemachten Versprechungen, von wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen als Belohnung fuer Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland. Gleichzeitig sagte er mir natuerlich zynisch, dass Deutschland gar keine Absicht hatte, diese Versprechungen zu halten, und er bemerkte: "Wie dumm diese Leute doch sind, an soche Versprechungen zu glauben."

H1121-0132

H1121-0133

Gleichzeitig als Deutschland solche Versprechungen von Belohnung fuer Mitarbeit an seinem Programm in Aussicht stellte, erregte es interne Zwietracht innerhalb der Laender selber, und besonders in Oesterreich und der Tschechoslowakei, alles in der Absicht, jede Opposition zu schwaechen und pro-Nazi und Fascist Gruppen zu staerken, um ein friedliches Zustimmen zu dem deutschen Programm sicherzustellen. Ueber seine Komplotte in Oesterreich habe ich im Einzelnen, wie sie unter meine direkte Beobachtung kamen, in einem separaten, beglaubigten Schreiben berichtet. In der Tschechei folgten sie derselben Taktik mit den Sudetendeutschen. Ich hatte zuverlaessige Information, dass die Nazi Partei ueber 6,000,000 RM ausgab allein um die Henlein Partei zur Zeit der Wahlen im Fruehjahr 1935 zu finanzieren. In Jugoslawien spielte man die alten Differenzen zwischen den Kroaten und Serben aus, sowie auch die Furcht vor der Wiedererrichtung der habsburger Monarchie in Oesterreich. Es sei hier bemerkt, dass dies letztere eines der Hauptinstrumente und eines der Wirkungsvollsten war, welches Nazi Deutschland benutzte, denn die Furcht besonders in Jugoslawien - einer Wiedererrichtung der Habsburger war aeusserst akut. In Ungarn spielte man die agrarischen Schwierigkeiten aus und gleichzeitig ermutigte man so offen die deutschen Nazi Elemente in Ungarn, dass die ungarische Regierung provoziert wurde, den Abruf von v.Mackensen 1936 zu fordern. In Ungarn und in Polen spielte es die Furcht vor Kommunismus und dem kommunistischen Russland aus.In Rumaenien bekraeftigte es den bestehenden Antisemitismus, indem es die wichtige Rolle der Juden in Rumaenien in der Industrie betonte und auch die juedische Herkunft von Lupescu. Deutschland hat auch zweifellos die Fascistische Eiserne Garde durch Codreneau finanziert.

Solche "diplomatischen" Massnahmen, verstaerkt durch Deutschland enormes Aufruestungsprogramm, hatten eine bedeutende Wirkung besnders in Jugoslawien, Polen und Ungarn, und genuegten, um zumindest diese Laender davon abzuhalten, sich einer Kombination oestlichen und suedoestlichen Europaeischen Laender zu garantieren und eine Garantie gegen aussere Angriffe zu schaffen durch gegensei

H1121-0134

anzuschliessen, die den deutschen Absichten entgegenstand, wenn noch nicht ausreichend, sie selber zu aktiven Verbuendeten des Nazi Deutschland zu ueberreden. Wichtige politische Fuehrer Jugoslawiens wurden allmaehlich davon ueberzeugt, dass das Nazi Regim am Ruder bleiben und seine Ziele erreichen wuerde, und dass der sicherste Weg fuer Jugoslawien die Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland waere. Das wurde durch direkte Information, die ich hatte, so offensichtlich, dass ich im September 1.37 von Wien aus wie folgt schrieb:

".... Die Haltung Jugoslawiens ist aeusserst beunruhigend. Fraglos haben die Deutschen das schon schwierige Problem, welches zwischen Italien und Jugoslawien besteht, noch kompliziert durch Versprechungen an die Jugoslawen von territorialen und anderen Vorteilen. Es gibt eine Menge Leute in Jugoslawien, die glauben, dass die gegenwaertige Regierung Deutschlands bleiben wird, und dass sie in der Lage sein wird, ihren Willen dem uebrigen Europa aufzuzwingen, und dass sie am besten daran tun, mit Deutschland zu arbeiten, denn sie werden letzten Endes mehr auf diese Weise gewinnen. Diese Meinungsgruppe in Jugoslawien glaubt, dass Oesterreich schliesslich Deutschland erliegt und dass, wenn das eintritt, Jugoslawien ein gutes Stueck des gegenwaertigen oesterreichischen Gebietes erhalten wird, und dass es obendrein Deutschlands Unterstuetzung gegenueber Italien haette, was schliesslich dazu fuehren wuerde, dass es Erstrebungen in anderen Richtungen verwirklichen wird, die jetzt nicht zu verwirklichen moeglich scheinen. Diese Einstellung in Jugoslawien erklaert die wohlwollende Haltung gegenueber den Nazi Fluechtlingen aus Oesterreich nach dem 35.Juli. Jugoslawien nimmt daher entschieden immer seinen eigenen Vorteil wahr. Es will gegenwaertig nicht mit Frankreich abbrechen, um sich die Bruecken dort nicht abzuschneiden noch mit den anderen Staaten der kleinen Entente, aber es spielt entschieden mit Deutschland, und es macht den

H1121-0135

Anschein, dass es im Augenblick geneigt ist, mehr Verlass der deutschen als der franzoesischen Hilfe zu schenken. Die Haltung Polens hat natuerlich Jugoslawien ermutigt, und was es fuer eine schwankende Haltung Ungarns haelt, ist ein zusaetzlicher Sporn der Ermutigung..."

In Ungarn wurde eine aehnliche Haltung mehr und mehr augenscheinlich. In demselben Brief aus Wien vom September 1434 schrieb ich mit Bezug auf die Ereignisse in Ungarn, ich zitiere wie folgt:

"....In Ungarn ist das Revisionsbeduerfnis staerker als vielleicht in allen anderen Nachfolgerstaaten, und gerade das Beduerfnis hat den groessten Einfluss in der Formulierung der ungarischen Politik. Wie Sie wissen, hat Ungarn schon seit einiger Zeit mit Deutschland geflirtet, aber es tut dies sehr diskret. Die Ungarn haben die freundschaftlichsten Gefuehle fuer Oesterreich. Sie ziehen es vor, Oesterreich unabhaengig zu haben. Sie wuenschenkeine Deutsche Vorherrschaft in Oesterreich oder Suedosteuropa. Sie ziehen den status quo, sogar ohne Vertragsrevision, einer Deutschen Herrschaft in Oesterreich und letzten Endes ueber sieselber entschieden vor. Aber sie fuerchten Deutschland, und sie fuerchten, dass das gegenwaertige Regim in Deutschland halten wird, und das bedeutet fuer sie das sichere deutsche Durchdringen nach dem Suedosten. Die Ereignisse des 30.Juni und des 25.Juli verursachten einen wirklichen Umschwung der Gefuehle in Ungarn und verstaerkten das Verlangen, Oesterreich weiter unabhaengig zu sehen, aber das Gefuehl der Furcht vor Deutschland hat letztens wieder mehr Boden gefasst.
Kanyz, der Aussenminister war, ich glaube, vor mehreren Monaten in Berlin, und ich wäss, dass er Hitler, Schacht, Neurath und Blumberg sah. Er kam mit dem Gefuehl nach Ungarn zurueck, dass das gegenwaertige Regim sich erhalten werde und war daher in seiner Politik gestaerkt, eine zweideutige Haltung beizubehalten. Man muss daher Ungarn als zu den Staaten zugehoerig gelten lassen,

H1121-0136

die dauernd schwnken und sich bemuehen, sich mit der Windfahne zu drehen..."

Polen, gereizt durch seine territorialen Absichten auf Teschen und in Angst, in einen Krieg zwischen Deutschland und Russland gezogen zu werden, hat fast ganz offen angefangen, der deutschen Richtlinie zu folgen, und besonders im Hinblick auf die Zergliederung der Tschechoslowakei. Im Herbst 1935 berichtete ich aus Wien in diesem Zusammenhang folgendes:

"....Die Rolle, die Polen jetzt spielt und schon seit einigen Monaten gespielt hat, ist eine aeusserst gefaehrliche und, nach der Ansicht vn vielen, eine nicht sehr ehrenwerte. Polen schuldet seine Existenz Frankreich und England, und die Tschechoslowakei half, das neue Polen moeglich zu machen; dieses Land wollen sie jetzt helfen aufzuteilen. In seiner Begierde nach Ansehen und zusaetzlichen Gebieten ist es bereit, sich gegen seine alten Freunde zu wenden und eine recht traurige Rolle zu spielen.... Der hiesige Tschec oslowakische Gesandte hat mich informiert, dass die Tschechoslowakei einen Vermittlungsvertrag mit Polen hat, dessen erster Paragraph alle Dispute deckt, dieauftreten koennen. Als vor einiger Zeit die Polen willkuerlich einige 20 Tschechen aus verantwortlichen Stellungen in Polen entliessen, und als keine Klaerung der Schwierigkeiten gefunden werden konnte, schlug die tschechische Regierung Vermittlung vor; doch is zum heutigen Tage hat die polnische Regierung nicht geantwortet und abgelehnt, irgend welche Schritte zu tun. Die Polen haben eine Luftverkehrslinie ueber die Tschechoslowakei zwischen Warschau und Wien, und als diese eingerichtet wurde, stimmten die Tschechen mit der Einschraenkung zudass, wenn sie eine Linie ueber Polen einzurichten beabsichtigten, die Polen zustimmen wuerden. Die polnische Luftlinie besteht seit einiger Zeit, doch als die Tschechen kuerzlich beabsichtigten, eine Handelsluftlinie ueber Polen einzurichten, lehnten die Polen die Erlaubnis ab. Die Tschechen nahmen Vergeltung in Schritten, welche die polnische Wien - Warschaulinie stoppte.

H1121-0137

Es ist ganz bekannt, dass die Tschechen den polnischen Minoritaeten in der Tschechoslosakei Schulen etc. gewaehren, waehrend die Polen es ablehnen, irgend etwas dieser Art fuer die Tschechen in Polen zu tun. Es scheint eine beabsichtigte Politik des "immer seinen eigenen Vorteil wahr nehmen" zu sein, welche kein Vertrauen in polnisches Verfahren geben kann...."

Die Wirkung war, dass diese Laender apathisch wurden gegenueber dem Anschluss Oesterreichs, und bei der Aufteilung der Tschechoslowakei mitarbeiteten. Ich berichtete im October 1935 diesbezueglich wie folgt:

".... Jugoslawien, wegen seiner Furcht vor den Minoritaeten, zieht den Anschluss einer Wiedereinsetzung der Habsburger in Oesterreich vor, in der eitlen Hoffnung, dass dieses eine Katastrophe fuer sie vermeiden wuerde. Der Anschluss wuerde keine Katastrophe fuer Jugoslawien vermeiden, sondern diese nur hinausschieben und um so sicherer machen. Grundsaetzlich bleibt Ungarn pro-Deutschland, wegen der verehrten Idee, dass von dieser Seite fruher die von ihren anderen seine Revisionshoffnungen Genugtuung finden wuerden. Es erkennt nicht, dass diese Revisionsgenugtuung, welche es von Deutschland erhofft, nur der Vorlaufer zu dem spaeteren Verlust seiner Oberhoheit bedeutet. Die Tatsache, dass es Ungarn gibt, die erkennen, dass die Wendung nach Berlin der sicherste Weg zum Ruin ist, verhindert Ungarn nicht, seine Schritte in dieser Richtung zu tun.

"Weil die Tschechoslowakei ihre militaerische Vereinbarungen mit Russland getreten ist, und Rumaenien dabei ist, dasselbe zu tun, und Jugoslawien es sich ueberlegt, versucht Berlin, Polen und Ungarn davon zu ueberzeugen, dass dies fuer sie eine sowjetische Drohung bedeutet. Die wirkliche Absicht natuerlich ist, deren Mitwirkung an der Zergliederung der Tschechoslowakei zu erhalten, und am Sichern des Jochs Oesterreichs als ersten Schritt auf dem Vormarsch zum Suedosten..."

Da die Nazi Fuehrer Deutschlands erkannten, dass jedoch diese begrenzten und unsicheren Gewinne nicht genuegten, den Erfolg ihres Programmes sicherzustellen, haben sie zu Hause in ihrer

Aufruestung nicht nachgelassen, um damit den Terror und die Furcht zu verstaerken. Oesterreich und die Tschechoslowakei haetten leicht gerettet werden koennen, und ihre Nachbarn haetten ueberredet werden koennen, sich mit ihnen zu einer gemeinsamen Selbstabwehr zu vereinigen, wenn England und Frankreich zu der Zeit, mit oder ohne Italiens Hilfe, ausreichenden Beweis zum Widerstand gegen das deutsche Programm geliefert haetten. Die Nazi Fuehrer waren damals hoechst bestaendig und beharrlich in ihren Beumuehungen, die Reaktion zu ihrem Programm in Italien und in Frankreich und zu einem gewissen Grade auch in den Vereinigten Staaten festzustellen. Sie waren begierig zu wissen, bis zu welchem Grade diese Laender ihrem Programm widerstehen wuerden. Sie nahmen keine Ruecksicht darauf, was die kleineren Laender Europas taeten, denken oder tun mogen. Ihre physische Kraft war schon so bedeutend , dass das schon nicht mehr in Betracht gezogen zu werden brauchte. Ich besinne mich auf Unterredungen mit Nazi Fuehrern in diesem Stadium, als ich sie zufaellig in Deutschland traf auf Reisen von Wien nach Berlin, bei denen sie einen kindischen Eifer zu Tage legten, meine Reaktionen zu ihren bevorstehenden Handlungen zu hoeren; und als ich ihnen sagte, dass sie einen Krieg hervorrufen wuerden, in welchem Deutschland geschlagen und seine Macht in Europa zerstoert wuerde, nicht allein fuer Generationen, sondern fuer Jahrhunderte womoeglich, dann lachten sie mir ins Gesicht und sagten, dass England und Frankreich und wir nichts tun wuerden und dass sie es wuessten.

Es gelang Deutschland irgend welche dieser Kombinationen zu verhindern, durch Herbeifuehrung von Teilungen und das Ueberreden Frankreichs und Englands um des Friedenswillen in deutsche Ausbreitung im Suedosten Europas zum Austausch fuer eine unsichere Sicherheit im Westen einzuwilligen.

Waehrend sich Italien offen 1934 den oesterreichischen Anschlussbemuehungen entgegensetzte, haben die italienischen Bestrebungen

H1121-0138

H1121-0139

in Abessinien Deutschland mit der Gelegenheit versorgt, Unfrieden zwischen Italien und Frankreich und England zu saehen, und Italien zur Annahme des deutschen Programmes zu gewinnen im Austausch fuer deutsche Unterstuetzung italienischer Plaene in Abessinien. Die Nazis haben wenig Anstrengung gemacht, ihre Motive fuer die Unterstuetzung des italienischen Kolonialabenteuers zu verbergen. Im Sommer 1935 wurde ich von jemandem informiert, an dessen Namen erinnere ich mich zu dieser Zeit nicht mehr, aber er war gruendlich informiert ueber die Entwicklungen in Deutschland, dass die Nazis mit Ungeduld den italienisch-abessinischen Krieg erwarteten, damit sie eine freie Hand in Mittel-Europa hatten. Ich berichtete zu der Zeit:

"...Er betonte dass man in der Partei bestimmt mit einem Krieg zwischen Italien und Abessinien als unvermeidlich rechnete, und dass dieser Unruhen in der europaeischen Lage hervorrufen wuerde, aus denen das Regime glaubte, ganz frei allen Nutzen zu ziehen Deutschland selbstverstaendlich hat seinen Vorteil aus der Lage gezogen, indem es Oesterreich zu der Uebereinkunft vom 11. Juli 1936 zwang, welche, wie ich in einem separaten offiziellen Bericht erklaert habe, der erste kritische Schritt zum Zerfall und letzten Endes Niederfall Oesterreichs war.

Jedoch haben die Nazis voll die Notwendigkeit einer Neutralisierung Frankreichs und Englands erkannt, als ein Teil ihrer strategischen Kriegsvorbereitungen, und haben alles getan, das zu erreichen. Fast mit Anfang des Hitler Regimes haben die Nazis versucht, ein Abkommen mit Frankreich zu machen. Die Grundlage dieses Abkommens mit Frankreich war die Sicherheit fuer Frankreich im Westen gegen eine Bewegungsfreiheit Deutschlands im Osten. Sehr bald nach seinem Machtantritt verkuendete Hitler dass, abgesehen vom Saargebiet, Deutschland keine Gebiete von Frankreich begehrte, und er hat danach oft diese Versicherungen wiederholt, besonders bei Gelegenheit jeder neuen Vertragsverletzung oder Angriffsakte im Osten. Die Annahme solchen Abkom-

H1121-0140

mens haette natuerlich Frankreich zu einer zweitklassigen Macht erniedrigt. Um Frankreichs Einwilligung zu gewinnen, machten die Nazis starke Appelle an alle Schichten der franzoesischen Gesellschaft.

Fuer die Linken beriefen sie sich auf die tief pazifistischen Empfindungen der Massen. Fuer die Rechten unterstrichen sie die Furcht vor dem Kommunismus, Bedenken, welche verschiedene Formen annahmen, entweder, nach der Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes, dass die Nazis unverwundbar im Westen waeren und im Osten nur von der Roten Armee aufgehalten werden koennten, oder umgekehrt (nach der Reinigungsaktion in der Russischen Armee in 1937) dass Russland, Deutschland nicht bekaempfen koennte, aber beabsichtigte, dass sich England und Frankreich erschoepften in einem Kriege mit Deutschland, um dann zuletzt als der alleinige Sieger hervorzugehen.

England gegenueber gebrauchten die Nazis im Wesentlichen dieselben Argumente, und wandten sich dazu noch an diejenigen, welche mit franzoesischer militerischer Haegemonie und den behaupteten Unzulaenglichkeiten des Versailler Vertrages nicht einverstanden waren. Als Beweis fuer ihre angeblichen Absichten, ein dauerndes Einvernehmen mit England zu erreichen, "nahm" Deutschland einen Seeruestungsbegrenzungsvertrag "an" und hielt vor den Augen der britischen Regierung den Preis eines Locarno Luftpaktes.

Um sich eine allgemeinere Annahme dieser Argumente zu sichern, zoegerte Deutschland nicht, zu versuchen es so einzurichten, dass England und Frankreich anderweitig verwickelt wuerden, damit Deutschland ein freieres Spiel im Osten Europas haette. Deutschland hat tatkraeftig Italien in seinen beiden Abenteuern in Abessinien und Spanien unterstuetzt, und dadurch Italien mit England und Frankreich verwickelt. Mittels eines Abkommens mit Italien, welches 1936 bekannt gegeben wurde, und mittels der Bildung des Anti-Comintern Paktes mit Japan zu une

H1121-0141

Gefahr gleicher Zeit, schaffte Deutschland solche moeglichen Gefahren fuer England im Mittelmeer und im Fernen Osten, dass es England entmutigte, die Fortsetzung der Verpflichtungen, die es im Osten Europas eingegangen war, aufrecht zu erhalten.

Diese deutschen Schritte in Bezug auf Frankreich und England waren ueberraschend wirkungsvoll. Der franzoesische Gesandte in Berlin, M. Francois Poncet, der mit einem Mitglied einer der maechtigsten Industriefamilien Frankreichs verheiratet war, hat sich ueberzeugen lassen, dass Deutschlands militaerische Macht nicht ihresgleichen haette, und sandte viele pessimistishe Berichte heim, wie ich von Freunden aus dem franzoesischen Aussenministerium erfuhr. Schon im Herbst 1935 habe ich von diesen Freunden und anderen gehoert, dass Frankreich sich vorbereite, seine Verpflichtungen in dem suedoestlichen Teil Europas aufzugeben gegen Versprechungen von Sicherstellung seiner eigenen Grenzen. Die Nazis schienen gleiche Erfolge in der Unterminierung der Britischen Mentalitaet zu haben. Die "Bekehrung" des Lord Lothian und die Stellungnahme der Londoner Times zu Beginn von 1935 sind geschichtlich festgestellt. Die Haltung solcher Konservativer spiegelte sich natuerlich in der Britischen Diplomatie wieder.

Deutschland war bereit. Es hatte sein Aufruestungsprogramm beendet. Es hatte Uneinigkeit unter seinen beabsichtigten Opfern im Osten Europas gesaet. Es hatte die stillschweigende englische und franzoesische Zusage fuer deutsche Ausdehnung im Osten gewonnen als Gegenleistung eines Friedensversprechens im Westen. Deutschland war jetzt bereit zu marschieren. Das Uebrige ist geschriebene Geschichte.

H1121-0142

Unterschrieben und beschworen vor mir,

WILLIAM L. BREWSTER,
Vize Konsul der Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika, richtig beauftragt und
qualifiziert,
in Mexiko, D.F., Mexiko am 30. August 1945

gezeichnet: WILLIAM L. BREWSTER
Vize Konsul der Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika.
Service No. 6808
Tariff No. 38
Keine vorgeschriebenen Kosten

H1121-0143

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2463-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Bennecckenstein)

Page 134, no. 23b.

Telegram from DR. SEYSS-INQUART, Austrian Minister of the Interior, to the Führer and Reich chancellor on the eve of 11 March 1938.

The provisional Austrian government which after the dismissal of the SCHUSCHNIGG government, considers it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German government to send German troops as soon as possible. 2)

-c- - - - - - - - - - - signed SEYSS -INQUART. -

1)VB of 12 Mar 38, Melzer, Weltgeschichte miterlebt p. 39; Berber, Das Diktat,von Versailles, p.597. After the resignation of the Schuschnigg cabinet on 11 March at 2000 hours, minister of the interior Dr. SEYSS-INQUART had complete government power in Austria as the last minister of the Confederation in office.

2) On the morning of 12 March from 0600 hours on, German troops under the high command of Infantry General FEDOR VON BOCK, crossed the Austrian border.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2463-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2463-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738.

H1121-0144

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945
Not offered in evidence

(Partial)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2464-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein.)

Page 125, no. 21b.
Official Austrian Announcement of the change in the Austrian cabinet and the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938.

At 0200 hours, the following announcement was made by the official news agency:

Bund chancellor Von Schuschnigg proposed to the Bund president a change in the cabinet. The Bund president has executed the following removals and appointments.

The cabinet now consists of the following:
Bund chancellor: Dr. KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG;
Vice chancellor: Field marshal-Lieutenant LUDWIG HÜLGERTH;
Foreign minister: DR. GUIDO SCHMIDT;
Finances; DR. RUDOLF NEUMAYER;
Commerce: ING JULIUS RAAB;
Social administration; DR. JOSEF RESCH;
Interior and Safety; DR ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART;
Agriculture: Economy counsel PETER MANDORFER;
Education: DR. HANS PERNTER;
Justice: University professor DR. LUDWIG VON ADAMOVICH;
Minister without portfolio: GUIDO ZERNATTO;
Dr. n.c. EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU; HANS ROTT;

(pages 127,128)

The ministerial counsel, upon request of the Bund chancellor, decided in executing the measures of yesterday's official announcement, to submit to the Bund president a resolution for the proclaiming of an amnesty for lawfully punishable political debits. It comprises all political crimes which were committed before the 15th of February of this year, if the criminal remained in the country. It pertains to the non-institution of penal procedure for actions before this date as well as the discontinuance of pending trials and amnesty of sentences not yet completed.

The amnesty is subject to the conditions of probation until 31 December 1941. The competent department ministers should quickly work out the required measures, in order to annul sentences passed on account of political delicts as well as measures referring to pensions, revenues, and supports and matters of education. Reinstatements into the active civil service are out of the question.

The Bund government has taken steps in this spirit of reconciliation, to make it possible for all citizens heretofore standing on the sidelines to participate in the construction of the fatherland and thereby to safeguard the internal and external peace of the country.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2464-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document no. 2464-PS.

Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.
33925738

H1121-0145

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945
Not offered in evidence.

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2465-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, part 1, Page 137, no. 25a
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Official announcement
of the nomination of DR. SEYSS-INQUART as
Austrian Bund Chancellor in the eve of 11 March 1938.

The Bund president has, under the pressure of the internal political situation, entrusted the Confederation Minister, Dr. SEYSS-INQUART, with the leadership of the office of the Bund chancellory to maintain quiet and order.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2465-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that theabove is a correct translation of Document No. 2465.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1121-0146

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945
Not offered in evidence

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2466-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 147, no. 30b

Official Announcement dated 13 March 1938 of the resignation of the Austrian Bund President MIKLAS.

The Bund president, upon request of the Bund chancellor by letter dated 13 March has resigned from his office. According to article 77, item 1 of the constitution of 1934, his affairs are transferred to the Bund chancellor Dr. JEYSS-INQUART.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2466-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738 , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document no. 2466-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1121-0147

L-281
L-291
L-293
1060-PS
1659-PS
2311-PS
2313-PS
2367-PS
[redacted]
2464-PS
2465-PS
2466-PS
2467-PS
2469-PS

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2467
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 146, no. 29.

Telegram from the Führer and Reich Chancellor to Mussolini from Linz, dated 13 March 1938.

To his excellency the Italian minister president and DUCE of Fascist Italy,
Benito Mussolini.
Mussolini, I shall never forget this of you!
signed: ADOLF HITLER.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2467-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2467-PS.

Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.
33925738.

H1121-0148

H1121-0149

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945
Not offered in evidence

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2469-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1., 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 128, no. 21d.
Official German and Austrian Statement on the equality of right of the Austrian National Socialists in Austria dated 18 February 1938.

On the basis of the agreement made between the Führer and Reich chancellor and the Bund chancellor Dr. SCHUSCHNIGG at Berchtesgaden on 12 February, the Austrian national socialist will now be in the position to be legally active within the VATERLÄNDISCHE FRONT and all other Austrian organizations. However, these activities can only be pursued on the basis of the constitution which as heretofore includes political parties, in equalization with all other groups. Steps will be taken by the Reich in executing the existing prohibitional laws which will exclude an interference by party organs in internal Austrian conditions in order to contribute thus also toward the peaceful development.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2469-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM THOROUGHLY CONVERSANT WITH THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN LANGUAGES; AND THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2469-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC.
33925738.

H1121-0150

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945 - Not offered

(PARTIAL) (EXCERPT) TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2484-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1., 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 128, no. 21c

Official German announcement dated 17 February 1938 about the visit of the Austrian minister of the interior Dr. SEYSS-INQUART to the Führer and Reich chancellor in Berlin.

The Führer and Reich chancellor received today the Austrian Bund minister of the interior and security Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart arrived this morning for a short visit in Berlin.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2484-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2484-PS.

Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.
33925738.

H1121-0151

Referred to Nov. 29, 1945
Not offered in evidence

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2485-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol 6. part 1, Page 144-145; no. 28a
(edited by Paul Meier-Bonneckenstein)

Address of Bund Chancellor Dr. SEYSS-INQUART from the balcony of the city hall at Linz on 12 March 1938.

My Führer! In a moment important for the German nation and in its far-reaching effects for the shaping of the European history, I welcome you and with me the whole country, my Führer and Reich Chancellor, for the first time again in Austria.

The time has come when inspite of the peace dictation, force envy and want of judgement of a whole world finally German met German.

Today the German nation stands unaminous and united to endure every fight and every suffering as one nation.

The road was difficult, hard and full of sacrifice. It led over the most shocking defeat of the German people, but yet out of it grew the great and brilliant idea of the indivisible common fate, the knowledge of one living nation, the idea of the national socialism!

You, my Führer, have experienced the nation's want and sorrow as a son of this frontier country. Out of this knowledge you conceived the great idea to use everything to deliver the German people from this, their worst defeat. You have done that!

You have delivered it! You are the Führer of the German nation in the fight for honor, freedom and right!

Now we Austrians have recognized this leadership freely and openly, proudly and independently, for all times while we, at the same time, solemnly declare article 88 of the peace treaty as invalid!

The Reich's mighty forces move into our country amidst the jubilation of Austria. Austria's districts welcomes German soldiers, not to spite us, but as a clear and final confirmation that the entire German nation has gathered to secure German right from all the world, and for all times!

The racial Reich of order, peace, and the freedom of the nations is our aim, and we are standing at the threshold of its beginning, and ADOLF HITLER is its leader!

My Führer! We Austrians thank you. I can say only plainly and as a simple man, but from the hearts of millions of Austrians: We thank you. We have always fought with you with the determination and attitude which befits us in this frontier country, everlasting with the greatest patience. I believe we fought a good fight till the end. But now we salute you with the jubilation of all German hearts; Heil, my Führer!

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2485-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct translation of Document No. 2485-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. [illegible]-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, part 1., 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Pages 135-137, no. 24
Letter from the Führer and Reich Chancellor to Mussolini on the eve of 11 March 1938.

In a fateful hour I am turning to you, Excellency, to inform you about a decision, occasioned by the circumstances and irrevocable from today on. For years the Germans in Austria have been forced and mistreated by a regime which lacks all lawful foundation. The immeasurable sufferings to which they are exposed, have no limits. Germany alone has as of now accepted 4,000 refugees who had to leave their fatherland although the great majority of Austria's population shares their political view. In order to eliminate this tension which became increasingly unbearable, I decided to undertake a last attempt with the Chancellor of the Confederation Schuschnigg, to reach an agreement whereby full equality for all under the law should be guaranteed once and for all. During one conference at Berchtesgaden I directed the Austrian Confederation's Chancellors attention to the fact that Germany could not for long bear it that a majority in Austria would be mistreated by a minority on account of its national idealogy. I myself am a son of this earth, Austria is my country, and I know from the circle of my own relations what great adversities and sufferings the great majority of this people who serve these national ideas have to endure. I pointed out to the Austrian chancellor that such a condition could not be tolerated by a great nation. I dare say that it would be a unique fact in the world if one had to stand by idly while men of the same blood, the same descent and of the same common historical past are being persecuted and deprived of rights for these very reasons. In addition, I told Schuschnigg that in case the equality of right of all Germans in Austria would not be restored we should be compelled some day to take over ourselves the protection of our brothers, forgotten by everybody. My demands were more than moderate. According to all principles of reason, right and justice and the democratic ways, Schuschnigg really should have resigned to make room for a government which enjoys the confidence of the whole nation.

I did not go that far. I was satisfied with a number of assurances according to which in the future all inhabitants of Austria would be entitled to the same rights and the same duties and that from the military aspect a certain security would be created within the framework of the Austrian laws which, though not righteously decreed, were nevertheless in force. Chancellor of the Confederacy Schuschnigg solemnly assured me this and made an agreement in this sense. But from the first moment on he did not keep it. Today he struck a a new blow against this agreement by instituting a pretended plebiscite which should become a really distorted picture of a plebiscite. The consequences which this new violation created among the majority of the people were those I feared: the Austrian people are now finally revolting against the constant pressure which necessarily would lead to new measures of force. Therefore, the representatives of the oppressed population as well as the government and of the other organizations retired.

H1121-0152

Since day before yesterday the country is increasingly driving towards anarchy. By authority of my responsibility as Fuehrer and chancellor of the German Reich, but also as a son of this earth, I can no longer watch idly the course of these events.

I have decided, therefore, to restore in the future in my country peace and order and to give to the will of the people the opportunity to clearly, openly and unequivocably decide for themselves their own future.

I want, therefore, to assure you, the Duce of the Italian people, and fascist Italy, most solemnly the following:

1) Consider this procedure as an art of native self-defense and, accordingly, as a deed which every man of character would have done in my place in the same manner. You, too, Excellency, could not act differently if the fate of the Italians would be at stake. As Fuehrer and national socialist I could not do otherwise.

2) In an hour critical for Italy, I have proved to you the firmness of my sympathy. Do not doubt that not the least will be changed about this in the future.

3) Whatever the consequences of the coming events may be, I have drawn a clear borderline against France and am now drawing an equally clear one against Italy. This border is the BRENNER. This decision will never be doubted or attacked. I did not decide this in 1938, but immediately after the world war, and I never made a secret out of it.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2510-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2510-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1121-0153

H1121-0154

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2799-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
Referred to Nov 28, 1945
Not offered in evidence

PAGE 83, part 38

Letter by Reich-Chancellor (Reichskanzler) Hitler of 26 July 1934 to Vice-Chancellor (Vicekanzler) von Papen
(From: Dokumente der deutschen politik, II, p. 83, # 38;)

26 July 1934.

Dear Mr. von Papen

As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest to the Reichs-President the removal of the German Minister to Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels respectively consented to an agreement made by both these parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government. Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason.

The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was strictly condamned and regretted by the German Government has made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without any Fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly channels.

For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take over this important task, just because you have possessed and continue to posses my most complete and unlimited confidence ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.

Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs-President that you, upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to me.

Thanking once more for all that you have at a time done for the coordination of the Government of the National Revolution and since then together with us for Germany, I remain,

Yours, very sincerely,

Adolf Hitler

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2799-PS

19 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2799-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

H1121-0155

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2831-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Office of the Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary Ambassador
of the German Reich
Austrian Division

Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr. 64

- - - - - - - -

IV 2 a A/O

To the Reich Chancellery
Attention Captain Wiedemann
Berlin W 8
78 Wilhelmstr.

Enclosed please find a confidential report on the situation in Austria, for your information. I may call your attention to the particular importance of this report.

Heil Hitler!

by order

signature illegible.

(P) D M 2

H1121-0156

COPY

14. Jan. 1937

Subject: Situation in Austria. Confidential Report.

With the exception of the extreme clerical camp, the C.V. (Catholic students' association) and the Catholic Action and the closely connected Legitimists, nobody denies really seriously that without an agreement between the governing circles and the nationalist opposition in Austria it will not be possible to attain the peace indispensable for the building up of the state. Therefore, it is the question of the way to it that hitherto could not be solved and that with every new attempt offers again and again a suitable point of attack for the group which is striving for a clerical-legitimist totalitarian regime. In addition there is the apprehension even of the moderate elements, in principle not averse to an agreement, not to be overpowered by a newly developing national movement. It depends on circumstances, impossible to define in advance, whether such counter-attacks will succeed. Hitherto they did.

At present, negotiations are in the foreground, being carried on by the Minister for Security Neustaedter-Stuermer. It is planned to gather a "Committee for the drafting or proposals" ("Proponenten komitee") composed of well-known nationally leading personalities of public life and business in order to form in this way a "German Action" built upon a broad basis, which should be inserted into the state. The Ministers Neustaedter-Stuermer and von Gleise-Horstenan will join the committee, one of the strongest advocates of which is a war-comrade of Minister Neustaedter-Stuermer, the former chief of the provincial government of Corinthia, Dr. Wolsaegger. Prince Rohan, too, is interested in it and collects business men particularly. The chances for approval of this action by the Bundes Ranzler are greater anyway than the previous attempts because it would be rather difficult for the government to reject without urgent reasons this proposal that is supported by some of its leaders - among them the Ministers of the 11th July - and that is also promoted by industry. Nevertheless it would be premature in view of the complicated situation to give an opinion. Of course it must be understood that a failure caused by the pressure of the clerical-legitimist wing would endanger also the value of the agreement of 11th July in a way difficult to bear even for Austria and, without doubt, would make untenable the position of the ministers supporting the plan. On the other hand, the fact of the forming of such a committee, even the planned extension of the "German Action" is of little meaning, for at first it has to be shown under what restricting conditions any activity will be possible.

In any case, a contradiction remains also in the attitude of the Minister for Security Neustaedter-Stuermer who wants the participation of the illegal party groups because in this action indubitably with his - at least forced - consent the police actions against the Party have been again greatly intensified just lately. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that new distrust has been created in illegal party circles and even beyond them in the circles of the nationalists on the whole, that this "Action" had only the purpose of wearing down the resistance of the nationalists and that it would end in a new wave of persecution. The attitude of the authoritative governmental authorities and of the "Fatherland Front" strongly supports this view and one has to take in account the immense bitterness of the people about the economic campaign of annihilation by the clerical-legitimist circles which still continues and is performed in the name of the regime.

H1121-0157

From all these events a very intensive crisis has arisen for the illegal party. It is generally known that grave differences of opinion on the attitude to be taken in future exist between the present leadership and a large part of the party, particularly the Gau-leadership. It became apparent that the optimism of the leadership that they could soon perform complete legalization and participate directly in the government was unjustified. Especially in SA-circles who had to suffer the most by the new wave of persecution the most vehement attacks have been sounded against the leadership. In very lengthy discussions of the Gauleiters, an immediate split-up of the party threatened in case the leadership should not resolve on a change of attitude. Eventually Dr. Fr. R succeeded by his considerate manner and his way of presenting the political situation without any illusions in preventing this split. In the end the gauleiters gave spontaneous support to his proposals representing a positive policy which does not precipitate the developing events, but demands the maintenance of the present leadership if it acknowledges these directives. Upon this basis, by further long discussions also an agreement between the Gauleiters and the leadership was accomplished in which the political directives of the R-report were explicitly acknowledged. Now it is to be seen if this line can be kept or the influence of the present advisers which were described as disastrous,will endanger anew this agreement also. Another point is the necessity to change the obstruction of the Nazis within the state into a constructive opposition and to make the cooperation of the Nazis valuable by their attitude in the fight against Communism and so on. Instead of a mechanical "legalization" which will do no one any good, now the way of positive politics in the state will be pursued.

But even here, with absolute reserve towards the present leadership, we have to wait to see if this way can be pursued with the given personalities as leaders. Towards the action Neustaedter a position of benevolent neutrality should be taken - as far as counter-currents do not already in this first case diverge from the line. A too strong and far-reaching connection would be understood neither in our own ranks nor could it be of use to the action itself.

- - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2831-PS

19 November 1945

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, S/Sgt, 13146954,hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2831-PS.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL,
S/Sgt, 13146954.

AMBASSADOR DODD'S DIARY - 1933-1938
Edited by William E. Dodd, Jr., and Martha Dodd
(Dondon; Victor Gollancz Ltd; 1941)

Exhibit U.S.A. 58
filed Nov. 28 1945

(Entry for July 26, 1934)

July 26. Thursday. A very busy day. I sent two telegrams to Washington explaining the putsch against the Austrian Government by the Nazi conspirators.

The attack upon Austria, from all evidence, was supported if not planned by the German Propaganda Ministry. Last February Ernst Hanfstaengl told me that he brought what was practically an order from Mussolini that Germans must leave Austria alone, and that Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich for Austrian annexation, must be dismissed and silenced. In May and June, Mussolini pretended to be in accord with the German anti-French, anti-Russian policy, and June 18, at Venice, Hitler was reported to have promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone. At any rate, great adc was made in the German press about the friendly accord of the two "greatest statesmen" of Europe. On June 30 came the Hitler murder of "traitors" and their assistants.

Mussolini, who had murdered even more Italians than Hitler has thus far murdered Germans, allowed his press to denounce Hitler unmercifully. On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs and shells to Austriafrom some arms plant. That looked ominous to me, but events of the kind had been so common that I did not report it to Washington.

Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as eleven o'clock, the government issued formal statements to the newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna had actually helped to form the new Cabinet. He had, as we now know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers should be allowed to go into Germany undisturbed. But it was realized about 12 o'clock that, although Dollfuss was dead, the loyal Austrians had surrounded the government palace and prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A copy was brought to me today by a friend.

All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support had been active for ten days before, some getting across the border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm of the Hapsburgs to Third Reich, in spite of all the promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German Government denounces all who say there was any support from Berlin.

I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of 1933. Once more the whole world is condemning the Hitler regime. No people in all modern history has been quite so unpopular as Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I expect to read a series of bitter denunciations in the American papaers when they arrive about ten days from now.

H1121-0158

H1121-0159

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2832-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Tagebuch des Gesandten Dodd
1933 - 1938

verfasst von
WILLIAM E. DODD, JR.
und
MARTHA DODD

Mit einem Vorwort von
CHARLES A. BEARD

LONDON
VICTOR GOLLANCZ Verlag
1941

AUSZUG.
Seite 143 - 145

Donnerstag, 26. Juli (1934)

Ein sehr geschaeftiger Tag. Ich sandte zwei Telegramme nach Washington, in denen ich den Putsch der Nazi-Verschwoerer gegen die oesterreichische Regierung erklaerte.

Nach allem Beweismaterial zu schliessen, wurde der Angriff gegen Oesterreich vom deutschen Propagandaministerium unterstuetzt, wenn nicht sogar vorbereitet. Im Februar dieses Jahres erzaehlte mir Ernst Hanfstaengl, dass er so gut wie einen Befehl von Mussolini mitgebracht haette, dass die Deutschen Oesterreich in Ruhe lassen muessten, und dass Theodor Habicht, der deutsche Beauftragte in Muenchen fuer den Anschluss von Oesterreich, entlassen und zum Schweigen gebracht werden muesste. Mussolini gab in Mai und Juni vor, mit der deutschen anti-franzoesischen und anti-russischen Politik uebereinzustimmen, und am 18. Juni hatte Hitler angeblich Mussolini in Venedig versprochen, Oesterreich in Ruhe zu lassen. Wie dem auch immer sei, die deutsche Presse gab sehr viel mit der freundschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit der beiden "bedeutendsten Staatsleute" in Europa an. Am 30. Juni geschah der Hitlermord von "Verraetern" und deren Helfer.
Mussolini, der selbst noch mehr Italiener hingemordet hatte als Hitler bis dahin Deutsche, gestattete seiner Presse, Hitler erbarmungslos anzuschuldigen. Nach wiederholten Bombenanschlaegen der Nazis in Oesterreich, wurde am Montag, den 23. Juli, ein Schiff mit Explosivmaterial am Bodensee von der Schweizer Polizei beschlagnahmt. Es handelte sich um eine Sendung deutscher Bomben und Munition von irgend einer Munitionsfabrik nach Oesterreich. Das war meiner Ansicht nach ein boeses Vorzeichen, aber andererseits kamen solche Sachen so haeufig vor, dass ich es erst gar nicht nach Washington meldete.

Beweismaterial wurde heute auf meinen Schreibtisch gelegt, dass die Regierung gestern noch spaet am Abend, um 11 Uhr, eine formelle Erklaerung an die Zeitungen gegeben hat, die Genugtuung ueber den Sturz von Dollfuss ausdrueckt und Grossdeutschland proklamiert, das logischer Weise folgen muesse. Der deutsche Botschafter in Wien hatte selbst geholfen, die neue Regierung zu bilden. Wie wir jetzt wissen, hatte er ein Versprechen erpresst, dass die Bande der oesterreichischen Nazimoerder unbehelligt nach Deutschland gehen duerfte. Jedoch war es um ungefaehr 12 Uhr klar, dass, obwohl Dollfuss selbst tot war, die loyalen Oesterreicher das Regierungsgebaeude umstellt hatten und so die Organisierung einer neuen Naziherrschaft vereitelt hatten. Die Moerder wurden als Gefangene bewacht. Daher verbot das deutsche Propagandaministerium die Veroeffentlichung der eine Stunde vorher ausgesandten Nachrichten

Cited Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2935-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 350

Order concerning the Establishment of a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938

Verordnung ueber die Errichtung eines Reichs Propaganduamts in Wien.

By virtue of Article III of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich (RGBl. I, p. 237), it is ordered as follows:

For the territory of the province of Austria a Reich Propaganda Office shall be established with its seat in Vienna.

Berlin, March 31, 1938.

Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda

Dr. GOEBBELS

Reich Minister of the Interior

By deputy: PFUNDTNER

Reich Minister of Finance

By deputy: REINHARDT

---

21 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2935-PS

I, Felix Edward Sharton, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2935-PS.

Felix Edward Sharton
046312

H1121-0160

Cited Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2936-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, VI, I, PAGE 150

Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938

Verfuegung des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers ueber das Oesterreichische Bundesheer vom 13 Maerz, 1938

---

1. The Austrian Federal Government has just resolved by law upon the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. The Government of the German Reich has by a law of this date recognized this resolution.

2. By virtue thereof I give this instruction: The Austrian Federal Army, as a component part of the German armed forces, shall be placed under my command as of this date.

3. I commission Infantry General von Bock, Commander in Chief of the Eighth Army, to assume command of what are now the German Armed Forces within the borders of the Austrian Province.

4. All members of the former Austrian Federal Army shall without delay take an oath of allegiance to me as their supreme commander. Infantry General von Bock shall immediately issue the necessary orders.

ADOLF HITLER.

---

21 November, 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2936-PS

I, Felix Edward Sharton, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and thatthe above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2936-PS

Felix Edward Sharton
046312

H1121-0161

H1121-0162

Exhibit U.S.A. 76
Filed Nov. 29, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2949 PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Reichs Ministry
for Aviation

14 March 1938

Institute for Research

B Nr. F...V. 1106/38g R

To the General Fieldmarshal

Fieldmarshal

Enclosed I submit, as ordered,-the copies of your telephone conversations.

/s/ HIHN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Cover Page

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, cover page.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1121-0163

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, Part A

Notes Concerning the Telephone Conversations between the Fieldmarshall (f) and the Minister Seyss-Inquart (s).

14:45 Phone call from F.

F: How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?

S: No.

Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?

S: The Chancellor has concelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 PM.

F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnig were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgadener agreement.
Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer.
Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at 15:05.

F: Told S that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision, made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Buchtesgadener agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon.
As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnig's resignation.
Telephone message by S. at 15:55.

S. informed the Fieldmarshal that the Chancellor Schuschnig was on his way to Federal President Miklas in order to hand in his resignation, as well as that of the whole cabinet.
Asked by F. if with this the commission to form a new cabinet intended for S. was secure.
S. said that he would let F. know not later than 17:30.

F: Replied emphatically that this, besides the resignation of the Chancellor Schuschnig, was an absolutely firm demand

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part A

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part A.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

Telephone Conversation Between Field Marshal Goering, Reichchancellery, with the German Embassy, Vienna, 1700 hours, March 11, 1938.

Dombrowski: I have to report the following. Seyss-Inquart has talked to the Austrian Chancellor until 1630 hours but he is not in a position to dissolve the Cabinet by 1730 hours because it is technically impossible.

Goering: By 1930 hours the Cabinet must be formed and several measures must have been taken. Is Seyss-Inquart there?

Dombrowski: He is not here just now. He is in conference. That is why he sent me here to telephone you.

Goering: What is the message? Repeat exactly.

Dombrowski: His message is that he is not in a position .... (Goering interrupts, What does he have to say?) He says that he has no hesitation to allow the party formations to come in now.

Goering: All that is not to the point. I want to know what is going on? Did he tell you that he is now the Chancellor?

Dombrowski: Yes.

Goering: As just transmitted to you?

Dombrowski: Yes.

Goering: Good, go on. What time can he form the Cabinet?

Dombrowski: Possibly by 9:18.

Goering: The Cabinet must be formed by 7:30.

Dombrowski: By 7:30.

Goering: For that purpose Keppler is now going to arrive.

Dombrowski: To continue, the SA and SS have already been organized as auxiliary police.

Goering: (Goering repeats the last sentence.) The demand of legalizing the Party must also be made.

Dombrowski: All right.

Goering: All right, with all of its formations, SA, SS, HJ.

Dombrowski: Yes, Field Marshal, only one thing, that the formations which are now outside the country will not come at this time.

Goering: They will only come during the next few days.

Dombrowski: Yes. He thinks after the plebiscite has been accomplished.

Goering: No, no, what plebiscite.

Dombrowski: Yes. He believes that the program then established will be carried out by Hitler.

Goering: One moment, As to the plebiscite, there are certain special things, aren't there. Anyway, this plebiscite tomorrow is to be cancelled.

H1121-0164

Dombrowski: That's already been taken care of. That's now out of the question.

Goering: Good, the Cabinet must been entirely National Socialist.

Dombrowski: Good, that also has been settled, by 7:30 that must be ....

Goering: (Interrupting) That must be reported by 7:30, and Keppler will bring you several names to be incorporated.

Dombrowski: Very well. One thing Seyss-Inquart requests regarding the organizations now in emigration are to come in later and not now.

Goering: All right, we can talk about that .... That will take a few days anyway.

Dombrowski: That is his request.

Goering: Good.

Dombrowski: That is all right then.

Goering: Yes, they will not come immediately. About that we will have a special talk.

Dombrowski: Very well, General Field Marshal.

Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?

Dombrowski: But that is .... it isn't necessary to even discuss that.

Goering: With all of its organizations.

Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.

Goering: In uniform?

Dombrowski: In uniform.

Goering: Good.

Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is all right.

Goering: Regarding the plebiscite, the Special Envoy will be coming down and will confer with you about the kind of plebiscite that is to be.

Dombrowski: Well then, we have time in that matter.

Goering: Yes, there is time. Seyss-Inquart is of the opinion that the relationship Germany-Austria must be put on a new basis.

Dombrowski: What did he mean by that? Well he means that the independence of Austria should be maintained but that everything else should be ruled on a National Socialist basis.

Goering: That will be a natural result. Tell him the units must come down in the next few days. That's in the interest of Seyss-Inquart, namely that he receives first-class units which are absolutely at his disposal.

Dombrowski: About that he will talk with you himself.

Goering: All right, he can do that.

H1121-0165

Dombrowski: So that he knows who is coming down but we have a few days for that.

Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 the report about the formed Cabinet.

Dombrowski: He'll have that by then.

Goering: And by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.

Dombrowski: That's understood.

Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.

Dombrowski: Yes, yes.

Goering: Give me the name.

Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn't that right?

Goering: Yes?

Dombrowski: Yes.

Goering: That's right and then also Fishbeck.

Dombrowski: Yes, that is taken care of.

Goering: Be careful, the daily press must leave immediately and our our people.

Dombrowski: Well, as to the man whom you mentioned with regard to the Security Department.

Goering: Kaltenbrunner. Yes, he is to get the Security Department and then mark this, immediately the press representatives. (They both talk at the same time, Dombrowski says several times, "Yes".) All right, at 1730 hours, no at 7:30--goodby.

M. (Much?): (Much comes to the telephone and calls Goering's attention to the fact that Keppler will not arrive until 5:40. Goering tells Much that he has just given the names to Dombrowski over the telephone.)

M[illegible]: Requests to be allowed to support the suggestion that the Party formations now abroad would not be let loose until this was called for from "here".

Goering: Yes, no, the Fuehrer wants to ... that he will tell to Seyss-Inquart in person ... those are the most disciplined and best units, they will come immediately under the command of Seyss-Inquart so that he has the best possible support.

M[illegible]: Yes, but as to the foreign political situation.....

Goering: (Interrupting) That will be handled. The foreign political aspect will be handled exclusively by Germany in this direction. Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart and the Fuehrer will talk about this matter, that will take quite some time anyway, until they can be dispatched. Anyway they won't come today or tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

H1121-0166

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, PART C

23 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., Inf., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 2949-PS, Part C.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lieutenant, Inf.
01332102

H1121-0167

H1121-0168

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, Part D

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Goering and Dr. Ullrich Vienna. Berlin-Vienna

17:20-17:25 on 11 March 1938

U: I was just looking for the gentleman, in order to tell him myself the same thing.

G: Look, Franz, you take over the Ministry of Justice, and corresponding to the wish of the Fuehrer, you also take over for the time being the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, later on someone else will replace you in this.

U: Please, there is something else. Fischbach (?) intends, before accepting his appointment, to the Fuehrer --

G: He should not do that at this moment, it won't be necessary tat all.

U: Then he will phone you, I also am against it.

G: Yes, let him call me. There is no time for it. Also he cannot afford to get for himself special favors, and be responsible now before he has to act history. With the Federal Chancellory, he should still reserve for himself the department of trade, Kaltenbrunner (ph) Security, you the department of Justice, and for the time being, the Foreign Office.

U: Does he know about it already?

G: The latter he does not yet know, I shall tell him that myself. He has to form the cabinet immediately, he shall not fly over here, because the Cabinet has to be formed till 7:30, otherwise it's all for nothing. Otherwise, things will take their own course, and very different decisions will be made then.

U: That is understood, I shall take care of it immediately.

G: And then another important factor which I forgot to mention before, but that is rather a matter of course. The Reds, who were given arms yesterday, have to be disarmed in the quickest way and just as well in a ruthless manner, that is rather a matter of course. Also make sure that he gives me a ring immediately, he shall not fly, there is no sense in doing so. Just a moment. He should call me under the following number, 125224. (Here the conversation is interrupted) The conversation was interrupted twice, in the beginning, and at the end. It seemed that Vienna was to blame for the interruption

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part D

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part D.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

Transcript of Telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart 11 March 1938

H1121-0169

Wien-Berlin, 17:26-17:31

S: The situation is like that: The Federal President (Bundespraesident) has accepted the resignation, but his point of view is, that no one but the Chancellor is to be blamed for Berchtesgaden and its consequences, and therefore he'd like ... but he would like to entrust a man like Ender (?) with the Chancellorship. At this moment our own gentlemen (?) are in conference with him, Klawotschnik (??) and so on, and report on the situation.

G: Yes, now look here: This will change the whole situation. The Federal President or some one else has to be told that this is entirely different from what we were told. Gowotschnik (?) said upon your order that you had been given the chancellorship.

S: I myself? When did he say that?

G: Just an hour ago. He said that you had the chancellorship and that also also the Party had been restored, SA, SS had already taken over police duties etc.

S: No, that is not so. I suggested to the Federal President to entrust the chancellorship to me, usually it takes 3 to 4 hours. As for the Party we still do not have the possibility to restore it but we have ordered the SA and SS to take over police duties (Ordnungsdienst)

G: Well, that won't do! Under no circumstances! the matter is in progress now therefore, please, the Federal President has to be informed immediately that he has to turn the powers of the Federal Chancellor over to you and to accept the Cabinet like it was arranged; you as Federal Chancellor and the Army --

S: (Interrupted him) Fieldmarshal, just now Muchlmann who was there has arrived. May he report to you?

G: Yes.

Dr. Muehlmann (?) takes over the conversation with G. -

M: The situation that the Federal President still refuses persistently to give his consent and asks for official diplomatic action by the Reich. Now we three National Socialists - Rodenstock (?), Dreila (?) and I went to speak to him personally in order to make him understand that in this hopeless situation only one thing can be done by him: namely to say yes. He would not even let us see him. So far it looks as if he were not willing to give in.

G: (short conversation) (give me S.)
S.I. continues the conversation.

G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just thru the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (it follows a sentence which is broken up) ------
M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations --- (again interruption) and then call

out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.

S: All right.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part E

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part E.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1121-0170

H1121-0171

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 2949-PS, Part H
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

H, Transcript of Telephone- Conversation between Goering and Keppler and Lt.General Muff, instead of Muff, Keppler answered the phone. 11 March 1938 Wien-Berlin, 12.28 -18-34

k, I just spoke to Muff. The Muff action was going on at the same time as mine was, so I did not know about it. Muff just saw the President. but he also refused. I shall call once more to find out whether or not the President wants to speak to me at this last minute.

G, Where is Muff now?.

K, Muff just came down, his action was unsuccessful.

G. But, what does he have to say?

K, Well, he would not agree with it.

G. Well, then Seyss Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S.I. shall call on the National-Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.

K. (Muff is called to the phone) Muff (?) does not answer by name.

M. It is a fact that Schushnigg tried to prove to the world, that the National Socialists do not have any majority, and only by the threat of German arms .....

the conversation is interupted for about 3 minutes, interuptions comes from Vienna G, remains at the phone

Unknown voice (male)

U. Hallo

G. Is that Secretary of the State Keppler?

U. No, he is just in conference with the Federal Chancellor.

G. With the Federal President;

U. No, with the Federal Chamcellor, they are all together, Federal President and Federal Chancellor.

G. Who is speaking?

U. Fehsemeier (?) Adjutant of .....

G. Has he gone upstairs ?

U. Yes, just now.

G. Who is with him, upstairs ?

U. The Federal President, the Federal Chancellor, and Mayor Schmidt.

G, Yes, I hold on,- Fehsemeier, you have to hurry, we have just 3 minutes left;

U. Yes, I know:

Goering waits a while at the phone.

H1121-0172

Cont:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part H

K: Comes first to the phone, "Well, I just saw the President again, but he has not given his consent

G: He refused : Well, then Seyss shall call immediately

K: He come to the phone immediatley.

Seyss Inquart come to the telephone.

G: Well, how do we stand?

S. Please, Fieldmarshal, yes.

G: Well, what is going on?

S: Yes, ah, the Federal President sticks to his old view-point. Now the Federal Chancellor(double name, not to be understood clearly -------- Weserick (?) went to see Schuschnigg in order to change his mind. He himself uses all his influence, but there is no decision made yet:.

G. But do you think it possible that we shall come to a decision in the next few mimutes.

S. Well, the conversation cannot take longer than 5 to 10 minutes, it will not take any longer, I guess.

G. Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery- as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power alright ?

S. But if he threatens?

G. Yes.

S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten)

G. Call me via Blitz.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part H

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part H.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 2949-PS, PART I
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Transcipt of telephone conversation between Seyss-Inquart and Goering 11, March 38, Wien-Berlin 19-57 20-03

S. Dr. Schuschnigg will give the news over the radio that the Reich Goverment has given an ultimatum.

G. I heard about it.

S. And the Goverment itself has abdicated, General Schiwaski is in command of the Military forces and he will draw the troops back. The gentlemen pointed out that they are waiting for the troops to march in.

G. Well, they were appointed by you?

S. No.

G. Did you dismiss them from their office, ?

S. No, no one was dismissed from his office, but the Goverment itself has pulled back and let matters take their course.

G. And you were not commissioned, it was refused?.

S. Now like before it was refused. they expect that they are taking a chance with the invasion and expect that, if the invasion will actually take place the executive power will be transferred to other people

G. O K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure, that you get the power, Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now: Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately, be subjected to our court -martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?.

S. Yes

G. Including leading personalities, it doesnot make any difference.

S. Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.

G. Yes, it does not matter: the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.

S. Yes,

G. Well, now you are officially authorized.

S. Yes.

G. Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part I

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part I.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169



Transcript of Telephone-Conversation between Goering and Lt.General Muff
Goering himself adresses Muff who till an hour ago Lt.General as General
German Embassy, Vienna.

G. Tell Seyss-Inquart the following: As we understand it the Goverment has abdicated but he himself remained. So he should continue to stay in office, and carry out necessary measures in the name of the Goverment. The invasion is going to happen now, and we shall state that every one who put up any resistance has to face the consequences. But the Austrian organizations may join us any time, rather they may seek protection from the German Wehrmacht. I should try to avoid chaos.

M. Seyss, will do so, he is already making a speech:

G. But he should take over now the Goverment, and should carry through things quietly. The best will be if Miklas resigns,

M. Yes, but he won't! It was very dramatic, I spoke to him almost 15 minutes He declared that he will under no circumstances yield to force

G. So- he will not give into to force,

M. He does not yield to force.

G. What does this mean? so he justs wants to be kicked out?

M. Yes, he does not want to move.

G. Well, with 14 children one cannot move as one likes. Well, tell Seyss that he'll take over.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part J

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part J.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

H1121-0174

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Goering and Keppler
Berlin-Vienna, 11 March 1938

20:48-20:54

K: I want to inform you shortly: Federal President Miklas has refused to do anything. But nevertheless, the government has ceased to function. I spoke to Schuschnig and he said they had laid down their functions and we had to act accordingly. (Was the last sentence repeated) They have laid down their functions, and Schuschnig himself said that we had to act and (consequently?) Buhler (Buhler or Buhle - very unclear) has spoken to Seyss-Inquart over the phone, he (?)who is still in Office as Secretary of the Interior, spoke over the radio.

G: (interrupts) I have read that. Continue.

K: The old Government has ordered the Army not to put up any resistance. Therefore, shooting is not allowed.

G: OK, I do not give a darn.

K: Pretty soon Landesleiter Kloose (?) will deliver a speech over the radio, and now (?) I want to ask you if not a prominent personality in Berlin wants to add a few words for the Austrian people?

G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied ...

K: Well, we represent the Government now.

G: Yes, that's it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart: Take the notes

"The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnig Government, considers it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose if asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible."

K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quick. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?).

G: Now listen: He has to guard the borders, so that they cannot disappear with their fortunes.

K: Yes, indeed.

G: And then, - above all, he also is responsible for the Foreign policy.

K: Yes, We still do need some one for this post.

G: Well, that does not matter. Now, Seyss-Inquart has to take it over and he has to appoint a few people. He should call upon the people we recommended to him. He should form now a provisional government. It is absolutely unimportant what the Federal President may have to say.

K: Yes, they are not doing anything!

G: No, no, he has to form the Government right now like he intended to do, and he should inform the people abroad about it.

K: Yes.

G: He is the only one who still has Power in Austria.

K: Yes.

H1121-0175

G: Then our troops will cross the border today.

K: Yes.

G: Well. And he should send the telegram as soon as possible.

K: Will send the telegram to S.I. in the office of the Federal Chancery.

G: Please, show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him - well, he does not even have to send the telegram - all he needs to do, is to say: agreed.

K: Yes.

G: Either call me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good luck Heil Hitler!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part L

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part L.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1121-0176

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Wilhelm Keppler and Mr. Dietrich, Berlin-Vienna, 2154, 11 March 1939.

General Bodenschatz wants to speak to Keppler. Dr. Dietrich Berlin
Keppler Vienna

Dietrich: I need the telegram urgently.

Keppler: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.

Dietrich: This is marvelous. Thank you.

Keppler: Listen to the radio. News will be given.

Dietrich: Where?

Keppler: From Vienna.

Dietrich: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?

Keppler: Jawohl!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part M

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part M.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

H1121-0177

H1121-0178

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Adolf Hitler and Prince Philipp von Hessen, 11 March 1938

FL ZUERICH 22:25-22:29

H: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnig gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility, it would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.

F: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.

H: Yes.

F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.

H: Yes, I told him that, too.

F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.

H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

F: Listen, I shall make any agreement - I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.

H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.

H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

F: Well

H: Then, I would like to say that this afternoon the French envoy asked for a conference with Count Ciano, by order of his Government on account of the Austria affair. But Count Ciano refused to see him and thereupon the envoy stated that they have to desregard any further oral negotiations with Italy.

F: Yes, I thank you.

H: My Fuehrer, also I wanted to ask you do you want me to stay here, or shall I come back at once tomorrow?

F: You may still stay there.

H: Shall I send the machine back ?

F: No, you may still keep it there.

H: Yes, I shall report again tomorrow.

F: Yes, I thank you.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part N

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part N.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1121-0179

H1121-0180

Telephone Conversation between
Goering and Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop
13 March 1938, London
9:15 - 9:55

G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgesch-äfte). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.

R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn't it?

G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenkn) have presented theultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order, or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with "Heil Moskau" and so on, naturally, all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherlandish Front (Vaterlandische Front) would fight to its last man, one could not know that they would capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. This way the people may..... The following is interesting: The absolute complete enthusiasm for the National Socialism which is surprising even to us. And the reason for that is: About 80% among the members of the Fatherlandish Front were National Socialists, but these people had to join the Fatherlandish Front, otherwise they were subjected to terror, mainly economically, in that everybody who did not belong to the Fatherlandish Front lost his job so the Fatherlandish Front really seemed to be something. But actually, these were all our people which is just being discovered now, and that explains the whole situation, which did even surpass all our expectations. At least we thought..... but with the one exception of the Jews and a part of those deep black ones, there is no one against us.

R: So it seems that all Austria is on our side.

G: Well, let me tell you, if there were an election tomorrow, - I already told S-I he should invite the representatives of the democratic powers - they could convince themselves that this was really an election carried through on a democratic basis - and we shall have 90% votes in our favour. Absolutely! Only now one gets the reports how these people have been mistreated; I believe it is absolutely necessary that serious people from England and France should be asked to come over here and to watch what is actually going on. The biggest trick which ever had been played was done here.

R: I believe that this conviction will grow here. During these last days I had a few conversations not to forget the one I had the day before yesterday. Things are like that: at the moment they had their big surprise were.....later on I shall tell you more but generally

people act very sensibly. The day before yesterday I told Halifax - who was with me quite a long time - that the whole English public opinion knows exactly what is going on in Austria.

G: There is something else I started to say: We cannot afford to have any elections as long as our troops are stationed there, they should be back first. Besides, during the next few days our troops will return. No one could stop that, any military man knows that, when such a thing is running, when the order is given to start the matter takes its course, till the troops have reached their destination, and till they are ready to be shipped away and returned. As I was informed yesterday, one figures with 5 - 6 days. This is now nothing but a friendship march. Nothing has happened, not one shot was fired. Still we have to take over Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt. But I am convinced that will be an easy job - as it was all over. But no one could have expected that. Just remember the speeches of these people. They always shouted these were fanatics, determined... to fight for Austria, for her independence, and soon, that there was nothing behind it, no one could suspect. Officials, for instance, reported and the higher ups just as well as the smaller ones and the ones in the ranks in between, they all told the same story: "You cannot imagine if we only once had mentioned that we were sympathizing with you we would have been put ruthlessly into the streets with our families." It was such a brutal system! They only could fool the world by covering all their deeds with the word "christianity", they were so slimy. But they were the most brutal days that ever did exist. I have to say I take my hat off to those

H1121-0181

in Russia, at least they are honest. On top of it, these people here were infamous. There they did not behead people - well, some of them they did behead - but here they killed them economically, they ruined them. One thing I want to say: it is claimed that we overpowered the Austrian people, and took away their independence, then one should admit at least that just one little part of it was put under pressure - not by us - and that was the government which existed on such a small basis. The Austrian people have only been freed by now. I would just suggest to Halifax or to some real serious people whom he trusts to just send them over, so they may have a picture of what is going on here. They shall travel through the country, then they will see everything. Besides I also want to point out, yesterday, you know, if there..... they were saying the most serious things, war, and so on, it made me laugh because where would one find such an unscrupulous statesman who would send again millions of people to death only because 2 German brother-nations - - - -

R. Yes, this is absolutely ridiculous; one realizes that over here; I do think one knows pretty well over here what is going on.

G. Mr. Ribbentrop, I would call attention to one fact particularly: What state in the whole world will get hurt by our union? Do we take away anything from any other state? If the states say: well, that is against our interests! What kind of interest did these states have? They only could have one interest, to create hostile feelings against Germany. The percentage of minorities does not exceed more than 0.1% over all Austria. All the people are German, all the people speak German. Well, not one single state is involved in it. And the states which as the only ones might have an interest. You may say that, Italy and Yugoslavia and Hungary because a few hundred thousand Germans are living there - these who could say that they might feel etc. ... they actually do not feel that they are threatened. Therefore, it is ridiculous, if France.... Besides I do want to point out that the Czechoslovakian Minister came to see me yesterday and he explained, that the rumor Czechoslovakia had mobilized was taken out of the thin air and they would be satisfied with one word from me that I would not undertake the slightest thing against Czechoslovakia.

R. Of this the embassy was already informed the day before yesterday. He himself called here yesterday and told Woermann so.

G. There upon I said the following: The German troops are supposed to stay away 15-20 Km from the border, on their march through Austria, and north of the Danube in the whole sector only one dissolved battalion was to march merely so that these villages can share in the joy and pleasure. Today the advance does no more take place according to military principles but all over the roads smaller columns are marching because every village wants to see a German soldier.

R. Now let me tell you this: Later on I want to take a plane. I paid my farewell visit to everyone already the day before yesterday. The embassy takes care of all business. I do not have any more authority.

G. But the Fuehrer thought because you are just there that you could inform the people what is really going on. Above all, that it is absolutely wrong to think Germany had given an ultimatum.

R. I have already spoken very openly with Halifax and Chamberlain. There is no doubt about it. Only the fact that the newspapers --- people start to ask questions and it does not seem to be right if I still remain here, it would look strange, somehow.

G. No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more, - but no, - not at all once more, - but generally speaking - tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, -

H1121-0182

Gleise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore I want to state that S-I asked us expressively - by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener- Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherlandish front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.

R. Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet?

G. Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17. division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.

R. That had to be expected.

G. The marching-in took place, then, according to this wish. Now we also recognize that further invasion is no more necessary. The whole affair is rolling as it is supposed to roll and it has crystallized into a march of joy; if you want to call it like that, as soon as it will stop, - which will be either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, - the transport back shall start. The Austrian Government

H1121-0183

has informed us that it will then hold a free and secret election, on the basis of democratic principles, so that every Austrian will be able to give his real free vote in a free and secret election. And therefore they want to ask people from abroad so that afterwards no reproach of falsification can be made - like Schuschnigg did - so that they will see that this is a real and secret election. It is also in our interest because we are absolutely convinced that we shall get an overwhelming majority. Therefore it is also in our interest that this election will be handled absolutely correctly. After the election then we shall see the decision the people made and we shall see what is going to happen. But above one thing you must not leave any doubt: We will respect the decision, Austria will make in any respect. And, in case she decides for union - of which we have no doubt - then no power on earth will be able to separate us. It may be that a world-league of all states may overpower Germany, but it won't be possible that we will tolerate to be separated again if Austria decides to go together with Germany. And this is no threat for any state whatsoever, I want to make that clear. In no respect are we threatening the CSR but the CSR has now the possibility to come to a friendly and reasonable agreement with us. They say (the CSR) : " We did not mobilize any soldiers in the West. Nothing has been changed in the present situation." Everything under the condition that France remains sensible and does not take any steps. Naturally, if France organizes now a big mobilization close to the boarder, then it'llnot be funny.

R: I believe that they will behave all right.

G: We have a clear conscience and that is the decisive factor. Before world history we have a free conscience. Never has it happened in the world that anyone did interfere if two brother-nations united. That would be against the sovereign rights of people. That would be absolutely ridiculous.

R: I had a long intensive conversation with Halifax, and I told him our basic conception also in respect to the German-English understanding.....

G: That I wanted to say, you know yourself, Ribbentrop, that I always was in favour of a German-English understanding. Noone else would be more glad than I, if the English really wanted it seriously, and if they also recognized that we are also a proud and free nation. After all, we also do represent 2 brother-nations.

R: I can tell you one thing, Mr. Goering. The other day I spoke to Chamberlain after that breakfast, and I got a very good impression of him, and he gave me a message, some news for the Fuehrer, which I shall deliver personally to the Fuehrer. Will you be in Berlin this afternoon?

G; Yes, I will. We celebrate the "Memorial Day" (Heldengedenktag) but let me tell you this, you'll have to stay in Berlin. The Fuehrer himself gave me the order that every minister..... You know, otherwise we would have a great migration ..... Yesterday not one single minister and official was at home. I would have needed 1000 planes. Naturally, they all want to enjoy this ecstasy of joy. Therefore I had to keep the gentlemen back by using draconic measures.

R: I cannot tell you that over the phone. But it is better for me to take off today.

G: Yes, I leave it entirely to you.

R: Otherwise, it will not make sense. My conversations are concluded, and if I sit around it might give a funny impression. But I had an excellent impression of Chamberlain.

G: I am glad to hear that.

R: The other day I spoke quite a while with him. I do not want to speak about it over the phone, but I have the impression that Chamberlain also is very serious about an understanding. I told him in this conversation that after the Austrian problem had been settled, the understanding between Germany and England will be so much less complicated than before. I believe, he realized that.

H1121-0185

G: [illegible] Look, since the whole problem has been settled down there and no more danger of excitement and disturbance exists - and this was a source of real danger - the people should be thankful for our having eliminated this source of crisis.

R: I told them that, too and also pointed out that we got rid of a situation, which caused always many troubles. Even if there was some excitement at this moment, the great line for the German-English understanding could only be strenghtened by it. I also said to Halifax at the end of our conversation that we honestly do want to come to an understanding and he replied that his only worry was the CSR.

G: No,no, that is out of the question.

R: I told him then that we were not interested and we did not intend to do anything there. On the contrary , if our Fellow-Germans were

H1121-0186

treated in a sensible way, then we should come to an agreement there, too.

G: Yes, I am also convinced that Halifax is an absolutly reasonable man.

R: I got the best impression of Halifax as well as of Chamberlain. He thought it would a little difficult with our (engl) public opinion, because here it looks like force etc. I have the feeling that the normal Englishman, the man in the street will say, why should England bother with Austria. And therefore I believe that if the English Government will tell Chamberlain today him as the leader - after all he is the leader; he himself said so during the last few weeks if he really does interfere in this case and if he gives an explanation in the sense in which we worked it out together (3 words unintelligible) that at home, our Fuehrer, as far as he could see that it is proved by the public English opinion which after a few days or weeks on a great problem of world history in the sense of a German-English understanding like we all desire it (extremely unintelligible).

G: This is absolutly clear. (The following unintelligible). There are matters which do concern people, and there are matters which do not concern them at all.

R: I have to say thru my last conversation with Halifax I have the impression that he did not react to the arguments I gave him, but at last he said I could be convinced that he also did favour a German-English unterstanding.

G: More or less everything is in wonderful peace. Two peoples embrace each other and are overjoyed and express their happiness.

R: All the people over here think .....

G: Another people which other ..... the other state bears the whole responsibility if such misery overcomes the people. Besides I must say, Mussolini behaved wonderfully.

R: Yes, I heard already about it.

G: Wonderful.

R: Very good, indeed. We always thought so !

G: Marvellous ! He (M) said Schuschnigg asked him about the the election. So he answered Schuschnigg: you cannot do that, you cannot do it, such a kind of an election has never happened before; now we have the material which shows how Schuschnigg wanted to carry out these elections. (Some words unintelligible). Everysingle vote we found was a yes-vote. Only votes which did indicate neither yes nor no were considered as no-votes and on these slips was written: "I say no Hermann Goering, Innsbruck ?Strasse 2".

H1121-0187

R: Unbelievable. Anyone of the small poeple would never have dared to do that.

G: Listen; if someone took a yes-vote and crossed it out with a pencil and then wrote over it "no", then this was considered as "yes". If you took a yes-vote and you tore it in 2 pieces and you threw both parts in, then is was not considered as one vote, but it counted for 2 yes-votes since it was torn into pieces.

R: Really ?

G: As true as I am here ! These are the secret matters which we shall still publish.

R: By God, you should publish it immediately, this is unbelievable.

G: Well, every torn vote was considered as yes-vote; so if several were torn, one did not put them together, but every single torn piece was a yes-vote.

R: This is quite unbelievable

G: Now - but how did one vote !

R: Do we have any material which gives us any clue ?

G: Yes, yes, this is how it happened: Well, you went into the voting-place and said: I am Mr. Meier ! "Yes, Mr.Meier, give me your vote". Now they said that the registry of all the inhabitants was

H1121-0188

delivered. Well, let's say, this Mr. Meier had this list and he marked it. Then he went into the next voting place in Innsbruck; they had the same lists, every voting had these lists (words unintelligible.) Mr. Meier said: "I want to vote" "Please, Mr. Meier". It is being marked again. Now he goes into the third voting-place, where again one has the same list, because every voting-place always had the same list.

R: It is unbelievable

G: Now, he gives his vote for the third time. The only fear these people had was the following: That one might find more yes-votes than there were people entitled to vote. But even that would not have bothered them, they would just have subtracted them.

R: They just would have subtracted them.

G: S.-I believes - and so do I, - that he may still find out thru interrogation of the employees that they already had fixed beforehand the numbers of the yes and no-votes and also the amount of people who had not given their vote at all.

R: unintelligible

G: That was the most brazen election which would ever have taken place.

R: Immediately when I was informed first I expressed myself very strongly against this election as a pure swindle a few days ago in my conversation with Halifax.

G: Listen: Another swindle was enacted. Inspite of the fact that them then is a new minister for foreign affairs, the an Hassa-
also dors - I believe the one in London, Frankenstein, (ot.) went and they have responsibility (unintelligible) toward their old government -- they were made to come, changed opinions of the new ministers according to their convictions. This is being investigated. S-I informed me about it yesterday. He said, he found out, that there still exist connections between the embassies and underground forces, that is unauthorized people of the old government and that these ambassadors represent requests of the old government on behalf of the new one. Do you understand?

R: Yes.

G: And this is supposed to have happened in London.

R: Yes, yes. Frankenstein himself .... we have a few people, I know, they are very unfriendly.

G: How is Frankenstein?

R: Well, toward us -- I do not know how he really feels, you see, - they borrowed swastika flag for today -

G: That is fine

R: Yes, that is ok. But I believe he always showed himself loyal and decent toward me, I cannot say differently; I cannot say how he really feels though. But, as you know, we have a few people here who are most disagreable.

G: But tell Frankenstein he has to represent the present government.

R: Yes, that is understood.

G: Well, any way, S-I told me yesterday, I do not know if it was the Austrian Minister in England or in Paris, I believe in Paris, who asked? , is it correct that the Austrian government asked for the German troops. So he was told by the new foreign office: Yes, that is correct. Well, we said that the new ministry for foreign affair did say the government had not asked for them. This matter is being investigated.

H1121-0189

R: There are a far more fellows there who just try to mingle in; well, thank you so much, Mr. Goering.

G: Come over here, it is beautiful over here.

R: Well, I shall come this afternoon. Generally speaking, I do believe it is a wonderful thing.

G: I want to tell you, I am happy beyond any description. You do not know how much I suffered under the Austrian question. That was what always made me suffer so immensely as a German. I never could understand, that 4 foreign powers were against us, - when just Germans were yearning for Germans. Always this penetrated me to my marrow.

R: I have also, you know, in a very short time - I do not think I am wrong - one will say here - by God, it is good that finally a problem has been settled in such a peaceful way - isn't it fantastic,-

G: Now listen, I do not ask for anything but that the world will respect the election in Austria as we do. If this will happen then I believe that in the next future unintelligible

R: And then I believe, we may - -

G: Ribbentrop, then you have to mention another thing, if you have a chance to, - it is very important. The Austria people is ruined economically. There are many many unemployed people, a terrific misery. In case Austria will make her decision in favor of Germany, we will be able to help these people with our great economic program. We can continne the Autobahn immediately, we can build more highways, we may buy again timber, also some cattle, and imagine, Austria always has lived from tourists. Imagine, if now Austria will make her decision for Germany, then - I am sure - there will not exist a German who will not gotto Austria next summer.

R: Well, I believe the unemployment problem will no more exist there, within a short time. I guarantee you, I personally -

G: I believe-within the next 6 weeks - there will be no more one unemployed in Austria - but everybody will be working, and they will be put to work in Austria herself.

R: I want to tell you one more thing: I have not left any doubt what so ever, - that in case of a threat, or if any thing would happen - the Fuehrer and the whole nation will stand behind it - 100 percent.

G: Let me tell you the following, confidentially: The Fuehrer who is usually well controlled, - is too much involved in this respect with his heart since it concerns his homeland. I believe if he receives any threat in the Austrian question he will never give in, and I have to make it clear, neither will the 2 nations. That would be a fanatic matter, in Germany as well as in Austria.

R: That is clear.

G: There is no doubt. Who ever threatens, us now, will strike at both peoples, and both shall put up a fanatic resistance.

R: I believe there is no doubt about that any where.

H1121-0190

G: Yes, if anyonce insists on it, all right-. But I always say if there is any states man in the world unscrupulous enough- because 2 German people want to get united - ready to threaten with war, or who ever is ready to send millions of people to the battle-field,- let him come. I rather want my people to be eliminated than that they may give in to this.

R. I never left any doubt about that. But I may say, that I am of the opinion that one is rather reasonable, I do believe.

G. In thatm- I have to say,- I'd not see anything reasonable, that would be the most absurd thing. Then the world must have become an insane - asylum. It might be differnt if there was a people over there which might resist with all its force against a German invasion and ask the whole world for help. Then I might understand that. This is just ridiculous.

R. Yes, Mr. Goering-

G. Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.

R. I shall see you this afternoon.

G. The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony,- all covered with blankets- in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Lateron I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must is wonderful over there.

R. That is marvellous.

G. I do envy all those, who could be there yesterday. I have to sit here and have to keep the key - position.

R. Just a whole ago we also listened in.

G. It is interesting, did you hear the Fuehrer's speech from Linz?

R. No, unfortunately not.

G. To me it was the most interesting one- it was very short,- the most interesting speech I ever heard from the Fuehrer. This man who masters the language as hardly any one- this man could hardly speak. It was not much that he said, but he was deeply moved. Then later he phoned me and said: "Goering, you cannot imagine, how beautiful my homeland is-Ihad forgotten it." Today, he is visiting the grave of his parents where he will deposit a wreath. Linz, imagine, for many years it has been the first time that he is in the city, at the grave of his parents,--- how crazy and grotesque circumstances have been. Imagine, shortly before the Berchtesgadener agreement,- when the house of my sister was searched, she is married to the present secretary of Justice,- the pictures of the Fuehrer and the one of myself - of her own brother- were taken away. (Next sentence annot be understood)
Nothing was written about that.

R. Was the Fuehrer very much shocked?

G. Yes, very much so. I believe, that he goes through dark days. Scenes are supposed to happen... Besides, Ward Price is with him.

H1121-0191

R. Yes, I already have read the article by Ward Price, this morning.

G. From Linz?

R. By Ward Price, very good.

G. Yes, I mean, concerning Linz?

R. Yes, about Linz, wonderful/

G. Well, this does interest me, because, he is supposed to ---

R. I do know: The Fuehrer asked for him and wanted his opinion, if he did consider that, what he did see here, as force?

G. What does W P write about it?

R. Well, he writes,--- it looks like it must have been overwhelming.

G. Imagine, this small town of 36.000 inhabitants, almost half a million people are supposed to have gathered here. - Well, do come!

R. Good bye, and Heil Hitler.

G. Heil Hitler.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, Part W

23rd November, 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33 812 169; hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 2949-PS, Part W.

GOETZ MAYER

T/5 33 812 169.

H1121-0192

2968 PS
Exhibit U.S.A. 60
Filed Nov. 28, 1945

H1121-0193

2968-PS

U.S.A. 60

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
Office of the Judge Advocate
APO 777, U.S. ARMY

14 November 1945

Memorandum to Lieutenant Richard Heller:

Inclosed herewith you will find two photographs of the monument of the placque erected on the Austrian Chancellory in Vienna by the Nazis in memoriam to the killers of DOLLFUSS. These were found, after a long and tedious search, in the National Library in Vienna and are forwarded herewith for your information and such action as you may deem necessary. Delivery of the original placque is impossible inasmuch as it was smashed and the pieces were scattered as rubble.

ARTHUR T. RATCLIFFE
Major, JAGD
Asst. Judge Advocate

2 Incls
photographs of placque

Doc. No. 2985-PS

(R 4127/37/3) No. 13.

Mr. Hadow to Sir John Simon.--(Received July 26, 1934)

(No. 89) (By Telephone)
(Telegraphic) En clair. Vienna.

FOLLOWING is gist of official version of events of yesterday given verbally to Diplomatic Corps last night by Ministers Schuschnigg and Fey.

"Council of Ministers summoned at 11 A.M. was broken off because Major Fey had received news of massing of men in military and police uniforms in a suburb of Vienna. Schutz Corps were mobilised and Counsellors Fey and Karwinsky were preparing protective measures when five lorry loads (roughly 100 men) in uniform of Deutschmeister Regiment drove up, seized Federal chancery and made the above three Ministers and Secretary and Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and roughly 140 civil servants, police detectives and soldiers prisoners. Chancellor was wounded in trying to escape by private staircase, being shot twice at close quarters.

"At the same time Radio Building in the centre of the town was similarly overwhelmed by twenty uniformed men and official announcer compelled to issue news that Dr. Dollfuss had resigned and Dr. Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor. Police were soon able to reoccupy Radio Building, though material damage put the station temporarily out of action.

"The remainder of Cabinet who had assembled in the Ministry of National Defence received orders from President Miklas, who returned to Vienna today, to reoccupy the Federal chancery and not to recognize insurgents. The latter then forced Major Fey to act as intermediary. Owing to the necessity of saving the lives of those imprisoned, whom the insurgents threatened with death if the building were attacked, the Cabinet authorized Neustadter Sturmer to offer insurgents safe-conduct to German border, which they had requested, 'provided the three Cabinet Ministers were handed over unharmed'. Offer was made publicly at 6 P.M., Neustadter Sturmer standing in the street below and Major Fey guarded by two insurgents with revolvers on balcony of building above. Insurgents asked German Minister by telephone to witness agreement and demanded an escort of regular troops to the border. They also asked to be allowed to enter Germany and become German citizens.

"Negotiations then took place between German Minister, Major Fey and Neustadter Sturmer and also privately between Dr. Rieth and insurgents in the building. As a result prisoners were released about 7 P.M. and insurgents, having laid down their arms, were taken under heavy escort to barracks in Vienna, where they still are. Chancellor, who saw Major Fey about 2 P.M. and asked that no blood should be shed, had unfortunately breathed his last about 6 P.M., not having had the services of a doctor.

"In reply to a question as to validity of guarantee of safe conduct now that Chancellor had died, Dr. Schuschnigg replied that Cabinet were still debating this point."

H1121-0194

PARTIAL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2985-PS
Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

Excerpt from:
Correspondence Respecting South ern Europe.
AUSTRIA

L. German Subversive Activities -Putsch

(Murder of Dollfuss)

R 4127/37/3 No. 13

Herr Hadow an Sir John Simon - (Am 26. Juli, 1934 erhalten)

(Telephonisch)

(No. 89)

(Telegraphisch Offen Wien.

Folgendes ist das Wesentliche der amtlichen Darstellung der gestrigen Vorfaelle, die gestern Abend von den Ministern Schuschnigg und Fey dem diplomatischen Korps muendlich gegeben wurde:

"Der auf elf Uhr vormittags einberufene Ministerrat wurde abgebrochen, weil Major Fey Nachricht erhalten hatte, dass Personen, in Militaer- und Polizei-Uniformen gekleidet, sich in einem Vorort Wiens angesammelt hatten. Das Schutzkorps wurde mobilisiert und die Raete Fey und Karwinski waren im Begriff Schutzmassnahmen vorzubereiten, als ungefaehr 100 Mann, in der Uniform des Deutschmeisterregiments, in fuenf Lastwagen vorfuhren, sich des Bundeskanzleramts bemaechtigten und die drei obengenannten Minister und den Bundessekretaer und den Unterstaatssekretaer fuer das Aeussere, sowie ungefaehr 140 Personen (Bundesbeamten, Polizeidetektive, und Soldaten)gefangen nahmen. Der Bundeskanzler wurde beim Versuch, ueber eine private Treppe zu entkommen, verwundet, indem zweimal aus der Naehe auf ihn gefeuert wurde.

Auf aehnliche Weise wurde zur gleichen Zeit das Rundfunkgebaeude im Zentrum der Stadt von zwanzig uniformierten Maennern ueberwaeltigt und der offizielle Ansager wurde gezwungen, die Nachricht zu uebergeben, dass Dr. Dollfuss zurueckgetreten sei und Dr. Rintelen seine Stelle als Kanzler uebernommen habe. Die Polizei war bald wieder in der Lage, das Rundfunkgebaeude zu besetzen, obwohl die Station infolge wesentlichen Schadens zeitweilig ausser Betrieb war.

Der Rest des Kabinetts, das sich in dem Ministerium der Nationalen Verteidigung versammelt hatte, erhielt Befehl von Praesident Miklas, der heute nach Wien zurueckkehrte, die Bundeskanzlei wieder zu besetzen und die Rebellen nicht anzuerkennen. Die Letzteren zwangen dann den Herrn Major Fey, als Vermittler zu dienen. Infolge der Notwendigkeit, das Leben derjenigen, die gefangen genommen worden waren und denen die Rebellen mit Tod drohten, wenn das Gebaeude angegriffen wuerde, zu retten, ermaechtigte das Kabinett Neustaedter Stuermer, den Rebellen das von ihnen verlangte freie Geleite zur deutschen Grenze anzubieten, "vorausgesetzt, dass die drei Kabinettminister unverletzt uebergeben wurden." Dieses Angebot wurde um 6 Uhr abends in der Oeffentlichkeit gemacht, indem Neustaedter Stuermer unten auf der Strasse und Major Fey, von zwei mit Revolvern bewaffneten Rebellen bewacht, oben auf dem Balkon des Gebaeudes standen. Die Rebellen baten den deutschen Gesandten telephonisch, das Abkommen zu bezeugen und verlangten ein Geleite von regulaeren Truppen bis zur

H1121-0195

Grenze. Sie baten auch darum, dass es ihnen erlaubt sei, Deutschland zu betreten und deutsche Buerger zu werden.

Dann fanden Verhandlungen zwischen dem deutschen Gesandten, Major Fey und Neustaedter Stuermer, und auch privatim zwischen Doktor Rieth und den Rebellen im Gebaeude, statt. Als Resultat wurden die Gefangenen um 7 Uhr abends befreit und die Rebellen wurden, nachdem sie ihre Waffen niedergelgt hatten, unter schwerer Bewachung in die Wiener Kaserne verbracht, wo sie sich noch befinden. Der Kanzler, der den Herrn Major Fey um ungefaehr zwei Uhr nachmittags sah und gebeten hatte, dass kein Blut vergossen werden sollte, hatte leider um 6 Uhr, mangels aerztlicher Hilfe, den letzten Atemzug getan.

In Erwiderung auf eine Anfrage, bezueglich der Gueltigkeit der Garantie fuer freies Geleite, nachdem der Kanzler jetzt verschieden sei, erwiderte Doktor Schuschnigg, dass das Kabinett diesen Punkt noch immer debattierte.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

OF DOCUMENT No. 2985-PS

November, 23, 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/S, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2985-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/S 33812169

H1121-0196

Doc. 2994-PS

H1121-0197

OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
SPO 403, US ARMY

Exhibit U.S.A. 66
Offered Nov. 28, 1945
Objection to admission upheld

Nurnberg, Germany,
19 November, 1945.

A F F I D A V I T

OF
KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG - FORMER CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA

I Kurt von Schuschnigg, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

That, I was Federal Chancellor of Austria from 1 August 1934 until 11 March, 1938; that during my tenure of office as Federal Chancellor of Austria, more particularly on the 11th day of July, 1936, I negotiated with the then existing Government of the German Reich, and with Adolf Hitler, on Agreement, more particularly known as the Agreement of 11 July 1936.

I further depose and say that, prior to the consummation of the aforesaid Agreement, the German Government had placed certain economic barriers against trade between German and Austrian subjects - to wit - the 1,000 mark barrier which said barrier provided that any German citizen who crosses the border of Germany into Austria is obliged to pay to the German Government the sum of 1,000 Reich Marks for the privilege thereof - Austria had been accustomed before this edict of the German Government to receive into Austria some one hundred thousand visitors from Germany annually.

I further state that the aforesaid barrier placed against Austria was extremely injurious to Austrian agriculture and industrialist interest.

As the Federal Chancellor of Austria, I accordingly attempted to reach an assurance from the Government of the German Reich, and more particularly Adolf Hitler, the Chief of the aforesaid Government of Germany, that he, Adolf Hitler, would lift the 1,000 Mark barrier he had levied against Austria and reassure Austria that he had no political designs concerning our State, Austria.

At that time, Franz von Papen, who was the duly constituted representative of Germany in Austria, namely, special Ambassador to Vienna, conducted all negotiations with the Austrian Government for the conclusion of the aforesaid Agreement.

I further depose and say that a draft of the said Agreement was prepared in Vienna, Austria, by the Austrian Government, together with von Papen. That the said draft was carried by von Papen to Germany, and with minor alterations there accepted by Hitler without further formality, by either Hitler or the Austrian Government.

The said Agreement being as follows:

1. "The Reich Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria, in the sense of the Fuehrer and the Reichskanzler's statements of May 21st, 1935". (Germany has neither the intention nor the desire to interfere in internal Austrian affairs, or to carry through an annexation or snschluss of Austria).

2. Internal political matters, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, are regarded by each State as purely the private affair of the other, which it will not seek to influence directly or indirectly.

H1121-0198

3. Austria promises to conduct its general policy, especially vis-a-vis Germany, in accordance with the fact that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State.

I further depose and state that there was secret part of the said treaty, which contained generally the following Agreement:

1. Nazi organizations shall be started on Austrian soil for German subjects, provided they do not try to influence by propaganda Austrian subjects.

2. Recalling that both States belong to the German Cultural Circle they mutually agree to abstain from allowing any aggressive tendencies against the other in broadcasting, film, news or theatrical matters. Restrictions on books were to be gradually removed.

3. Press - Each country obliges itself to influence its Press, including that of the emigres - so that it shall not interfere in internal affairs, and shall restrict its criticism of the other. Austria accepts five national newspapers. The Berliner Börsenzeitung; Berliner Tagblatt; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung; Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten; and the Essener Nationalzeitung.

4. Austria will examine the question of the return of the Austrian Legion.

5. Austria sanctions the use of the Swastika badge and Banner and the singing of the Horst Wessel song, by German subjects in Austria.

6. Provided for the mutual abolition of restriction on tourists visits - abolish the 1,000 mark barrier.

7. Future touristic trade between the two countries.

8. Same as para 3 of the original Agreement above.

9. a. Austria grants an amnesty to all Nazis, except those guilty of grave crimes, including the members of the Austrian Legion, if permitted to return.

b. With the object of encouraging a real appeasement, the Austrian Chancellor declares that he is prepared, at a suitable moment which he intends shall come in the near future, to summon leaders of the so-called "national opposition in Austria" to cooperate in taking political responsibility. The persons concerned shall enjoy the confidence of the Austrian Chancellor, whom he is to select himself. It is hereby agreed that these persons shall be given the task of providing, in accordance with a plan to be drawn up in advance, for the internal satisfaction of the wishes of the National opposition and their cooperation in forming political opinions in Austria."

Notwithstanding the agreement by and between Austria and Germany, consummated on 11 July 1936, Germany continued to support the National Socialist Party in Austria, backing and encouraging the said National Socialist Party then existing in Austria, to create overt acts against the legally constituted Government of Austria, with the design to overthrow the Government of Austria, to wit:

1. The Olympic Torchlight Demonstration during the last days of July 1936, when, at the occasion of the Olympic Games, the Olympic torch passed Vienna on its way from Athens to Berlin, an official celebration was planned, which was to be held on the Vienna Heldenplatz (Heroes' Square - Burg); the Federal President, the Government, and the Diplomatic Corps were to be present, prepared to give official speeches, etc.

The National Socialists - organized at the time into the "Deutscher Turnerbund" (German Athletic League) -- interrupted the celebration with a well-prepared demonstration in favor of the Anschluss (singing of National Socialist songs, giving of the Hitler salute, etc.) which, of course, was particularly embarrassing for the Government in view of the fact that the celebration was broadcast. As was admitted by the German propaganda machine after March 1938, this demonstration was staged with the agreement and participation of Reich German party offices. Its effect was to paralyze the agreements of July 11, 1936, which had been concluded a few weeks previously, and which were unfavorable to the National Socialist illegal party in Austria.

2. Visit of von Neurath to Vienna during February 1937. When Neurath arrived in Vienna, the illegal National Socialist Party staged a large Anschluss demonstration under the leadership of Leopold. Its participants were lined up along the concourse from the Westbahnhof (Western Station) of Vienna to the Hotel Imperial; in the course of this demonstration there were proclamations in favor of Hitler and against Austrian independence and the Austrian government (there were 30,000 National Socialists, according to police reports.)

The German press played up these demonstrations as a "proof of the Austrian desire for Anschluss"; at the same time, it strongly attacked the Austrian Government because it had intervened against the demonstrators.

3. Financing with large sums of money the illegal National Socialist Party in Austria. Large sums of money were diverted to Austria for the purpose of financing the illegal movement. The illegal party functionaries (Gauleiter, etc) were paid by Germany. Leopold, for instance, had a German Mercedes car.

4. Purchasing Agricultural Products by Germany only from proven members of the National Socialist Party in Austria. German buyers of cattle and wood made their transactions dependent upon the membership of the Austrian dealer in the illegal party.

5. Notwithstanding the alleged removal of the 1000 Mark barrier, enacting a further decree that prevented German visitors from taking to Austria more than five Reich Marks. Due to the fact that German tourists were allowed to bring no more than 5 Marks, the German tourist trade continued to be out of the question for Austria.

6. Provocative Behaviour of German Official Visitors to Austria. A visit of German industrialists in Austria under the direction of the Party ("N.S.K.K.") was abused for Anschluss Demonstrations (e.g. in Leoben, Summer 1937).

German motorists in Austria were obliged to display the Swastika flag on their cars, if they did not want to incur persecution by the Gestapo upon their return to the Reich.

Reich German guest speakers in Vienna abused Austrian hospitality in the most flagrant manner (eg. Buerckel, Oberlindober, etc.).

Goering, at the occasion of a return visit of Austrian industrialists in Berlin (1937) openly disseminated Anschluss Propaganda.

7. Use for anti-Austrian Propaganda purposes in the German Newspapers permitted to be published in Austria in accordance with the provisions of the 11 July 1936 agreement - The Essenernationalzeitung, Goering's official newspaper.

The attitude of the German Press with regard to Austria remained unfriendly, and at times became spiteful; it contained repeated mis-statements and attacks against the government.

8. Finally, the most serious violation and disregard for the provisions of the 11 July 1936 agreement was manifested by the discovery of the Tavs Plan, which plan was captured by the Austrian Police at 4 Tienfeldstrasse

H1121-0199

H1121-0200

during the month of November 1937. This plan contained instructions from High Nazi Officials, to wit: the Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party, namely Rudolf Hess, and was as follows:

(1) The overall situation in Germany demonstrates that the time for action has come in Austria. England is occupied with the conflict in the Far East; moreover, she has not yet gotten over the Abyssinia crisis nor the Spanish conflict, which offers a menace to Gibraltar. France is incapable of action due to social conflicts within the country, adverse economic conditions, and the uncertainty of the situation in Spain. Czechoslovakia finds herself in extremely difficult circumstances due to the enormous growth of the Henlein party, the encouragement of the Slovak and Hungarian population occasioned by this growth, and the weakened condition of France. Jugoslavia fears the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria which would revive the old conflict, among Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs; she is willing, therefore, to welcome any solution which liquidates the Hapsburg question once and for all. Italy, finally, has been weakened by Abyssinia and the conflict with Spain to such a degree that she is dependent upon the treaty friendship of Germany and that she will not seriously oppose any action which does not interfere with her direct interests for survival. It is supposed that a strengthened guarantee with regard to the Brenner frontier will suffice to insure Mussolini's neutrality.

(2) It is at this moment that action against Austria will have to be undertaken.

Course to be followed.

(a) For any reason whatever, the details of which will be mentioned later, unrest among National Socialist Party members will break out. This unrest is to provoke the government to employ government forces throughout the country for stringent measures.

(b) The German government, after previously informing her Axis partner, submits an ultimatum is to demand the incorporation of National Socialists into the government and the withdrawal of government forces. In case of a refusal, the German Army would march in.

(c) If the Austrian government accedes to this ultimatum, the incorporation, on a basis of equality, of the illegal party into all government offices, into the Fatherland Front, and professional organizations is to be effected.

(d) It is to be assumed that the government is no more in the position to quelch the unrest in the country.

(e) In this case, the German Army marches into Austria in order to restore order.

KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG

Subscribed to and sworn to before me
this 19th day of November, 1945.

CURTIS L. ILLIANS
Colonel, IGD

H1121-0201

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2994 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Nuernberg, Deutschland
19. November 1945

Zeugenaussage des Kurt von Schuschnigg - frueherer Kanzler

von Oesterreich.

Ich, Kurt von Schuschnigg, erklaere unter Eid, bezeuge und sage folgendes aus:

Ich war Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich vom 1. August 1934 bis 11. Maerz1938

Waehrend meiner Dienstzeit als Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich, besonders am 11. Juni 1936 verhandelte ich mit der damalig bestehenden Regierung Deutschlands ueber eine Vereinbarung welche besser als Uebereinkommen vom 11. Juli 1936 bekannt ist.

Ich bezeuge weiter und sage aus, dass vor dem Abschluss der obengenannten Vereinbarung die deutsche Regierung gewisse oekonomische Schranken gegen den Handel zwischen deutschen und oesterreichischen Staatsangehoerigen, naemlich, den 1.000.- Mark Schranken, errichtete.

Diese Schranke verfuegte, dass jeder Deutsche, der die Grenze von Deutschland nach Oesterreich ueberschreitet, verpflichtet ist der deutschen Regierung die Summe von 1.000.-- Reichsmark fuer dieses Vorrecht zu bezahlen- vor diesem Edikt der deutschen Regierung war Oesterreich gewohnt ungefaehr 100.000 Besucher jaehrlich von Deutschland zu empfangen.

Ich erklaere weiter, dass die obengenannte Sperre, errichtet gegen Oesterreich, bei dessen landwirtschaftlichen und industriellen Interessen sehr schmerzhaft empfunden wurde.

Als Staatskanzler von Oesterreich versuchte ich darum eine Versicherung von der deutschen Regierung, und insbesonders von Adolf Hitler, dem Haupt der vorgenannten deutschen Regierung zu erhalten, dass er die 1.000.-- Mark Sperre, die er gegen Oesterreich errichtet hatte, aufheben und Oesterreich wieder versichern wuerde, dass er keine politischen Absichten bezueglich unseres Staates - Oesterreich - habe.

Zu der Zeit, Franz von Papen, der der rechtlich ernannte Vertreter Deutschlands in Oesterreich, naemlich der besondere Gesandte in Wien war, fuehrte alle Verhandlungen mit der oesterreichischen Regierung fuer den Abschluss der obengenannten Vereinbarung.

Ich bezeuge weiter und sage aus, dass ein Ausdruck der besagten Vereinbarung in Wien, Oesterreich, bei der oesterreichischen Regierung zusammen mit Papen vorbereitet wurde. Dieser besagte Ausdruck wurde bei von Papen nach Deutschland gebracht und mit kleinen Aenderungen dort bei Hitler ohne weitere Formalitaeten angenommen - sowohl bei Hitler als auch bei der oesterreichischen Regierung.

Diese Vereinbarung lautete folgendermassen:

1. Die Reichsregierung anerkennt die volle Unabhaengigkeit des Bundesstaates Oesterreich im Sinne der Erklaerung des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers vom 21. Mai 1935 (Deutschland hat weder die Absicht noch das Begehren sich in die Innenangelegenheiten Oesterreichs einzumengen, noch eine Anektierung oder Anschluss Oesterreichs durchzufuehren).

H1121-0202

2. Innenpolitische Angelegenheiten, inbegriffen die Frage des oesterreichischen Nationalsozialismuses werden bei jedem Staat einfach als Privatangelegenheit des anderen angesehen, die es nicht direkt oder indirekt zu beeinflussen versuchen wuerden.

3. Oesterreich verspricht, dass es seine allgemeine Politik, besonders gegenueber Deutschlands, im Uebereinstimmen mit den Tatsachen fuehren wuerde, dass Oesterreich sich als deutscher Staat bekenne.

Ich bezeuge weiter und sage aus, dass es einen geheimen Teil des erwaehnten Vertrages gab, der im Allgemeinen die folgende Vereinbarung enthaelt:

1. Naziverbaende sollten auf oesterreichischem Boden fuer deutsche Staatsangehoerige ins Leben gerufen werden, vorausgesetzt, dass sie nicht versuchen, Oesterreich durch Propaganda zu beeinflussen.

2. Widerrufend, dass beide Staaten dem deutschen Kulturkreis angehoeren, beide stimmten gegenseitig ueberein, aggresives Verhalten gegen den andern in Rundfunk, Film, Nachrichten oder schauspielerischen Angelegenheiten nicht zu bewilligen. Das Verbot von Buechern sollte nach und nach aufgehoben werden.

3. Presse - jedes Land verpflichtet sich seine eigene und wenn moeglich auch auslaendische Presse zu beeinflussen, sodass sie sich nicht in Innenangelegenheiten einmischen und ihre Kritik ueber den anderen beschraenken. Oesterreich akzeptiert 5 nationale Zeitungen:
Berliner Boersen-Zeitung, Berliner Tageblatt,
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten,
Essener National-Zeitung.

4. Oesterreich genehmigt den Gebrauch der Hakenkreuzbinde und Banner und das Singen des Horst-Wessel-Liedes bei Deutschen in Oesterreich.

5. Oesterreich wuerde die Frage der Rueckkehr der oesterreichischen Legion untersuchen.

6. Voraussichtlich der gegenseitigen Aufhebung von Beschraenkungen im Touristenverkehr - die 1.000.-- Mark Sperre wuerde aufgehoben werden.

7. Zukuenftiger Touristenverkehr zwischen den zwei Staaten.

8. Dasselbe als im Paragraph 3 der obengenannten Orginalvereinbarung.

9a Oesterreich gewaehrt eine Amnestie fuer alle Nationalsozialisten ausser denen, die schwerer Verbrechen schuldig sind, eingeschlossen Mitglieder der oesterreichischen Legion, wann immer diese gestattet ist, zurueckzukehren.

9b Eine wirkliche Befriedigung im Auge, erklaert der oesterreichische Kanzler, dass verbreitet waere in einem guenstigen Moment, den er in der baldigen Zukunft erwarte, die Fuehrer der sogenannten Nationalen Opposition in Oesterreich: zusammenzurufen, um fuer politische Verantwortung zusammenzuarbeiten. Die betreffenden Personen, die er selbst auserwaehlen wuerde, sollen das Vertrauen des oesterreichischen Kanzlers geniessen. Hiermit wird uebereingestimmt, dass diese Personen die Aufgabe erhalten, die fuer die innere Befriedigung der Wuensche der nationalen Opposition und ihre Mitarbeit in der Bildung politischer Meinungen in Oesterreich sorgt und dass nach einem Plan der im vorhinein aufgezogen werden soll.

Deutschland setzte es fort, die Nationalsozialistische Partei in Oesterreich zu unterstuetzen trotz des Abkommens von und zwischen Oesterreich und Deutschland, das am 4. Juli 1936 aufgezogen wurde, unterstuetzend und ermutigend die genannte nationalsozialistische Partei, damals in Existenz in Oesterreich, um oeffentliche Taten gegen die rechtmaessig eingesetzte Regierung Oesterreichs zu instigieren, mit der Absicht, die Oesterreichische Regierung zu stuerzen.

1. Der olympische Fackellauf in den letzten Tagen des Juli 1936 als anlaesslich der olympischen Spiele, die olympische Fackel, auf dem Wege von Athen nach Berlin durch Wien kam, eine offizielle Feier war geplant, die auf dem Wiener-Heldenplatz stattfinden sollte. Der Bundespraesident, die Regierung und das Diplomatische Corps sollte anwesend sein, vorbereitet Ansprachen zu halten etc.

Die Nationalsozialisten - damals im Deutschen Turnerbund organisiert - unterbrachen die Feier mit einer wohl vorbereiteten Demonstration zu Gunsten des Anschlusses (das Singen von nationalsozialistischen Liedern, das Leisten des Hitlergrusses, etc.) , welches natuerlich fuer die Regierung sehr peinlich war, da die Feier ueber den Rundfunk uebertragen wurde. Wie die deutsche Propagandamaschine nach Maerz 1938 zugab, diese Demonstration war mit Beistimmung und Teilnahme von Reichsdeutschen Parteigenossen durchgefuehrt worden. Die Wirkung davon war, das Uebereinkommen vom 11. July 1936 das nur einige Wochen vorher beschlossen wurde und welches fuer die illegale nationalsozialistische Partei in Oesterreich unguenstig war, zu laehmen.

2. Der Besuch von Neurath's in Wien im Februar 1937.
Als Neurath in Wien ankam, veranstaltete die illegale nationalsozialistische Partei unter der Fuehrung Leopolds eine riesige Anschlussdemonstration. Die Teilnehmer standen entlang der Strecke vom Wiener Westbahnhof zum Hotel Imperial. Waehrend dieser Demonstration gab es Proklamationen zu Gunsten Hitlers und gegen oesterreichische Unabhaengigkeit und Regierung (nach Polizeiberichten gab es ungefaehr 30.000 Nationalsozialisten).

Die deutsche Presse legte diese Demonstration als einen Beweis des oesterreichischen Anschlussbegehrens aus; gleichzeitig griff es die oesterreichische Regierung staerkstens an, da dieselbe gegen die Demonstranten eingeschritten war.

3. Die illegale nationalsozialistische Partei mit grossen Summen Geldes zu finanzieren. Grosse Geldsummen wurden nach Oesterreich, fuer die Finanzierung der illegalen Bewegung abgeleitet. Die illegalen Parteifunktionaere (Gauleiter) wurden von Deutschland bezahlt. Leopold zum Beispiel hatte einen deutschen Mercedes.

4. Der Einkauf von landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen nur von bewiesenen Mitgliedern der nationalsozialistischen Partei in Oesterreich. Deutsche Vieh- und Holzkaeufer machten ihre Verhandlungen von der Mitgliedschaft des oesterreichischen Haendlers in der illegalen Partei abhaengig.

5. Trotz der angeblichen Anschaffung der 1.000.-- Mark Sperre, ein weiterer Erlass wurde herausgegeben, der deutsche Besucher hinderte, mehr als 5.-- Reichsmark nach Oesterreich mitzunehmen.

6. Herausforderndes Benehmen von deutschen offiziellen Besuchern nach Oesterreich. Ein Besuch von deutschen Industriellen in Oesterreich unter der Leitung der Partei(NSKK) wurde fuer Anschlussdemonstrationen missbraucht (e. g. in Leoben, Sommer 1937).

Deutsche

H1121-0203

H1121-0204

Deutsche Kraftfahrer waren gezwungen die Hakenkreuzfahne auf ihren Wagen ausgestellt zu haben, falls sie nicht Verfolgungen bei der Gestapo bei ihrer Rueckkehr ins Reich nach sich ziehen wollten.

Reichsdeutsche Gaesteredner in Wien missbrauchten die oesterreichische Gastfreundschaft auf abscheulichste Weise (e.g. Buerkel, Oberlindober)

Bei der Gelegenheit eines solchen Besuches oesterreichischer Industrieller in Berlin (1937) ganz oeffentlich verbreitete Anschlusspropaganda.

7. Gebrauch fuer anti-oesterreichische Propagandazwecke in deutschen Zeitungen die nach den Vorkehrungen des Vertrages vom 11.Juli 1936 gestattet waren in Oesterreich zu erscheinen - die Essener Nationalzeitung, Goerings offizielles Blatt.

Die Einstellung der deutschen Presse gegen Oesterreich blieb unfreundlich, zeitweilig wurde sogar widerspenstig: sie enthielt oefters Falschheiten und Angriffe gegen die Regierung.

8. Endlich die erste Uebertretung und Missachtung fuer die Vorkehrungen der Vereinbarung vom 11. Juli 1936 wurde durch die Entdeckung des Tave Planes, welcher Plan von der oesterreichischen Polizei in der Tienfeldstrasse 4 waehrend des Monates November 1937 gefunden wurde, festgestellt. Dieser Plan enthielt Anweisungen von hohen Parteiangehoerigen : stellv. des Fuehrers der Nazipartei, naemlich , Rudolf Hess und war folgendermassen:

1. Die allgemeine Lage in Deutschland weist darauf hin, dass die Zeit gekommen sei, in Oesterreich zu handeln. England ist mit dem Konflikt im fernen Osten beschaeftigt, ferner ist es weder ueber die Krises in Abessinien, noch dem Konflikt in Spanien, der eine Gefahr fuer Gibraltar darstellt, hinweggekommen. Frankreich ist unfaehig infolge von sozialen Konflikten im eigenen Lande, widrigen oekonomischen Verhaeltnissen und die Unsicherheit in Spanien, zu handeln. Die Tschechoslowakei befindet sich in besondern schwierigen Umstaenden zufolge des enormen Wachstums der Henlein -Partei, der Ermutigung der slowakischen und ungarischen Bevoelkerung, hervorgerufen bei diesem Wachstum und die geschwaechte Lage Frankreichs. Jugoslavien wuerde die Wiedereinsetzung der Habsburger in Oesterreich, was den alten Konflikt zwischen Kroaten, Slowenen und Serben erneuern wuerde; und ist deshalb willig, jede Loesung die die Habsburger Frage ein fuer alle mal liquidiert zu bewillkommen. Italien schliesslich ist durch Abessinien und den Konflikt in Spnien zu so einem Grade geschwaecht dass es von dem Freundschaftsvertrag von Deutschland abhaengig ist und nicht ernstlich daran denken kann, sich irgendwelcher Aktionen, die nicht direkt seinem Ueberlebensinteresse zuwiderstehen, zu widersetzen. Es wird angenommen, dass eine verstaerkte Garantie betreffend der Brennergrenze genuegend sein wird, Musolines Neutralitaet zu versichern.

2. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt muessen Schritte gegen Oesterreich unternommen werden.

Richtlinien.

a) Durch gewisse Gruende, die Einzelheiten welche spaeter genannt werden, Unruhen unter den Mitgliedern der nationalsozialistischen Partei werden ausbrechen. Diese Unruhen sollen die Regierung provozieren Truppen im ganzen Land fuer einschneidende Massnahmen anzuwenden.

b) Die deutsche Regierung, nachdem sich vorher die Achsenpartner benachrichtigt haben, praesendiert ein Ultimatum, welche die Eingliederung von Nationalsozialisten in die Regierung und die Zurueckziehung von Truppen fordert.

H1121-0205

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2994 - PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED

Im Falle einer Weigerung wuerde die deutsche Wehrmacht einmarschieren.

c) Im Falle die oesterreichische Regierung diesem Ultimatum nachkommt, die Eingliederung auf einer Basis der Gleichheit der illegalen Partei in alle Regierungsaemter, in der Vaterlaendischen Front und proffisionellen Organisationen soll in Effekt treten.

d) Man nimmt an, dass die Regierung nicht mehr in der Lage sei, die Unruhen im Land zu unterdruecken.

e) In diesem Falle marschiert die deutsche Wehrmacht in Oesterreich ein um die Ordnung wieder herzustellen.

Kurt von SCHUSCHNIGG

Unterschrieben und geschworen von mir an
diesem 19. Tag des Novembers 1945

CURTIES L. WILLIAMS
Colonel, IGD

CERTIFICAT OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2994 - PS

November 22nd, 1945

We, FRANK G. WOLF B 313 440, MARCEL HOLLANDER B 303 974, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2994 PS.

FRANK G. WOLF
B 313 440

MARCEL HOLLANDER
B 303 974

OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
APO 403, US ARMY

Nurnberg, Germany
19 November, 1945

A F F I D A V I T

I, Kurt von Schuschnigg, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

That at the beginning of the year 1938, Franz von Papen, the then special Ambassador of Germany in Vienna, Austria, mentioned for the first time to me, a precise proposal for me to meet Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Subsequently and following this first proposal made to me by Franz von Papen, we discussed the idea many times before I definitely made up my mind that I would accept an invitation to go to Berchtesgaden. I further state and say, that, during the latter part of January 1938, I informed von Papen that I was prepared to go to Berchtesgaden and discuss the differences and misunderstandings that had arisen regarding the execution of the agreement reached by and between our two Governments on July 11, 1936, providing that if I should go, the following three conditions must be guaranteed by Hitler

1. I must be invited by Hitler.

2. I must prior to going to Berchtesgaden be precisely informed concerning the matters that would be discussed between Hitler and me, and I must be assured that the agreement of July 11, 1936, would be maintained.

3. Hitler must agree with me in advance about the main points of a communique that each of our two nations would publish at the end of our meeting, and, further, that this communique would again reiterate that the full maintenance of the July 11, 1936, Agreement would be observed by each of our two nations.

I further state that von Papen informed me that he would go immediately to Berchtesgaden and discuss with Hitler my demands and convey to me the reply of Hitler concerning them.

I further state that, during the first week of February 1938, von Papen again came to me and declared that he had had a discussion with Hitler at Berchtesgaden concerning my demands as set forth above, and that Hitler had authorized him, von Papen, to say - "Hitler invited you to a meeting at Berchtesgaden to discuss all the disagreements that have arisen as a result of the July 11, 1936, Agreement between our two nations". He further authorizes me to inform you that "the whole of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, between Austria and Germany, will be maintained and once more underlined". In regard to your demand concerning the communique, Hitler agrees to meet your request and further agrees that both parties shall issue simultaneously a communique containing the same text which will again affirm and quote the provisions of the July 11, 1936, Agreement". Von Papen then added, "Hitler further authorizes me to say to you that at any event, the political situation of Austria will in no wise be worse after the conference of Berchtesgaden than it is now". I further state and say that to conclude the talk between von Papen and me, we agreed and my office prepared a preliminary draft of the proposed communique, the final form of said communique to be completed in Berchtesgaden. Von Papen further informed me on that occasion that I would have "an opportunity to conclude a satisfactory agreement with Hitler, which opportunity would perhaps never be presented to me again, for Hitler has his difficulties in his own ranks and is occupied with some ideas in another direction, and he is therefore desirous of having no further troubles with Austria".

H1121-0206

I furthermore state and depose that, on the evening of the 11th of February, 1938, I departed from Vienna accompanied by Secretary of State for Foreign matters, Guido Schmidt, and other members of my staff. During the night of 11 February, 1938, I remained in Salzburg. On the morning of 12 February, 1938, accompanied by Guido Schmidt, I departed from Salzburg for Berchtesgaden, and arrived at the border of Austria and Germany at about ten thirty A.M. According to a former agreement by and between von Papen and my office, I was met at the border by Franz von Papen. Von Papen then and there informed me that I would have a very good speech with the Fuehrer. He further informed me that "the Fuehrer was in a very good mood today!" Von Papen said that the Fuehrer had asked him, von Papen, to inquire of me if I had any objection that by chance some of his, Hitler's, Generals should be present at the Berghof. I inquired of von Papen, who those generals were whom Hitler had present at the Berghof and he, von Papen, replied, Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau. Without further conversation of special interest herein, von Papen and my party arrived at the Berghof.

I furthermore state and affirm that, immediately after arriving at the Berghof, I commenced a conference with Hitler. Hitler and I were alone for two hours. Hitler attacked in a violent manner the politics of Austria, both of the past and present. He furthermore informed me that he, Hitler, had "decided to bring the Austrian question to a solution so-or-so, even if he had to immediately use military force". At no time during the first two hours of our conversation did Hitler ever make any precise demands or requests of me, but spent the whole of the two hours accusing me and menacing me as a traitor to Austrian politics. Especially he informed me that, according to his knowledge, Austria could no longer reckon with any assistance from other European Powers, and that Austria now stood alone in the world. He furthermore added - "Schuschnigg, you now have the chance to put your name alongside the names of other famous German leaders, such as Goering, Hess, Frick, Epp, Goebbels, and others" -

I further state and say that at this point there was a pause, or recess in the conversation and we had lunch. After lunch, I was allowed to confer with my Foreign Secretary, Guido Schmidt, at which time I informed Schmidt of my experience of the morning with Hitler. While I was conferring with Schmidt, he, Schmidt, informed me that he had learned that Dr. Kajetan Muhlmann was present at the Berghof, and was now having a discussion with Hitler.

I furthermore state and affirm that I was next called before Joachim von Ribbentrop with my Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Guido Schmidt, and, in the presence of Franz von Papen, Ribbentrop exhibited to me a typewritten draft containing the conditions and demands made by Hitler upon me and Austria. He furthermore added that Hitler has informed me, Ribbentrop, "that these demands that I now offer to you are the final demands of the Fuehrer and that he, Hitler, is not prepared to further discuss them". He further stated that, "you must accept the whole of these demands herein contained". Ribbentrop then advised me to accept the demands at once. I protested, and referred him to my previous agreements with von Papen, made prior to coming to Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to Ribbentrop that I was not prepared to be confronted with such unreasonable demands as he had then and there placed before me. Von Papen, still present, apologized and informed me that he, von Papen, was entirely surprised and not at all informed about the aims of the Fuehrer as here laid down. He further stated, and informed me, that he, von Papen, could only offer his advice that I should now accede to, and sign, these demands. He furthermore informed me that I could be assured that Hitler would take care that, if I signed these demands and acceded to them, that from that time on Germany would remain loyal to this Agreement and that there would be no further difficulties for Austria.

At this point in the conversation, I was summoned again before Hitler, but before going to him, I requested of my Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Guido Schmidt, that he attempt to reach some amendments of the proposed demands made upon me by Hitler through Ribbentrop - his success was limited to a few unimportant points.

H1121-0207

H1121-0208

I further state and say, that I then went before Hitler again. Hitler was very excited and informed me that he would make a final test with Austria, and stated further: "that you must fulfill the conditions of the demands made by me on you within three days, or else I will order the march into Austria". I replied: "I am not able to take over the obligation to fulfill your demands, for I am only the Chancellor of Austria, and that obligation you attempt to place upon me is the duty only of the Federal President, Miklas, I am only able to sign the draft and, when I arrive in Vienna, to present it to the Federal President". Hitler then flung open the door and yelled "Keitel". At the same time, Hitler asked me to wait outside. Keitel then came in to Hitler. After twenty minutes or more I was again called before Hitler and, when before him, he, Hitler, informed me as follows: "For the first time in my life, I have changed my mind. You must sign the demands that I have made upon you, then report them to the Federal President, Miklas, and within three days from now Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise things will take their natural course". I then agreed to sign the demands and, while waiting in Hitler's private room, he, Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz von Papen, who was also present, "Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that". Papen replied: "Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer".

I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence of Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler, signed the demands, and retained a copy for the Austrian Government.

I further state and affirm that, on the way back to Vienna from Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen accompanied me and my party. Between the Berghof and Berchtesgaden, von Papen informed me as follows: "Now, you have your own impression of how excited the Fuehrer can get, but that happens very seldom, and I am convinced that the next time you meet him, you will have an amicable conversation with him.

_____

KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 19th day of November, 1945,

_____

CURTIS L. WILLIAMS
Colonel, IGD

DOC NO. 2996 PS

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
APO 403, U.S. ARMY

Nurnberg, Germany
19 November, 1945.

A F F I D A V I T

I, Kurt von Schuschnigg, being first duly sworn, depose and say:

That during the first days of March 1938, I was Federal Chancellor of Austria. I then made up my mind that I would hold a plebecite concerning the independence and sovereignty of Austria, according to the provisions of the Agreement reached with Germany at Berchtesgaden, and, further, according to the Austrian Constitution.

On the evening of the 8th of March 1938, I informed Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, the then Minister of Interior and Public Security for Austria (who had been previously appointed to such position in compliance with the demands made on Austria at Berchtesgaden), of my intention to hold such a plebecite. I requested that he, Seyss-Inquart, give me his word of honor that he would keep this information secret until after I had published it, which I intended to do on the evening of March 9, 1938, at Inssbruck. He gave that word of honor. On the evening of the 10th of March, 1938, I had a long conversation with Seyss-Inquart concerning the terms of the plebecite. He first objected to the procedure which I had proposed. However, when we parted on that occasion, Seyss-Inquart expressed his intention to support the plebecite as proposed, and declared to me that there would be no difficulty. He, furthermore, expressed his willingness to broadcast a speech favoring the plebecite, and directed to his National Socialist followers. On the night of the 10th of March, 1938, I retired firmly convinced that the plebecite would be a success for Austria, and that the National Socialists would present no formidable obstacle.

I furthermore state and say - that at 5:30 A.M. on the morning of the 11th of March, 1938, I received a telephone call from Dr. Skubl, President of Police for Austria, and Secretary of State for Public Security matters. Skubl informed me that the Austrian-German border was closed - the railway traffic between Germany and Austria had been stopped and movements of German military forces along the Austrian-German border had been reported. I hurried to my office. This news that I had received from Dr. Skubl was confirmed by the Counsel General of Munich, who stated that the German Army Corps of Munich was mobilized, and that Panzer troops were moving toward the Austrian frontier. Dr. Skubl then informed me that the Press Prosecutor for Austria had, on the morning of the 11th of March, 1938, censored an article written by Dr. Hugo Jury, an intimate friend of Seyss-Inquart, which article attached violently the proposed plebecite.

I further state and say that I attempted to contact Seyss-Inquart, my Minister for Interior and Security, at once, but every effort to locate him failed, until after 10 o'clock the same morning. Sometime after 10 o'clock, Seyss-Inquart, accompanied by Glaise-Horstenau, Minister without portfolio, appeared in my office.

H1121-0209

H1121-0210

Seyss-Inquart informed me as follows: "I have just come from the airport, where I have met Glaise-Horstenau. Glaise-Horstenau has just now returned from Germany". Glaise-Hortenau then informed me that he had the night before seen Hitler, and that he, Hitler, was very highly excited and in a rage concerning my proposal to hold the plebecite. It is my feeling too, that you should not have done such a thing, it is a big mistake" - Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and, upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held in hind hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The contents as he read it to me was as follows: "The Chancellor must revoke the proposed plebecite within the time of one hour, and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to carry out a plebecite concerning the Anschluss according to the SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the Austrian frontier".

I further state and say that after informing the Federal President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided to recall the Plebecite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions.

Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he, Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further, as follows:

"I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows:

"The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief of the Austrian Government, if Seyss-Inquart does not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will suppose that you are hindered from doing so"."

I then reported to the Federal President the new developments, and, after some conversation with him and other members of the Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 PM on the afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor - he therefore asked me to continue my duties as the Take Care Chancellor until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor. I accepted and remained as "Take Care Chancellor" from 3:30 PM 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 PM the same night, when Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal Chancellor.

I further state and say that at about 3:30 PM on the afternoon of 11 March, 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German Government. The Military Attaché of Germany in Vienna, one, Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums that had previously been delivered to us by

H1121-0211

Seyss-Inquart.

I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at about 7:30 or 8:00 o'clock PM on the night of 11 March 1938 ordered me, as Take Care Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to protect against the demands made on Austria during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of Germany through superior force.

Previously to the above incident, I had been informed that Engineer Keppler had on the afternoon of the 11th of March 1938 arrived in Vienna from Berlin. That, he had set up an office in the Austrian Chancery without my consent or the consent of the Austrian of the Austrian Government. While seeking my Secretary of State, and Police President I went into the office occupied by Keppler, and Keppler made the following remark to me:

"You see that if you would have followed my advise that I gave to you a week ago, you would have had an entirely different situation. Do you have now any personal wishes".

I further state and say that at about 10:00 o'clock PM on the night of March 11, 1938, Seyss-Inquart entered the room where I was having a conversation with the Federal President, and informed us as follows:

"Just now, Goering called me by telephone and said: "You, Seyss-Inquart, must send me a telegram asking for German military assistance owing to the fact that the communists and others in Austria have caused great riots-there is great bloodshed in the Austrian cities and the Austrian Government is no longer able to maintain order with her own forces".

I further state and say it was after eleven o'clock PM on the night of 11 March 1938 that the Federal President Miklas, made up his mind to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor of Austria and sometime between eleven o'clock PM and midnight on the night of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart was appointed by the Federal President of Austria as Chancellor Austria but not before.

I furthermore state and say that I departed the Chancery building of Austria at midnight on the 11th of March 1938, and at that time the building was guarded by SS troops, I returned to my home. Upon awakening the morning of the 12th of March 1938 I found the door of my home blocked and guarded by large numbers of armed SA men. From the date last mentioned until 4 May 1945, I was a prisoner of the German Reich, under continuous guard.

Further the affiant sayeth not.

KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

Subscribed to and sworn to before me
this 19th day of November, 1945.

CURTIS L. WILLIAMS
Colonel, IGD

H1121-0212

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2996-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Nuernberg, Deutschland
19. November 1945

Z e u g e n a u s s a g e.

Ich, Kurt von SCHUSCHNIGG, bezeuge unter Eid und sage aus:

Dass ich waehrend der ersten Tage des Maerz 1938 Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich war. Ich entschloss mich damals, eine Volksabstimmung betreffs der Unabhaengigkeit und Souveraenitaet Oesterreichs abzuhalten laut den Bestimmungen des mit Deutschland in Berchtesgaden gemachten Abkommens, und weiter, gemaess der oesterreichischen Landesverfassung.

Am Abend des 8. Maerz 1938 teilte ich Dr. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART, dem damaligen Minister des Inneren und der oeffentlichen Sicherheit Oesterreichs (welcher zuvor zu diesem Posten ernannt wurde entsprechend den in Berchtesgaden an Oesterreich gestellten Forderungen) meine Absicht mit, solche Volksabstimmung abzuhalten. Ich bat ihn, Seyss-Inquart, mir sein Ehrenwort zu geben, dass er diese Mitteilung geheim halten wuerde bis nachdem ich sie veroeffentlicht habe, was ich am Abend des 9. Maerz 1938 in Innsbruck zu tun beabsichtigte. Er gab mir dieses Ehrenwort. Am Abend des 10. Maerz 1938 hatte ich eine lange Besprechung mit Seyss-Inquart betreffs der Bedingungen fuer die Volksabstimmung. Zuerst war er gegen das von mir vorgeschlagene Verfahren. Jedoch, als wir bei dieser Gelegenheit auseinandergingen, drueckte Seyss-Inquart seine Absicht aus, die Volksabstimmung wie vorgeschlagen zu unterstuetzen und er erklaerte mir, es werde keine Schwierigkeiten geben. Ueberdies erklaerte er sich bereitwillig, eine Rede zu Gunsten der Volksabstimmung ueber den Rundfunk an seine nationalsozialistischen Nachfolger zu richten. In der Nacht des 10. Maerz 1938 legte ich mich zur Ruhe, fest davon ueberzeugt, dass die Volksabstimmung ein Erfolg fuer Oesterreich sein werde und dass die Nationalsozialisten kein bedenkliches Hindernis bilden wuerden.

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, dass ich um 5,30 A.M., am Morgen des 11. Maerz 1938 von Dr. Skubl, Polizeipraesident von Oesterreich und Staatssekretaer fuer oeffentliche Sicherheitsangelegenheiten einen Ruf am Fernsprecher empfing. Skubl teilte mir mit, dass die deutsch-oesterreichische Grenze geschlossen sei, - der Eisenbahnverkehr zwischen Deutschland und Oesterreich hatte aufgehoert und es seien deutsche Truppenbewegungen entlang der deutsch-oesterreichischen Grenze gemeldet worden. Ich eilte auf mein Buero. Die Neuigkeiten, die ich von Dr. Skubl erhalten hatte, wurden vom General-Konsul in Muenchen bestaetigt, welcher erklaerte, dass das deutsche Armee-Corps in Muenchen mobil gemacht worden war und dass Panzertruppen sich der oesterreichischen Grenze zu bewegten. Dr. Skubl teilte mir dann mit, dass der Anwalt fuer die Presse Oesterreichs am Morgen des 11. Maerz 1938 einen von Dr. Jugo Jury, einem intimen Freund Seyss-Inquarts, geschriebenen Artikel zensiert hatte, welcher Artikel die vorgeschlagene Volksabstimmung gewaltig angriff.

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, dass ich versuchte, sofort mit Seyss-Inquart, meinem Minister des Innern und der Sicherheit, in Verbindung zu treten, aber jede Muehe, ihn zu finden, war umsonst bis nach 10 Uhr desselben Vormittags. Etwas nach 10 Uhr erschien Seyss-Inquart, begleitet von Glaise-Horstenau, Minister ohne Portefeuille, in meinem Buero. Seyss-Inquart teilte mir folgendes mit: "Ich komme soeben vom Flughafen, wo ich Glaise-Horstenau getroffen habe. Glaise-Horstenau ist eben aus Deutschland zurueckgekehrt." Dann teilte mir Glaise-Horstenau

H1121-0213

mit, dass er nachts zuvor Hitler gesehen habe und dass er, Hitler, hoechst aufgeregt und wuetend war ueber meinen Vorschlag, die Volksabstimmung abzuhalten. "Es ist auch mein Gefuehl, dass Sie solche Sache nicht haetten tun sollen, - es ist ein grosser Fehler." - Gerade dann wurde Seyss-Inquart an den Fernsprecher gerufen und nach seiner Rueckkehr las er mir von einem Fetzen Papier, welchen er in der Hinterhand hielt, den Inhalt eines Ferngespraeches, das er angeblich eben von Goering aus Berlin empfangen hatte, vor. Der Inhalt, wie er ihn mir vorlas, war wie folgt: "Der Kanzler muss die vorgeschlagene Volksabstimmung innerhalb einer Stunde abberufen und nach 3 oder 4 Wochen muss Oesterreich sich verpflichten, eine Volksabstimmung bezueglich des Anschlusses gemaess dem Saar-Status abzuhalten, andernfalls hat die deutsche Armee den Befehl, die oesterreichische Grenze zu ueberschreiten.

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, dass, nachdem der Bundespraesident mit dieser Forderung Deutschlands an Oesterreich bekannt gemacht worden war, wir uns entschieden, die Volksabstimmung zu widerrufen, worauf ich Seyss-Inquart und Glaise-Horstenau diese Absicht mitteilte. Seyss-Inquart sagte, er werde zum Fernsprecher gehen und Goering in Berlin den um diese Zeit gefassten Entschluss Oesterreichs mitteilen. In wenigen Minuten kam er, Seyss-Inquart, in mein Buero zurueck und erklaerte mir weiter wie folgt:

"Ich habe ein Ferngespraech mit Goering gehabt und Goering hat mir befohlen, dem Bundeskanzler Schuschnigg folgendes mitzuteilen: Die Sachlage kann nur noch fuer Oesterreich gerettet werden, wenn Schuschnigg als Kanzler Oesterreichs innerhalb 2 Stunden zurueecktritt und Seyss-Inquart zum neuen Chef der oesterreichischen Regierung ernannt wird. Wenn Seyss-Inquart mir, Goering, innerhalb 2 Stunden nicht berichtet, werde ich, Goering, annehmen, dass sie verhindert waeren, es zu tun."

Daraufhin berichtete ich dem Bundes-Praesidenten die neuen Entwicklungen und nach einiger Rueecksprache mit ihm und anderen Mitgliedern der Regierung entschloss ich mich, zurueckzutreten. Der Bundes-Praesident nahm meinen Ruecktritt um 3.30 P.M. am Nachmittag des 11. Maerz 1938 nur ungern an. Er selbst war nicht willig, Seyss-Inquart zum Bundeskanzler zu ernennen, weshalb er mich ersuchte, mit meinen Pflichten fortzufahren als provisorischer Kanzler, bis er sich entschliessen konnte, wer mir als Bundeskanzler nachfolgen sollte. Ich sagte zu und blieb als provisorischer Kanzler von 3.30 P.M. 11. Maerz 1938 bis ungefaehr 11.30 P.M., die selbe Nacht, in der Seyss-Inquart zum Bundeskanzler ernannt wurde.

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, dass um 3.30 P.M. am Nachmittag des 11.Maerz 1938 das Auswaertige Amt der oesterreichischen Regierung sich mit der deutschen Botschaft in Wien ins Benehmen setzte um festzustellen, obdie von Goering dort und dann an Oesterreich gestellten Forderungen, die offiziellen Forderungen der deutschen Regierung seien. Der deutsche Militaer-Attache in Wien, ein Generalleutnant Muff, kam zum Bundespraesidenten und wiederholte den Inhalt des deutschen Ultimatums, welches schon zuvor durch Seyss-Inquart an uns abgeliefert worden war.

Ich statuiere ferner und sage aus, dass der Bundespraesident ungefaehr um 7.30 oder 8.00 P.M. in der Nacht des 11. Maerz 1938 mir, als provisorischem Kanzler, befahl, die Ereignisse des Tages durch Rundfunk bekanntzumache n und gegen die im Laufe des Tages von Deutschland an Oesterreich gestellten Forderungen zu protestieren. Ueberdies der Welt mitzuteilen, dass Oesterreich durch ueberlegene Gewalt gezwungen worden war, den deutschen Forderungen nachzugeben.

H1121-0214

Vor dem obigen Zwischenfall hatte man mir mitgeteilt, dass Ingenieur Keppler am Nachmittag des 11. Maerz 1938 von Berlin in Wien angekommen war; dass er, ohne meine Genehmigung oder die Genehmigung der Oesterreichischen Regierung, ein Buero in der oesterreichischen Staatskanzlei eingerichtet hatte. Auf der Suche nach meinem Staatssekretaer und Polizeipraesidenten ging ich in das Buero welches Keppler besetzt hatte und Keppler machte die folgenden Bemerkungen zu mir:

"Sehen Sie, wenn Sie meinen, Ihnen vor einer Woche gegebenen Rat befolgt haetten, dann wuerden Sie eine ganz andere Sachlage gehabt haben. Haben Sie jetzt noch persoenliche Wuensche ?"

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, dass ungefaehr um 10.00 P.M. in der Nacht vom 11. Maerz 1938 Seyss-Inquart in das Zimmer trat, in welchem ich mit dem Bundespraesidenten ein Gespraech fuehrte, und uns was folgt mitteilte:

"Jetzt eben hat Goering mich durch Fernsprecher gerufen und gesagt: Sie, Seyss-Inquart, muessen mir ein Telegramm senden und um deutsche militaerische Hilfe ersuchen zufolge den Tatsachen, dass Kommunisten und andere in Oesterreich grossen Aufruhr versucht haben, es gibt grosses Blutvergiessen in den oesterreichischen Staedten und die oesterreichische Regierung ist nicht laenger im Stande, mit eigenen Kraeften die Ordnung aufrecht zu erhalten."

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, es war nach 11.00 PM. in der Nacht vom 11. Maerz 1938, als Bundespraesident Niklas sich dazu entschloss, Seyss-Inquart zum Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich zu ernennen und zu einem Zeitpunkt zwischen 11.00 PM und Mitternacht in der Nacht vom 11.Maerz 1938 wurde Seyss-Inquart vom Bundespraesidenten Oesterreichs zum Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich ernannt, aber nicht vorher.

Ich statuiere weiter und sage aus, dass ich das Staatskanzleigebaeude Oesterreichs um Mitternacht am 11. Maerz 1938 verliess und um diese Zeit das Gebaeude von SS-Truppen bewacht war, - ich kehrte nachhause zurueck. Beim Erw achen morgens am 12. Maerz 1938 fand ich die Haustuere versperrt und von einer grossen Anzahl von bewaffneten SA-Maennern bewacht. Von dem zuletzt genannten Datum bis zum 4. Mai 1945 war ich Gefangener des deutschen Reiches und unter staendiger Bewachung.

Weiter geht die Zeugenaussage nicht.

Kurt von Schuschnigg

Unterzeichnet und geschworen
vor mir an diesem 19.Tag des November 1945

Curtiss L. Williams
Colonel, IGD

H1121-0215

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2996-PS

I, ELISABETH M. REDELSTEIN, X 046289, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2996-PS.

ELISABETH M. REDELSTEIN
X 046289

H1121-0216

NOTE FROM SIR NEVILE HENDERSON TO VON NEURATH

11TH MARCH 1938.

Dear Reich Minister,

My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.

I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.

As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is bound to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.

Yours sincerely,

for the Ambassador

I.A.KIRKPATRICK

3045 PS

H1121-0217

T.C.22.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL STATE OF AUSTRIA, JULY 11th, 1936.

Enclosure 1 in No. 147.

Translation of Official Communiqué broadcast from Vienna on July 11, 1936.

IT is officially announced : In the conviction that they are making a valuable contribution towards the whole European development in the direction of maintaining peace and in the belief that they are thereby best serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the Governments of the Federal State of Austria and of Germany have resolved to give their relations once more a normal and friendly form. In this connexion it is declared—

1. The German Government recognises the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st May, 1935.
2. Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian national socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.
3. The Austrian Federal Government will conduct its policy in general and in particular towards Germany always on that fundamental line corresponding to the fact that Austria regards herself as a German State.

In this respect neither the Rome protocols of 1934 and their additions of 1936, nor the relationship of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected. Considering that the *détente* desired by both sides can only become really effectual if certain preliminary stipulations on the part of the Governments of both countries are carried out, the Austrian Federal Government and the German Government will pass a number of particular measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state of affairs.

T.C.47
H1121-0218

[R 2665/137/3] No. 87.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 241.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Berlin telegram No. 100, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a proclamation of the Führer on the 12th March, 1938, respecting Austria.

Berlin, March 12, 1938.

Enclosure in No. 87.

(Translation.)

Proclamation of the Führer which was Broadcast to-day at Midday by Dr. Goebbels from all German and Austrian Stations.

Germans!

FOR years we have observed with deep sorrow the fate of our comrades in Austria.

An eternal, historical connexion, which was first broken in the year 1866 but in the world war received a new seal, has joined Austria since earliest times to the fate and community of the German people. The wrong which has been done to Austria, first from without and then from within, we have felt as though it were our own; just as we know that the misfortunes of the Reich have been to the millions of German Austrians the cause of similar anxiety and sympathy.

When in Germany the nation, thanks to the victory of the National Socialist idea, again discovered the path to the proud self-consciousness of a great people, in Austria a new period of suffering and bitter hardship began. A régime which lacked all legal authority attempted to maintain, by the most brutal methods of terror, of physical and economic repression and oppression, an existence which was rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people. Thus, we, a great people, were forced to stand by while more than 6 million men and women

H1121-0219

of similar origin as ourselves were oppressed by a numerically small minority simply because they had managed to obtain possession of the necessary organs of power.

The deprivation and gagging of political rights was accompanied by a deterioration in the economic sphere which was in frightful contrast to the blossoming of new life in Germany.

Who could find fault with our unfortunate comrades for casting longing looks in the direction of the Reich—in the direction of that Germany with whom their forefathers had been allied through so many centuries, with whom they had fought shoulder to shoulder in the greatest war of all times, whose culture was their culture, to which they themselves in many fields had made such valuable contributions? To suppress such sentiments was nothing less than to condemn hundreds of thousands of men and women to the most profound spiritual anguish.

But even though this wrong was patiently borne for many years, yet a time came when, with the increasing respect in which the Reich was held, the will to cast off this oppression became ever more vehement.

Germans! I have attempted in the last years to warn the late authorities in Austria of the danger of their ways. Only a madman could believe it possible to suppress indefinitely by methods of terrorism a people's love for the principles of its origin. European history has shown that in such cases only a greater fanaticism is bred. This fanaticism then compels the oppressor to adopt ever harsher methods of suppression, which only increase the hatred and the horror of those affected.

I have also tried to convince the responsible authorities that it would be impossible, because unworthy, for a great nation to continue to see kindred men and women oppressed, persecuted and imprisoned only on account of their origin or their avowal thereof or because of their devotion to an idea. Over 40,000 fugitives have fled to Germany alone, 10,000 others in this small country have passed through the prisons, dungeons and concentration camps, hundreds of thousands have been reduced to beggary and impoverished. No nation could continue to tolerate such incidents on its borders without deserving the contempt of the world.

I attempted in 1936 to find a way which might offer the prospect of alleviating the tragic fate of this German brother country in order thus to reach a real reconciliation. Hardly, however, was the agreement of the 11th July signed before again being broken. The suppression of the rights of the overwhelming majority remained, their unworthy position as pariahs in the country was not altered. Those who openly avowed their German origin were persecuted, irrespective of whether they were National Socialist crossing-sweepers or illustrious commanders in the Great War.

I then tried a second time to effect an understanding. I made efforts, I the appointed Führer of the German people, I made efforts to convince the representative of this régime, though he had no authorised mandate from his people, that this state of affairs could not possibly last since the increasing indignation of the Austrian people could not be for ever held down with increasing force, and that from a given moment it would also be intolerable for the Reich to look on at such oppression unprotesting.

For, if to-day the solution of the colonial problem is made dependent on questions of self-determination on the part of the lower types of humanity concerned, it is all the more intolerable that 6½ million members of a great and ancient cultural people should by reason of the nature of its régime in practice be deprived of such rights.

I therefore wished in a new agreement to effect that in this country all Germans should be subject to the same rights and to the same obligations. This arrangement was to be a complement to the treaty of the 11th July, 1936.

A few weeks later we had, however, regretfully to note that the members of the late Austrian Government did not propose to carry out the spirit of this agreement. In order, however, to manufacture an alibi for their continued refusal of equal rights to the Austrian Germans, a plebiscite was devised with the object of irrevocably depriving the majority in this country of their rights. The modalities of this procedure were to be unique. A country which for many years had had no election at all, which lacked all data for determining those eligible to vote, prescribes an election which was to take place within a bare three and a half days!

T.C. 47

There are no election lists, no election cards. There is no investigation of the eligibility of voters, no obligation of secrecy, no guarantee for the impartial conduct of the ballot, no security as regards the counting of votes, &c. If these are the methods to give a régime the character of legality, then we National Socialists in the German Reich were nothing but fools for fifteen years! We went through hundreds of elections in order to obtain painfully the approval of the German people.

When the late Reichspräsident finally called me to office I was the leader of by far the strongest party in the Reich. Since then I have always attempted to have the legality of my position and of my actions confirmed by the German people, and they have been confirmed. But if Herr Schuschnigg's methods are the right ones, then the plebiscite in the Saargebiet was merely the chicanery of a people whose return to the Reich it was wished to make more difficult.

But we here think otherwise! I think we may all be proud of the fact that even on the occasion of the voting in the Saar territory we obtained the confidence of the German people in so irreproachable a manner.

The German people in Austria have at last risen against this unique attempt to hold a falsified election. If, however, the régime had intended this time to suppress the movement of protest by force, then the event could only have led to a further civil war. But the German people from now on does not allow Germans to be persecuted in this territory because of their belonging to our nation or because of their avowal of certain convictions. It insists on peace and order!

I have therefore decided to place the help of the Reich at the disposal of the millions of Germans in Austria. Since this morning the soldiers of the German armed forces have been marching across all the German-Austrian frontiers! Mechanised troops, infantry divisions and S.S. troops on the ground and squadrons of German aeroplanes in the blue heavens—summoned by the new National Socialist régime itself in Vienna—will be a guarantee that the Austrian people will at last in the near future have the opportunity, by means of a real plebiscite, to decide for itself its future destiny. Behind these troops stand the will and the determination of the whole German nation.

I myself, as leader and Chancellor of the German people, will be happy once more as a German and free citizen to visit again that country, which is also my home. But the world may rest assured that the German people in Austria in these days are living hours of deepest joy and exultation.

They see in the brothers hastening to their help the saviours from their deepest need. Long live the National Socialist German Reich! Long live National Socialist Austria!

March 12, 1938.

[R 2695/137/3] No. 88.

The Earl of Perth to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 54. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Rome, March* 13, 1938.

MY telegram No. 144.

Following is translation of text of Herr Hitler's letter to Signor Mussolini about events in Austria:—

" Your Excellency, *Berlin, March* 11, 1938.

" In an hour fraught with destiny I address myself to your Excellency to inform you of a decision which seems imposed by circumstances and which is henceforth irrevocable.

" For years the Germans of Austria have been outraged and maltreated by a régime devoid of any legal basis. There has been no limit to the sufferings of numberless tormented people.

" Germany alone has received up to date more than 40,000 fugitives who were obliged to abandon their country, although the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Austria fully shares their ideology and their political sentiments.

" In order to remove a tension which was becoming ever more unbearable I decided to make a last attempt with Herr Schuschnigg to reach an agreement for establishing in a final manner the complete equality of all before the law.

H1121-0220